INTERNATIONAL

JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

JANUARY, 1898.

THE ETHICAL BASIS OF COLLECTIVISM.

THE Socialistic creed, as has been pointed out in one of the ablest expositions of its ethical tendency, has been subject like other creeds to the law of evolution. Both in its economic, its historical, and its ethical doctrine it has shown developments which to the hostile critic are mere proofs of internal disruption or perhaps insincerity, while to the more sympathetic they are rather signs of a healthy vitality. We are not here concerned with the systematic exposition of this development, but rather with an attempt to appreciate the phase at present reached. A brief reference, however, to some more primitive forms of Socialistic theory will help by way of comparison.

In its primitive form Socialism appears as a development of the Rousseauite principle of equality, and as such received its most scientific exposition in the Marxian doctrine of surplus value. The value of a commodity being measured, on this theory, by the quantity of labor required to produce it, it followed that all wealth was due to the laborer. But of the wealth that he produced the laborer only received a small proportion; in fact, in accordance with Ricardo's "iron law," which the Marxians accepted, only just enough to keep him alive and enable him to replenish the laboring population. The margin by which his actual product exceeded this "subsistence minimum" was wrongfully absorbed by the

capitalist and landlord, who had done nothing to bring it into existence. This exploitation of the laborer by the absorption of the surplus value of his industry was the inherent injustice of the capitalist *régime*. Now it is easy to riddle the economics of this theory with criticism. Value is not measured by labor alone. Between laborers there are qualitative as well as quantitative differences. The function of the captain of industry must be recognized as wholly distinct from that of the capitalist, and capital itself cannot justly be considered as contributing nothing to the production of wealth. But with all this destructive criticism it is easy to overlook the elements of truth contained in Marx's teaching. Marx lays down a certain ideal of abstract justice, which, like other abstract ideals, cannot be properly understood while it remains abstract, but nevertheless has its place in any true and comprehensive conception of social progress. The prevalent intellectual tendency of our time is to distrust abstract arguments. It is a tendency which has been growing for nearly a hundred years, and is in the main a natural enough reaction against the methods of the eighteenth century, while in England it appeals with especial force to the national dislike of anything which savors of theory or logic. But it is time to recognize that in its present form this tendency plays directly into the hands of political inertia. The upholder of things as they are does not require an ideal, because he does not need to be constructive. He has only to sit still and challenge the world to move him. At the present day he professes but little faith even in the past. He does not seriously believe in monarchy or aristocracy, or established churches, or anything but the security of his dividends. As long as he can rebut attack, his position is intellectually secure, and on the whole he finds his best weapon of defence in the cultivated and good-humored scepticism of which Mr. Balfour is the natural representative. Only let reason and logic be weak enough and the established fact will remain standing by mere force of inertia. Let us then weaken reason; let us prove that proof is non-existent; that there is no ideal beyond the actual, and that the laws of right and

wrong have no validity except as expressions of the existing order. Now, when the reformer admits these positions, as under the influence of the historical method and the spirit of relativity he has become prone to do, he is simply allowing his teeth to be drawn. An ideal is as necessary to the reformer as the established fact is to the conservative. Unless he knows precisely where he is going and what he expects to find when he gets there, he is a ship without steam and without rudder. A progressive movement, in short, must have an ideal, and an ethical ideal for the future must be in so far abstract as it is not yet realized and embodied in social institutions.

Furthermore, an ethical ideal cannot be based merely on existing tendencies. The existing tendency can take care of itself, and those Socialists make a very great blunder who base their position upon a fatalistic interpretation of history. If Socialism is coming of itself, why should any one incur the obloquy of calling himself a Socialist, or put himself to any trouble in securing the advent of the inevitable? Undoubtedly any sane theory of progress must take existing tendencies into account; but, so far from being dominated by these tendencies, it will seek to use them for its own purposes. There is not one tendency at work in society but many, and no one can say which of them is dominant until after the event. But any one who cares can say which he wishes to prevail, which tendencies or what elements in any given tendency seem to him to make for good and which for evil, and can shape his practical course accordingly. The true attitude of the ideal to the actual is that of a selective agency working like natural selection in the organic world upon such materials as come to hand, fostering what there is of good in each direction, and so framing a plan of action which is neither dominated by the facts nor removed from all contact with them, but is rather the expression of such possibilities of improvement as we find in the actual condition of things.

Of these actual conditions, one permanent constituent, it is apt to be forgotten, is the moral consciousness of men. The

conceptions of justice, equality, liberty, or humanity have been forces to be reckoned with in the last one hundred years of European history. And we can go a step further. These conceptions represent certain sides or aspects of the moral consciousness of mankind; and if that moral consciousness has any sort of validity, it must be capable of constituting a harmonious ethical order in which all its claims find satisfaction. When treated in isolation, indeed, the principles of justice and benevolence, or liberty and authority, or any others that we like to take, are apt, as moralists know, to harden themselves into exclusive and often partially incompatible rules. The more philosophic view being necessarily an attempt to harmonize is bound to wear something of a destructive aspect. It rubs off the corners of hard crystallizations of moral thought, and reduces all "absolute" rights and duties to a proper subserviency to some more general conception around which the whole of the moral consciousness may be taken to centre. Thus all the so-called natural rights may be shown to be relative to and limited by considerations of social welfare. But it is a mistake to pause here as though the task of philosophy were complete, when in fact it has only just begun. For the real problem is to find the place which each right and each duty recognized by the plain man would take in the system of rights and duties of which it is to be a part. It is not enough to say that the right of equality, the right to live and work, the prescriptive right of property are to be judged and measured by what is good for society as a whole. We want to know what place these rights would have in a sound conception of social welfare as attainable in Western Europe in the twentieth century, and, without pretending to any complete solution, I think we can say this much: that no conception of social welfare can be final in which these spontaneous, deep-lying, and constantly recurring claims of the moral consciousness do not find a legitimate satisfaction. We cannot make the principle of liberty or that of equality the sole touchstone by which an existing or an ideal scheme of society can be tested, but in Western Europe a society which wholly ignores either of them is doomed to failure.

The problem is to find a synthesis in which these and other such conceptions can live at peace with one another, being, as Aristotle would say, neither in excess nor in defect, but in that mean which is the good or rather the best. We conclude that in any true conception of social welfare those "abstract" ideas of rights and duties which faithfully formulate real though one-sided claims of the moral consciousness must, with whatever modifications, find legitimate scope and satisfaction.

It is thus with the abstract justice of the Marxian Socialism. The doctrine that the products of industry should belong to the producers contains a truth which should not be overlooked merely because we have discovered that it is not the whole truth. In the same way the doctrines of surplus value is, as as Marx stated it, an incorrect analysis of the facts, but it contains elements which a true and complete doctrine must embrace. It remains true that wealth does not go to its producers alone, but in large measure to non-productive classes, and that this is in part the reason why the immense development of our material resources has done so little to remove poverty from among us. And it follows that the institution of inherited property, enabling its owners to draw rent and interest not earned by their own exertions, must necessarily be called in question in any attempt to remodel the industrial system upon principles of equity.

But abstract justice is not the only thing to be considered. Equality is not the sole aim and object of society, though in some form or other it is a necessary element in any ethical ideal, since it stands for the truth that there is a common humanity deeper than all our superficial distinctions. But to model our political principles on this idea alone is just like modelling them on liberty alone, or on authority alone, or on prescription alone. The result is hopelessly one-sided, and the dreariness of the mechanical schemes of Socialism which from time to time appear may be taken as indicating the necessary failure of the abstract method. It is a trite charge against the Socialist that he would merely reduce all mankind to a dead level of mediocrity, and, as applying to a

system based on equality and nothing else, the accusation must be allowed some weight. An equality pursued as the sole end of government would be as dead as any other social ideal when isolated from the complementary conceptions of the social order. Equality is good in the sense that without it social and political life are poor things, not in the sense that social and political life exist only to secure it to the exclusion of every other consideration.

What we may call the fallacy of the abstract ideal is pushed to its furthest and most repulsive point when the economic mechanism of the Socialist theory is made into the ultimate end and object of the whole movement. This is done not only by critics, but by supporters of Socialism, and from both points of view is one of the gravest dangers of the situation. It is no doubt a necessary piece of mechanism that the functions of government should be in some degree extended, and in view of the Individualist theories which still linger on Socialists are often forced to contend for the abstract right to extend them to fields which they do not at present cover. Hence a temptation to hail any and every extension of State authority, whatever its principle or its object as a triumph for Socialism. Even the Agricultural Rating Act is hailed by the incautious or the paradoxically inclined as marking a step onward in the march of Collectivist ideas, and a measure designed to assist the clergy in maintaining an undivided authority over the administration of public funds is hailed as at least a blow to *laissez faire* Liberalism. This is *propter vitam vivendi perdere causas*, for the sake of Socialism to lose all hold of the reasons which make us Socialists. Nothing could be more threatening to the best hopes of human progress than an increase of the powers of government associated with a lowering of its principles. Neither a diminished nor an increased regimentation is an end in itself. Either may be good or bad according as the government in question is or is not likely to make a good use of its powers. And in point of historical fact this probability has decided the attitude of democratic reformers. As long as the government represented a narrow and reactionary class, its action in economic matters was naturally

opposed to the popular interest—witness Protection and the Combination Laws. The popular party was naturally in permanent opposition, and sought reasonably enough to curtail and restrict an authority which they could not hope to control. When the basis of government was changed and the legislature became responsible to the people as a whole, the consistent democrat modified his position. He is no longer in permanent opposition, but sees in the central authority a machine which he may hope to control in the interest of the public. Hence for the democrat the old *laissez faire* position is no longer logically tenable. But there is no need to run into the opposite extreme and applaud the running of the machine merely because it is a machine and is being run. Some Socialists, it would seem, have yet to learn that their synthesis must include all the elements of value represented by the older Liberalism. The State Socialism of Bismarck might have taught them something in this respect.

The true end of Socialism, then, is in the first place ethical. It is not the subordination of the man to the machine of State, but the use of the State for ethical, that is to say human, ends. Politics, it still seems necessary to repeat, are rightfully subordinate to ethics. They exist for the sake of human life, and in the modern world human life is wider and richer than State life. Now the essence of the ethical end is that it tries to comprehend human life on all sides, as a house in which there are many mansions, comprehensive in its possibilities, comprehensive also in its needs. Hence the ethical is necessarily opposed to the abstract view as represented by any single political dogma. How, then, are we to understand it?

An answer may be found if we remember that in a sense the ethical or human view is precisely that which in certain relations and for certain purposes we all understand. We are all human beings, and are all brought into direct contact with other human beings in the various personal relations of life. Without being philosophers and without any capacity for formulating general principles, we are all forced to some understanding of human life, its nature, and its needs,

and to some interest in its fortunes. And our personal relations, from the simplest and closest to the most complex and remote, tend to fall into two classes. In the struggle for existence and the fruits of existence our fellow-men are at once our most formidable rivals and our most potent allies. Love and hate, as Empedocles discovered, are the principles that govern the world. It has been the mistake of many modern Evolutionists to eliminate love from consideration, and to leave hate, rivalry, competition as the sole spring of movement in organic life. The truth is rather that hate, and war, and the struggle for self belong essentially to the inorganic sphere. It is precisely so far as divergent claims are not adjusted, as individuals are not organized into associations, as mutual dependence is not realized, that rivalry remains the principal means of subsistence and success. But from the lowest stages of organic life upward to civilized man there is an advance of integration which is constantly replacing the struggle of isolated atoms by the harmonious concurrence of interdependent parts. The lowest kind of compound animal is, I suppose, the cell colony, in which the association of parts is so loose that any component cell can emigrate when it chooses and live its own independent life. The loss of a limb matters little to the starfish and not as much as might be supposed to the limb. Even in the lower vertebrates, like the frog, the lower nerve centres retain a considerable degree of independence. But always as we mount the animal scale we come to a closer organization, in which, as between the myriads of living units which constitute the body, competition is reduced to very narrow limits, the health of the whole is essential to the life of each, and the cells secure their own maintenance by co-operating in the support of the entire body. In the relations of animals and of human beings to one another a somewhat similar development can be traced. Social life at any stage is a more or less organized structure as the case may be, and progress consists in the development of organization. At every stage competition is the law of unorganized, co-operation of organized, life.

I can perhaps best explain this by making clear what I do

not mean. I do not mean that the best state is that in which liberty is subordinated to order and progress left to take care of itself. I do not mean that the higher the social state the more complete is the sacrifice of the individual to common ends. On the contrary, such a constitution of society, though it may be necessary in a state of siege, is just the negation of the organic idea as I would wish it to be conceived. A mechanical unity is as much opposed to organic co-operation as is anarchy itself, which is, indeed, its natural correlative. The true conception of an organic society is one in which the best life of each man is and is felt to be bound up with the best life of his fellow-citizens. It is that in which the soul in bringing forth its fruit may be said, after Browning, to

> Forward the general deed of man,
> And each of the many helps to recruit
> The life of the race by a general plan,
> Each living his own to boot.

As I shall at once be told that this is pretty but chimerical, and that you can no more eliminate repulsion and antagonism from human life than from the like poles of two magnets, I would invite attention to certain general tendencies of organic evolution which seem to have been too much neglected, and which go to show that the organic conception of society is a natural deduction from all that we know of those evolutionary forces which make for progress. I shall try to show that while evolution is not the same thing as progress, there is such a thing as progress in evolution; and it will be convenient to state in advance how this progress is to be conceived and on what it must be taken to rest. An evolutionary process as such consists merely in the development of one type into another, and there is no necessity that the second type should be any higher in the scale of creation than the first, if the term higher is to carry any sense of value as appreciated by human intelligence. For the success of the new type is determined merely by natural selection, that is, by the advantages possessed by this or that individual in the struggle for existence, whatever those advantages may be. It thus comes about as the result of a blind clash of forces, and not

in accordance with a rational plan of organization. This must be so as far as the reign of competition extends and individual lives are not related to one another according to any comprehensive scheme. But it will also be clear that such a correlation of the individuals of a species may be one among other methods by which a type may be preserved. And where the germ of such a correlation exists, it may be fostered by natural selection, like any other quality advantageous to the species. The natural organ of such organization is what at least in its higher developments we call the moral intelligence, in virtue of which the individual makes the good of this social group, and ultimately of the whole species to which he belongs, an object of supreme interest to himself. As this intelligence develops it comes to dominate the methods of natural selection, first suspending the struggle between individuals, and, secondly, substituting direct and purposive effort towards the good of the whole for the method of maintaining the type by the clash of atoms. Now what we call *progress* in evolution, or the evolution of higher types, we take to be identical with the advance of organization. History, if it has a meaning, is a record of the process by which elements of value and rational purpose have come to make themselves good by organized coherence. What we call the progressive organization of life is therefore for us an evolutionary process, and the only evolutionary process of value.

We will illustrate this position first in reference to the deficiencies of natural selection regarded as an agent in improvement. There is a process known as the Law of Compensation,* which is generally acknowledged as a factor in the organic world, but has not, as far as I am aware, received the minute and careful study which it deserves. It may be explained roughly in this way. The tendency of the struggle for existence is to preserve an organism in virtue of some one or some very few eminent qualifications. An animal which has the average health and vitality of its species, but is a little stronger

* More generally, it is the law of Correlated Variation. The cases of "compensation" comprise all that need be noted for our purpose.

or a little faster, or has a harder shell or a sharper tooth, will have a sufficient advantage to determine the success of its descendants. But in developing any one of these advantages it may, and in many cases must, lose others. Strength, for example, almost of necessity involves bulk and weight, and if a given species is the prey of some materially stronger animal, variation in strength will make little difference to the chances of survival enjoyed by its members, while extra speed will be a most important point. In such a case, therefore, strength is likely to be sacrificed to speed, and we get a race developed like the deer, which is progressively less capable of standing up to its adversary, but more successful in running away. This is the law of compensatory sacrifice. The deer has, so to say, specialized on swiftness, and in doing so has abandoned strength. In the same way the human hand can be adapted to guiding the plough or to twisting ends of thread, but hardly to both at once. It must sacrifice one power to gain another.

Observe next that, as to the value of the qualities by which a type is preserved, natural selection exhibits a fine indifference. A conquers B and survives, but whether the result will be to produce a better or worse, a less or a more developed species can only be determined after the event. There is no greater or more common blunder than to treat natural selection as essentially an agent of progress. Whatever else progress may be, it at least involves a fuller and more many-sided life. But one of the commonest methods of maintaining yourself in the organic world is by reducing your wants, and therefore your capabilities, to a lower and a lower level, so that you may live without the supplies which you have not strength or intelligence or energy to gain. The lower type underbids the higher, so to say, and the species degenerates. It is a circumstance too little noted, that, whereas among all higher animals man the highest is everywhere dominant beyond dispute, it is only the low, miserable, degraded bacillus that wages war with him on equal terms, and in some places may be almost said to conquer and expel him. So great is the power of the deteriorated.

Speaking generally, we may put it that natural selection is

solely concerned with immediate success. You may possess qualities which, if you had but time to work them out, would ensure you lasting success and a place for your descendants above all competitors. But if while laying your plans you are accidentally eaten up, your long distance qualities, so to call them, will be of little avail, and your competitor, who has no brains, but a hard shell or quick legs, will survive and inherit your land. Hence we get this principle of progress in evolution. In so far as a type is forced to adapt itself to immediate necessities by the use of qualities incompatible with higher development there will be no progress, but merely change and perhaps deterioration of type. But if its higher qualities are strong enough to meet the exigencies of preservation from hour to hour, they will make of their exercise a means of development, and a higher type will be reached in which the best capabilities of the lower are realized and are dominant. In a word, in any evolution a new type will be higher or lower not according as it succeeds or fails, but according to the quality through which success is achieved.

If we take this fairly obvious principle in connection with the law of compensation, a further result is reached. If a perfect life is to be realized, the quality on which we rely for present safety must not involve the sacrifice of any other quality necessary to a more complete and satisfactory development. If the fulness of animal vigor is to be obtained, strength must not be sacrificed to swiftness, nor either of them to a length of neck, useful merely for gathering palm leaves inaccessible to better proportioned creatures. If a satisfactory social life is to be attained, the immediate necessities of order must not be allowed to crush the spirit of independence. Human history, indeed, and human biography are a long series of comments on the Law of Compensation. The great men who do not manifest the defects of their qualities may be almost counted on the fingers. And it is the same with every type of civilization, and perhaps with every movement which has arisen to correct recognized defects. I will take a single instance. The most signal defect in the intellectual achievements of the ancient world was what may be described as a

certain want of sense of the infinite, a tendency to contentment with the actual, and a disposition to make existing civilization the measure of all things. The gap was filled by Oriental religions, and finally by Christianity, and the adoption of some such religious scheme was a necessary preliminary to any future move forward. Yet in the form it took the new movement involved the break up of civilization, the disappearance of secular learning, the Inquisition, and the religious wars—in fine, some fifteen or sixteen centuries of delay before Western civilization could claim to be even on a level with the ancient world. On a smaller scale we have the same problem constantly before us in political life. The Liberalizing movement, for example, brought its own Nemesis in the opposition to the Factory Acts, and Socialist schemes, as we have seen, are liable to corresponding dangers.

All this is not mentioned by way of argument on behalf of Collectivism or any other plans of improvement, but merely as illustrating by contrast that gradual organization of life which we have taken to be the dominant feature of progressive development, and in which the Law of Compensation is slowly replaced by a more and more complete harmony among all the faculties employed. As life becomes rational, conduct tends to fall into a more or less coherent whole dominated by common principles and comprehensive ends. The occasions of the moment, even the obstacles and troubles of life, become means of grace to the resolute and intelligent will. Just as a little child makes every detail of its life into a game or a drama or a ritual, so the maturer man turns every occasion, sad or joyful, to rational account, and works out what is in him by its aid. But, as we saw before, the greatest of man's rivals are his fellow-men, and it is principally in his dealings with them that the difficulties of maintaining a constant hold on a rational or spiritual order appear.

The simplest way of maintaining your own position is the way of the strong man armed. The easiest way of getting through the crowd is the infallible process employed by Mr. Alfred Jingle, of elbowing the countenances of its component

members. And this primitive process, like other primitive processes, survives to the present day, to which, indeed, it has been reserved to glorify it as the royal road not merely to individual, but to social salvation. Rivalry, competition, the direct effort of each for himself to the exclusion of others, is in this view the way to secure the survival of the fittest. It is undoubtedly the way to secure the survival of those who are fittest to survive by that method, that is to say, the strongest and most self-willed and most unscrupulous, the man of blood and iron, the man of craft and guile. But it is utterly incompatible with anything like organization in social life as we have understood the term. And if there is anything like a social harmony possible, if, that is, society is capable of development to a better and a fuller life, it must be rather on the principle of love than of hate, by the recognition of the interdependence of its members rather than by their exclusiveness and mutual opposition. In short, the easiest and most obvious life consists in fighting for your own hand, and is exclusive of others and their interests. It may prosper to any extent, but it does not advance civilization. The higher and more difficult life is so to say inclusive of others. Their interests and hopes and feelings are a part of its own, incorporated in its own scheme, and bound up with its own happiness. It is harder to maintain, but, however short-lived, contributes something to the general purpose of the human race, the ultimate dominance of reason in things. Such a life can be lived in greater or less perfection by any individual according to his good pleasure at any time. But to attempt it may involve the extreme of self-sacrifice, since there is no one so much hated as a friend of men. But it is also possible that this spirit may prevail little by little in society itself, shared more or less consciously by all men, and capable of being carried further even by those who are not heroes or saints. This, according to our contention, is the true line of social progress, the development of that rational organization of life in which men freely recognize their interdependence, and the best life for each is understood to be that which is best for those around him. The attempt to shape

our social customs and institutions in this spirit is the aim and the principle of Collectivism.

Thus, to sum up this portion of our argument, so far as life is "inorganic," qualities are constantly developed to meet the exigencies of the moment which prove incompatible with the permanent requirements of a full and harmonious development, and individuals survive by fighting for themselves to the exclusion of the rest of their species. So far as life becomes "organized," all the qualities used by the individual tend to harmonious and uninterrupted development, while the life of the individual harmonizes similarly with that of the whole. It need hardly be said that the two harmonies are connected, since the higher qualities of the individual are precisely those by which his union with society is effected. Progress, then, as we understand it, consists in the steps whereby this "inclusive" or "organic" principle gradually makes itself good in the world of living beings against the "exclusive" tendencies of disorganization.

The conception of life which we have been trying to make clear is in no sense a new one, nor in any way the invention of Collectivism. On the contrary, it is part of our contention that it is as old as the ethical consciousness of man, and, indeed, expresses that which is distinctively ethical in a consciousness in which there is much that is adventitious, accidental, and inharmonious. For what passes as the moral consciousness of mankind is no more purely and unreservedly moral than mankind itself. It is a highly complex product of very various sentiments, many of them beautiful, most of them respectable, but some of them irrational and ugly. To make sure of this, it is only necessary to take the average moral sentiment of workaday life, consider not the phrases which it employs, but the application which it makes of them, and compare it with any well known example of the genuine ethical spirit, say the Sermon on the Mount, which comes almost as near as is humanly possible to unalloyed ethical truth. The difference resolves itself into this, that whereas the Sermon on the Mount is an expression of pure love, the average moral sentiment is an expression of regard for others

tempered by rivalry and fear. It is a compromise between the primitive struggle for existence and the sense of an identical nature and purpose. Hence, to illustrate by a single point, its regard for success as such, and its contempt and dislike of failure, its feeble criticism of successful violence and its self-righteous zeal in devising fresh degradation for those who are already disgraced. There can be little doubt that the average moral man thoroughly enjoys the punishment of an offender and feels his own righteousness enhanced thereby. Objection to cruelty seems to be a comparatively modern feeling, still in its infancy, and limited to a small percentage of people. An unauthorized shot at a rabbit is still a far more serious offence than beating a child with a poker, and *pecca fortiter* remains a tolerably safe motto. In the same spirit, when the average man talks of honor he is not really thinking of a moral quality, but of something which makes a man respected and feared by others, which puts him beyond the reach of insult or injury. It is only in this sense that a duel can be called an affair of honor, and it is in just the same sense that a nation's honor is thought to be more seriously menaced by a frank admission that it has done a wrong, than by the most unscrupulous use of force against the people that it has injured. In short, force, self-assertion, and all that contributes to the market value of man or woman, are natural objects of admiration for the consciousness which is immersed in the struggle for existence, and remain constantly at strife with the ideas of love, self-surrender, and mutual service which arise with the dawning consciousness of a common human nature.

This consciousness, we have said, is probably common in some shape or form to the whole race, but, as the historical student of ethics is aware, it is limited in its primitive form to a narrow circle. From the first, human development has been determined more by the competition of groups than by the rivalry of individuals. Natural selection, as operating on individuals, has probably had little to do with the advance of civilization; but the success of one family, one tribe, one city, or one nation in the struggle with another has been a potent

and constant influence. Now within certain groups rivalry is and always has been replaced in the main by co-operation. The family is by so much the most conspicuous example of what I mean that I will consider it alone. Imperfect, like other things human, it is nevertheless a striking and widespread example of the ethical spirit which I have tried to describe,—that is to say, it is a little society where the common welfare lies very close to the heart of each member, where self-sacrifice is cheerfully recognized as an honorable duty, and where the good of each is so much an object of real anxiety that more thought is taken for the weak than for the strong, and the deficiencies of any member are matter of honest regret rather than of secret satisfaction. If we pass outside the family to the relations of the average man to his immediate circle, we still find, if we are not prejudiced by cynicism, a good deal of the same spirit; at least, there is much genuine kindliness and good-will, and a tolerably high standard of honor in mutual dealings. Now moral progress, so far as there has been any, has consisted primarily in levelling up the standard of conduct towards mankind in general to something like the level commonly realized in the narrower relationships which we have mentioned. The process has been described by Green, in a well-known chapter, as the extension of the area of the common good. From the evolutionist point of view, it is the substitution of co-operation for competition, of the inclusive for the exclusive method of maintaining life and achieving progress. Undoubtedly some advance has been made in this respect, if we compare the ancient world with modern civilization. We no longer make slaves of white men, and, with regard to Matabele and others, we at least pay a tribute to principle by calling it forced labor. In fact, it is proved already, and will go near to be thought shortly that there should be limits to our brutality in dealing with what we pleasantly call the inferior races. It may be said (if I may be allowed another reference to Aristotle) that in these respects we have only advanced from the stage of *ἀκολασία* to that of *ἀκρασία*. Certain general principles of humanity are pretty widely admitted, but all sorts of ingenious devices are in-

vented to avert their application in practice, and hence the moral warfare in our age is mainly a struggle against the almost inexhaustible resources of sophistry. In this spirit ecclesiastical authorities will tell us that the Sermon on the Mount is not meant to be taken literally. The authority is admitted, but its decisions conveniently made void. In the same way measures to prevent laundry women working more than fourteen hours a day are obstructed by the benevolent interest suddenly developed by fashionable ladies in the poor widow whose livelihood is threatened if she is not allowed to make herself a slave. Still, it is something to get first principles widely acknowledged. It indicates a certain advance, however small, and it is a promise of more, however slow. The cynical may say that it has developed hypocrisy in high places to a degree which will make the Victorian era proverbial as the epoch of Pharisaism, but all this is without doubt transitional. Our era will be at least equally conspicuous for the development of a genuine feeling for every kind of social improvement, the strength of which is measured by the very ingenuity shown in combating it.

Still, when all is said and done, it must be admitted that the standing paradox of the moral consciousness is the gap between what we may roughly call its personal and its impersonal dealings. The callousness with which the best of good fellows will acquiesce in outrages which he does not directly witness must always come with something of surprise. The indifference of kind-hearted men to massive suffering, the apathy with which loving fathers and mothers contemplate the massacre of children, is an ever renewed miracle like the sunrise or the burst of spring. Philip II. of Spain was an affectionate father, and Abdul Hamid is said to be loved in his own harem. And after all, why not? Is the gulf so deep between instigation and acquiescence in a crime, between active outrage and indifference? *Pecca fortiter.* Let us at least respect success and put it one step above the mixture of cynicism, apathy, and cowardice which constitutes the only rival form of statesmanship known to our generation.

We take it, then, that the distinctly ethical consciousness,

with its principle of mutual aid and its spirit of love and good-will, is a widespread force acting on nearly all men, but operative in a narrow sphere. And moral progress consists in directly or indirectly widening its influence. Not that it supersedes the reign of brute force, but rather that it qualifies it by some tincture of the human spirit. We continue to play a game against one another, but the rules of the game are gradually modified in the interests of humanity. Every such limitation of war and competition is a gain, and in the economic sphere such limitations as are imposed by Factory Acts, sanitary regulations, and even perhaps poor laws, have long been admitted as the most important applications of the Collectivist principle in modern legislation. They run parallel with the abolition of explosive bullets and the protection of the wounded and other regulations of war by the Geneva Convention. When all the world is one family, the millennium will have been reached. Short of that it is possible to moralize rivalry, and possibly, in the spirit of the inclusive method, to turn it into a means of grace. The writer already referred to has pointed out that in Collectivist Ethics emulation in the public service would naturally supersede competition for private gain.

The Collectivist has been supposed, absurdly enough, to put material comfort above character, but the truth is that the question between him and his critics is not whether character is important, but what sort of character is desirable. On this point the Collectivist has his own view, and, as to his critic's conception of what is admirable in character, it is a very strong view. Hard self-reliance does not especially appeal to him, and among those things which may be injurious to character he would reckon the constant repression of the natural movements of kindness. Nor is the Collectivist unaware that individuals are responsible agents and must in a great degree take the consequences of their misdeeds. But I think he would limit the evil consequences to those which are really necessary or essential to the interests of society, and he would certainly take very special care that they should not fall upon those connected with the wrong-doer or

upon any one but the wrong-doer himself. When children are in question, the principle of responsibility cuts two ways; for, if we take a responsibility off the parent by saving the child, we neglect a common responsibility if we leave the child to its fate. And if the one course impairs the character of the parent, how does the other affect our own? What it finally would throw upon society, and what it would leave to the individual, is a matter which Collectivism has to thresh out in each case upon its own merits; but there can be no doubt that its general tendency is so to organize life as to make its responsibilities much more definite and a good deal less easy to escape.

To bring the somewhat diversified strands of our argument together, we may say first that the tendency of modern Collectivism is to absorb the abstract ideals of earlier political theories into a comprehensive and distinctly ethical system. This ethical system is based on the substitution of the principle of peace on earth and good-will towards men for the principle of rivalry and war. It thus aims at extending a process which has always been going on so far as moral progress has been a reality, that of qualifying the methods of competition by the social spirit realized in the more intimate personal relations. And in so doing it reveals itself as a phase in a still wider evolutionary process, whereby in the higher races a purposive and intelligent organization of life, inclusive of the whole species, is gradually substituted for the war of all against all by which the survival of types is determined at a lower stage.

L. T. Hobhouse.

Corpus Christi College, Oxford.

DETERRENT PUNISHMENT.

THE nature of legal punishment has been so frequently discussed that the subject has lost something of its original freshness, yet the difficulties that surround it, and the importance that attaches to it, were never more clearly appreciated than now. The general features of the problem are easily understood. There are certain ends which legal punishment seems to effect, or to aid in effecting, and these may be regarded as principles which, so far, regulate its use. The end may be conceived as deterrent, in the sense in which we shall use that term,—to deter others from committing the crime for which the criminal is seen by society to suffer. Or it may be reformatory, to improve the morals of the sufferer. Or it may be preventive, in the sense of placing the criminal in such a position as to render it impossible for him to repeat his offence,—perhaps for a long time, perhaps forever. Or it may be vindictive, to execute vengeance against him. Or it may be to satisfy some claim of abstract justice which society conceives itself to possess, and, of course, is not admitted to be the outcome of vindictive animosity. These and other ends suggest themselves, some of them perhaps merely to be rejected as inadequate to afford any explanation of the problem, but most of them as undoubtedly real factors in social life. And, accordingly, the popular view seems to be that they all represent some aspect of the truth; so that, to find a connection between them, to pass from this or that theory of punishment to a theory which will hold good generally, is the second phase of the problem, which is infinitely more difficult than the first.

Now, it may be maintained that the spirit of modern times has obviously passed beyond a merely vindictive principle of punishment; indeed, revenge is not punishment at all. Historically, the elaboration of instruments of vengeance may be interesting in this connection, but theoretically it hardly concerns us. The repression of the criminal's freedom, again, is

mainly of importance in its bearing on the conceptions of the new school of criminology. To this subject we shall return, but it may be passed over until we have considered the more orthodox points of view. If, then, we seek to determine the question in what is generally called the practical way, which means that the idea of abstract justice is too vague and metaphysical to be of much value, we are left with the two main objects of reforming the criminal and of deterring others from crime. And, when these two ideas are set against one another in the political arena, victory is almost certain to be with the latter. The reformation of the criminal is rather a moral than a legal or political aim. On the other hand, to deter from crime is of the utmost political importance, and, as a matter of fact, we believe that our punishments do, to a large extent, work out their aim in that way. At any rate, the deterrent end appeals very strongly to common sense. And so the deterrent end itself must be made a matter of investigation. The effect of the punishment of the criminal on society in general, and on the criminal class in particular, can only be tested by experience, and every method of deterring must have its limits and modifications. One axiom generally accepted, however, even by conservatives in such matters, is, that while the deterrent effect of punishment is not necessarily increased by an increase in severity, it depends largely on the absolute accuracy with which it is administered. That he should be sent to prison when he is caught in the act is a fact which the burglar accepts as part of the law of nature. It excites no animosity in his mind. But that he should be always caught is a condition under which his business cannot possibly be carried on.

But, admitting the force of deterrency from the practical point of view, it is often argued that this gives no answer, explicitly at least, to the question why the State should punish at all. It does not explicitly satisfy the demand for justice. Can we unite the idea of social justice with that which we have been considering? Can we dominate the whole with an idea of retribution, or of penalty, which shall give it a logical basis? A well-known answer is, that in punishment

the criminal's own act is seen returning on himself. The punishment of the criminal is just, because it expresses his own will as a rational being; for in his act is involved a universal element which by the act is set up as law. In punishment, which is, as it were, the injury of an injury, he receives his right. On the other hand, the reply which is made to such a line of argument is equally well known. We hear that retributive punishment is a mere phrase; a logical subtlety which, if it can do no harm, can at the same time do no good. It moves in a circle beyond the actual, and can never reach a concrete punishment at all. It seems very desirable, however, to bring the edges of the two theories together; to satisfy justice and yet not lose hold of the generalizations of experience. For, undoubtedly, it is difficult to believe that retributive justice is simply a combination of reformation and deterrency with a dash of vindictiveness thrown in. We may advance some way towards our object by considering a particular penalty, not as an isolated occurrence, but as part of a permanent system which exists in the State. The existence of this permanent system requires, perhaps, to be emphasized. The inter-relation of rights soon becomes obvious when we consider particular rights reflectively, and the systematic basis of punishment would be more often thrust into prominence by juridical writers than it is were it not for the fact that our present punishments are not nearly so systematic as we feel they ought to be. Hence, although we often hear criticism directed against the want of system in our punishments, the fact which that want reveals, the systematic nature of punishment, tends to be forgotten. Of course it may be readily admitted that a kind of systematic treatment is conceivable which is by no means desirable. To make punishment too rigid, to determine all its details by inflexible rule, to destroy that consideration of the particular circumstances of the case which at present in some degree animates it, would be a loss and not a gain. Nevertheless, a permanent system must be assumed; and if we conceive of the criminal as deliberately placing himself in conditions which, by the movement of society,—the same society which guarantees him liberty,—

necessarily result in his punishment, then we can conceive of his act as returning upon himself.

The conception of justice implied in such a phrase as the "justice of punishment" may be treated in many ways. Green's view of just punishment will suggest itself. The conception of the just, according to him, means that complex of social conditions which for each individual is necessary to enable him to realize his capacity for contributing to the social good. And the future maintenance of right must require that the criminal should be dealt with as he is in the punishment. But the precise form of words is, in our opinion, quite unimportant. However we may phrase it, when we are called upon to cross the line from justice to threats, we can only do so by following the tendency which leads us to break up legal life into a complex of rights—to break up our social environment into a complex of social conditions—and to regulate our punishments in relation to those rights, mainly by their deterrent effect. If this involves the abandonment of any synthesis with the true idea of justice, then deterrent punishment must be treated on that basis. The threat, however, always appears to be something more than a threat; it is a social threat, directed primarily against all; it involves an appeal to the conviction, or inference, that the soul of society is just, that the criminal is social.

The fact is that any conception of justice which we may form for working purposes has a necessary relation to life as we are living it, and to society as we find it, that forces us to fill up our ideal with a certain amount of detail which it may be difficult to justify from a merely abstract point of view. Conditions are assumed which, although relatively permanent, need not always wear the same aspect; and this tends to make us emphasize the contrast between abstract justice and concrete justice as embodied in the institutions of our time; between the abstract right to punish and such an explanation of justice as has been suggested. But the right to punish is, after all, an abstraction. If, for the time being, we look upon the social organism as complete and whole, then that system of punishment which the maintenance of its rights

demands is just. And if, on the other hand, we deny this conclusion, because it attributes a false completeness to the social organism, then we must fall back upon the idea of such justice being merely an expression of intrinsic justice. But in that case it is not legitimate to contrast the right to punish, as if it were something beyond the sphere of social life, with our interpretation of social justice. They both suffer from the same defect.

The general relation between the deterrent and the reformatory aims seems, in the popular estimation, to be more easily determined. If it is not the business of the State to seek active methods of promoting private morality, it is also unnecessary for it to attempt actively to effect the moral reformation of the criminal. But it ought, at least, not to hinder his reformation. A punishment which renders reformation difficult is, therefore, generally considered not desirable; but the reformatory end is the subordinate one. Whether this argument affords a valid objection to capital punishment is a matter of dispute. If we substitute repentance for reformation, it apparently does not; and it seems reasonable that the reformatory end should only be allowed to enter into our calculations when it does not conflict positively with the larger ends.

Two principles of practical interest should be noted, as they form a basis of many of the maxims which are believed in by upholders of deterrency. The first is, that although punishments should terrorize, they should not brutalize. Thus, it may be maintained that, relatively, the punishments of death and imprisonment as practised among us do not have a brutalizing tendency, and that punishment by mutilation or torture would. On the border line we may place flogging. Again, it is well known that in civilized communities certain forms of crime linger, or perhaps break out, in certain localities when the rest of the community is comparatively free from them. These are generally of a brutal class, such as assaults on women and children. The true causes of these phenomena have perhaps been overlooked, but there is undoubtedly a tendency to deal sharply with such crimes,

and even to advocate the employment of coarser methods of punishment for them than would be sanctioned elsewhere. The argument is, though its validity may be doubted, that a mild use of coarser methods is more effective in such special cases, and therefore, in the long run, more merciful. In the second place, however, we must avoid making crime romantic. Any method of punishment which excites morbid sentimentality is an evil. There appears to be a class of persons who are eager to see romance in crimes of every description; nor can we allow the fact that they are numerically weak in proportion to the whole population, to blind us to the consideration that they are frequently living on the border line between criminality and non-criminality, and therefore specially capable of being influenced the one way or the other.

Such ideas are commonplace. In the views to which the members of the school of criminologists popularly known as Italian have given expression we may find an interesting contrast. Here an attempt is made to correct the whole theory of criminal law by means of scientific results. It is difficult, indeed, to characterize the movement generally; for the value of it, like that of all similar movements, lies largely in principles which must be worked out through relative antagonism and amid much discussion. Different views are necessarily taken of the value of existing criminal systems, and the adoption of new stand-points is constantly being advocated. For it may be admitted that the results of anthropological and sociological investigation must be brought to bear on the practical problems of crime, and that punishment, though one instrument, is by no means the only instrument, for social defence, without much positive progress being made. The Honorable Oliver Wendell Holmes, in speaking of the movement at the dedication of the new hall of the Boston University School of Law recently, referred to the well-known formula, that we must consider the criminal rather than the crime, and proceeded to point out that there was weighty authority for the belief that not the nature of the crime, but the dangerousness of the criminal, must form the only legal criterion. This summary, perhaps, may lead us to ask ourselves how far every

form of compromise must be rejected as antagonistic to the new spirit,—an important question. Again, Professor Lioy, of Naples, in his general account, emphasizes the stress now laid on the *incorrigibility* of the criminal; and the partial reaction which has set in against the older phases of the movement is well represented by the works of Signor Alimena, now being published at Turin.

We must focus our attention, however, and we shall do so by directing it to Professor Ferri's position, which the English edition of his "Criminal Sociology" has brought into prominence. According to him, the criminal types are five in number,—criminal madmen, born criminals, criminals by contracted habits, occasional criminals, and criminals of passion; a scheme evolved, in a measure, from the twofold division of habitual and occasional criminals with which we are familiar. All the chief classifications of criminals may, he maintains, be brought into line with his own, which gives a more general value to his results. There are three strata in society, again, from his point of view. The first, the highest, is composed of persons who are organically upright and commit no crimes; the second is the lowest and the nursery of born criminals, for whom no punishments, so far as they are legally deterrent, are of value; and the third is formed by the class of persons between the two, who can be deterred and for whom punishment is psychologically useful. Thus the territory is marked out for scientific workers. But, coming closer to legal categories, we may ask, What is his conception of the efficacy of punishment? It is that punishment, as a means of repression, possesses essentially a negative value, because it has not the same influence on all anthropological types of criminals, and because its use is mainly to preclude the serious mischief which would result from impunity. "Impunity would lead to a demoralization of the popular conscience in regard to crimes and offences, to an increase of the profound lack of foresight in criminals, and to a removal of the present impediment to fresh crimes during the term of incarceration" (p. 109). This attitude is one which may be adopted by all, and the definition of it constitutes one of the most interesting portions of the

book. True, we may dissent from the statement that "the least measure of progress with reforms which prevent crime is a hundred times more useful and profitable than the publication of an entire penal code" (p. 135) as savoring of exaggeration; but the point, after all, is not of vital importance, because we desire both remedies, the one without prejudice to the other.

Keeping to the legal side of the subject, however, we find that the most important conception put forward is that of *indeterminate punishment* (p. 207). In its most moderate aspect the scheme proposes that, although punishment should be made indeterminate, it should only be so relatively; that is to say, a maximum and minimum of punishment should be fixed in the sentence. The more thorough-going innovators, however, desire that punishment should be at first quite indeterminate, and should be rendered definite in successive steps by persons qualified to judge how the criminal progresses. The first proposal is made as a sort of compromise with the older system, and, in my view, might well be supported. It leaves the law with much of its present publicity, dignity, and openness of method. On the other hand, it is maintained that such a compromise is quite impracticable, and the conception of indeterminate segregation, as Professor Ferri would have it, is that, when the conditions of the criminal and of his act show that reparation by itself is not sufficient, the judge should only have to pronounce an indefinite detention in the lunatic asylum, the prison for incorrigibles, the penal colony, or such an institution; then permanent commissions would see to and determine the successive steps by which the offender was detained; and thus, it is argued, the oblivion which follows the convict on conviction under the old system would be satisfactorily obviated.

Again, following this principle of indefinite segregation, there is the principle of indemnification, which may take two forms,—of a fine payable to the State or of reparation to the injured persons. As regards the latter, the State is to indemnify the injured person and recoup itself from the criminal. Thus, if society is applying the principle that the individual

ought always to be held responsible for his crimes, it is also applying the counter-doctrine that he ought always to be indemnified for the crimes of which he is a victim. So, at least, runs the argument. Here we find, in a measure, the healing up of the old division between public crime and private injury, and an apparent return to the ideas of the past. A measure which would involve the criminal indemnifying his victim, or something similar, has often been advocated from the more strictly juridical point of view, and its practical end recommends it to a class of students by whom indefinite punishment, or at any rate the thorough application of the idea, would, on account of its vagueness, want of power to grip the public mind, and liability to corrupt influences, be condemned. The question of how to make the criminal more profitable to society than he is is a very important one. It is succinctly treated in an article in this JOURNAL for October, 1891, by Dr. Tönnies, of Kiel, in which a moderate view of criminological reform is persuasively presented.

Lastly, the means of defence must, according to Professor Ferri, be worked out in relation to the various criminal types; and here, in his view, a distinction must be made between the proposals before us and the so-called individualization of punishment which prison experts have advocated in America, as the latter idea is impracticable.

It would be useless even for the members of the classic school to deny that in the details of punishment—on the question of form—many instructive ideas are being put forward, and that experiments are being made in America and elsewhere which are of the utmost importance. The difficulties which attend prison administration seem to be great. In providing suggestions and facts which may lead to a better penal organization in detail probably the most useful work of the new movement will be found. Where the defects of that organization lie and how they are to be remedied are questions which can only be solved by much patient work, and every investigation which keeps the facts well in line is a step in the right direction. But in estimating the value of the progress which has been made and is embodied in existing

institutions, and in preparing for the future, the difficulty of the subject, especially as regards types, must not be forgotten. "Of all the problems which the human race has had to confront," says Dr. Hunter significantly, in his "Roman Law," "the greatest, perhaps, is to know what conduct is really injurious to mankind and what is the best way to secure good conduct. Scarcely less important is it to know the degree in which conduct is injurious. On all these points early societies had everything to learn."

On the other hand, whether the best arguments which can be brought forward for or against such an institution as trial by jury (which Professor Ferri attacks) are not so general in their nature as to fall beyond the scope of a special criminal science has to be considered. As regards lawyers as a class, they assuredly have no sentimental attraction for this form of trial. The old quarrel between the poets and the philosophers is as nothing compared to the old quarrel between the amateurs and the professionals. But if a Churchman could maintain that he would rather see England free than England sober, the lawyers must be allowed the opinion that they would rather that the people should feel that they were free than that they should have the highest possible refinement of judicial justice.

The most sensational question which occurs in this connection is, perhaps, that of capital punishment, to which we have already referred. Even Professor Ferri admits that it has been exhausted from the intellectual stand-point and has passed into the region of prejudice. As an instrument of elimination capital punishment is of no practical value, and popular opinion will never allow it to become so. It is probably as a means of terror that it must stand or fall. No doubt there is an air of poetical justice about it, and no doubt it seems to embody, for some minds, the power of the law; but a further question is, whether it does adequately deter those whom it is meant to affect directly. The latter point is doubtful. Its usefulness, if it is useful, seems rather to lie in its indirect effect; it forms, as it were, the culmination of the penal system; it proclaims that not even life itself will be re-

garded as sacred in those who utterly outrage society. And in any country where its employment, though authorized, is systematically evaded it is useless.

The criminal law—to gather up our criticism—must, before all things, be a workable system, and to render it workable regulations and conceptions have to be acted on which are not so exact as, ideally, we might desire. Analytical distinctions have to be introduced,—notably the distinction between the ordinary and the abnormal man. This is the real rock of offence to the upholders of the existence of graduated criminal types. The distinctions which the law upholds may be seen to have been treated too absolutely when we have advanced a stage in general progress. The tendency of the reformer is always to urge that new and apparently more refined distinctions be substituted for those formerly employed; and he is right in doing so provided the social organization can really apply the new methods. Even then, however, it is unnecessary to be uncompromisingly severe on the past. Now, the principle of indeterminate segregation in accordance with criminal types is one which it is very difficult to judge as such, but it is not unreasonable that it should excite our fears. The scientific spirit is bold and uncompromising. The modern world will never tolerate a court which pretends to sit in judgment on men's mere thoughts as opposed to their actions. But is it possible that we could tolerate a court which, even in a qualified way, sat in judgment, not upon men's thoughts, but upon their mere dispositions and tendencies? That is the danger, although it seems probable that the fixing of a maximum and minimum of punishment in the sentence would practically do much towards obviating it. And, whether this be so or not, it can hardly be disputed that the idea of indeterminate punishment, in some form or other, is becoming more and more actualized in society.

The new line of thought, then, may perhaps be said to cut the deterrent theory obliquely. It is, but only in a very modified way, reformatory. It is more truly preventive. It cannot be assumed that it would necessarily be favorable to the criminal from the criminal's own point of view. Of course,

even for the criminal, all may ultimately be for the best. But the claims of society are resolutely set against his claims, and, in so far as this idea is consistently carried out, a lapse in the direction of mere sentimentality is precluded. The idea of "doses" of punishment, which has been so frequently ridiculed, meant at least this: that there was a penalty which the criminal had to pay, and when he had paid it the debt was cancelled. On the deterrent theory any "dose" given him was for the good of all. This whole conception, be it right or wrong, is being strenuously attacked. Prevention, in its scientific sense, is swallowing it up. Hence the great stress laid upon those social reforms which are technically called penal substitutes; the assertion that such substitutes have never been properly studied until now, and the glorification of them at the expense of legal codes. Prevention is said to be primary, repression secondary, and in a wide and general sense this may be admitted. But if it be recognized, as it appears to be, that repression is, in its right place, nothing less than a social necessity, the reiteration of the comparison, when repression is under consideration, tends to confuse the issue. A social necessity which involves the liberties of men can never be called unimportant.

W. A. WALL.

GLASGOW.

THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF RELIGION.

CAN anything new be said on such a well-worn subject as the nature of religion? If I did not think that there could, I should not attempt it. My point of view may not be new, but I have not met with it. I shall not begin in the usual way by enumerating the various theories of religion, but shall proceed at once to set forth my particular theory.

My thesis is that *religion is a substitute in the rational world for instinct in the subrational world.* But when I say *religion*, I mean, as my title implies, the essential element of religion, which is a very different thing from what is popularly understood by religion. For, while all that is embraced in existing religions of both civilized and uncivilized races is doubtless legitimate and belongs to religion in the sense of having been produced by it, the greater part of it has been superadded to the original nucleus, and this to such an extent that the latter has been lost from view. This process of enveloping the kernel of the religious idea takes place so early that it is difficult to find it even in the most rudimentary religions. Nevertheless it has always been present and active, and to those who understand its nature its workings can be seen at all stages. It is, in fact, intuitively perceived by all, as is evidenced by the almost universal recognition that religion is something good, and this in the face of all the evil that has been done in its name.

The task of unmasking religion is not an easy one. The external garb it wears has come to belong to it. It is organically connected with the primitive form, secreted, as it were, from its tissues, like the shell of a mollusk or the carapace of a tortoise. The alteration that has taken place in religion is not properly a development. It may be compared to the modification that certain plants have undergone at the hands of man. It has been artificially transformed and made to depart from the original type. It always bears the marks of some kind of reasoning, however erroneous.

Although religion is mainly a product of reason, it would be impossible to elucidate its real nature without going much farther back in the history of mind than the origin of the rational faculty, even after conceding all the claims that have been made for the antiquity of that faculty. It may be true, as is asserted of both life and mind, that no point can be indicated at which reason actually began, yet we must recognize that there was a time when it was not. For all the purposes to be subserved in the present discussion it may be said to have begun with man, leaving the question open as to when man himself began. For whatever earlier and feebler states of the rational faculty may have existed, it was only in man that it was sufficiently marked to make religion possible. *Per contra*, no type of human creature has thus far been discovered in which that faculty was not strong enough to generate the religious sentiment.

Anything so universal must surely have a cause in the nature of things. This cause is, of course, psychic, and before it can be understood it is necessary to consider still simpler phenomena. It would be hopeless to attempt an explanation of the rational faculty until the psychic faculty itself was first explained. The reason is a late derivative product, and no clear grasp of its nature can be gained until the nature of mind is first understood. I do not profess to have any unknown secret as to the nature of mind. The biological origin of mind I shall assume to be established, and the principle underlying it need be only briefly set forth. The primordial element of mind is not reason, but *feeling*. A sense of the agreeable and the disagreeable, however feeble, must be assumed as the primary condition to the preservation of the class of organisms in which this sense inheres. This incipient *algedonism* lies at the very foundation of the entire series of psychic phenomena. It is the basis of psychology.

Living things differ from non-living in requiring some means of preservation. They are made up of delicate, colloidal, unstable constituents which are easily destroyed. The organic compounds consist not only of elements of the most complex inorganic compounds, but also of elements of other

organic compounds of lower orders, in a rising scale of complexity. Organized bodies are formed out of the highest and most unstable of these latter, such as protein, albumen, and hemoglobin, making substances so complex that their chemical formulas cannot be written. Protoplasm is the primordial organized substance,—the "physical basis of life,"—but it is as much more isomeric and unstable as it is more complex than any of its organic constituents, so that there may be hundreds of different kinds of protoplasm, varying according to a sort of permutation of their organic elements. The very essence of the life principle results from the fact that, in consequence of the relatively immense size of the molecules of protoplasm, due to this recompounding of the already highly complex molecules of organic compounds, the molecular activities of the units are converted into molar activities of the product. This is the only rational explanation I can frame of the phenomena of spontaneous movement, or motility.* Structures, therefore, thus composed, however simple biologically, are exceedingly complex chemically, and this complexity is accompanied by an instability so great that every particle of organized matter is constantly undergoing change by the process called *metabolism*, which is nothing less than the continual falling back of its molecules from the high-tension plane required to constitute life to some lower chemical plane, and the equally unceasing supply of these "waste" elements by a reproductive power inherent in the living mass.

When we consider, therefore, the extreme perishability of organized beings, it is easy to see that for life to exist every possible means must be employed for their protection. The advanced biology of to-day makes it no longer necessary to call in intelligent design to explain these means. In fact, at the same time that the nature of living substance was being revealed by science there was being discovered the natural principle that makes it possible. That principle is natural selection, and we now know that, in conformity with

* I first proposed this theory in 1882. See the *American Naturalist*, Vol. XVI., December, 1882, p. 978.

that principle, only such organic beings have persisted as have been furnished with some adequate means of self-preservation. There are many such means. Plants possess protective structures of various kinds, and not generally having the power of spontaneous locomotion, which so greatly increases the dangers of most animal forms, they are able to exist without true sensibility to pain. Having for their function to absorb inorganic matter, chiefly in the gaseous or liquid form, they do not require the spur of appetite to impel the pursuit of nourishment. Animals, too, possess numerous other means of protection, such as shells and bony coverings, in addition to sensitiveness. Great fertility performs the same office by constantly filling the places of those that succumb. But in the case of plastic organisms endowed with the power of spontaneous locomotion and compelled to subsist on organic matter, there can be no question that the great and paramount mode of self-preservation is the one pointed out, —viz., susceptibility to pleasure and pain.

This twofold or algedonic character was necessary, for it was not enough merely to escape the destructive agencies of an impinging and more or less hostile environment. There was an internal destructive agent far more fatal than the external ones,—viz., the very waste of tissue above described as incident to the nature itself of living substance. Metabolism could not go on unless every molecule that fell back to a lower, non-living plane was replaced by another raised to the plane of life by the nutritive powers of the organism. It was not alone necessary to avoid dangers; it was equally necessary to seek supplies. But these expressions, closely examined, are seen in each case to involve an ellipsis. They illustrate the tendency to speak of feeling in terms of function. As a matter of fact, it is not danger that is avoided nor nourishment that is sought. The thing shunned is pain, and the thing pursued is pleasure. Safety and nutrition are the indirect or consequential results. The organism knows nothing of these. They are secured by a sort of adjustment of circumstances, a contract, as it were, between Nature and Life. It may also be looked at as a kind of "pre-established har-

mony" between things wholly dissimilar, by which the one shall always coincide with the other. It is analogous to the harmony between the hands of a watch turned by different wheels at different rates but perfectly adjusted, or to the action of the "cut-off" adjusted to that of the piston in a steam-engine. In short, the principle is that of *adaptation*, which may be conceived in a neuter as well as in an active sense. The adaptations of man are active and *telic*, those of nature are self-adjusting and *genetic*, but the result is the same; and the mechanisms evolved by nature so closely resemble those designed by man that it is only in late years, and now only by special students of nature, that the distinction pointed out has been perceived.

For present purposes even this distinction is immaterial, and if any prefer to regard this great primary bio-psychic adaptation as the work of design, this will not affect the conclusions to be reached. It is only necessary clearly to grasp the truth that, on the one hand, the class of beings under consideration came into possession of a faculty unknown to all other objects, which led them to distinguish the agreeable from the disagreeable and to seek the one and shun the other, and that, on the other hand, those things or acts which possessed the quality of agreeableness were in the main such as supplied the needs of existence, while those which were disagreeable were such as endangered existence. This primordial adaptation, when compared with the multitudinous adaptations familiar in every department of organic life, is found not to differ from these in its essential character. The principle of all organic adaptation is one. That principle is natural selection, and it began to act at the earliest beginnings of life. It may be looked upon as a process of trial and error,—*i.e.*, of trying every conceivable device for rendering vital existence possible and for making it safer and fuller, and the selection of such, and such only, as secured these results. Such experiments usually take the form of structural modifications; but the essential thing is advantageousness, and if this is secured by immaterial qualities these are as legitimate subjects for selection as physical organs. At bottom it comes to the same

thing, since every psychic attribute is the result of some modification in the nerve tissues. In the case under consideration the device belonged to this latter class, resulting in an immaterial quality which may be called *feeling*, restricting the term to the intensive form already described, and excluding the indifferent form which later played so great a *rôle* as the basis of the perceptive faculty.* The object may be said to have been to *induce* the creature to perform the acts that would preserve its existence, and no other device is conceivable than the one that was actually adopted. Had no such quality been possible in nature, we seem compelled to assume that animal life would never have been developed.

An adaptation implies two terms. In the present case one of these terms was the action of the organism, while the other was its preservation. Activity may be looked upon as the means and existence as the end. Every device possesses this nature. A telic device, or invention, is the adoption of a means for the attainment of an end foreseen by the designer, and there need be no resemblance between the means and the end. It is the same with genetic devices, if such an expression is admissible. An organ is not at all like its product, any more than is a machine. The product of a machine or mechanism is the foreseen end or purpose. In genetic mechanisms the end is not foreseen, but from the poverty of language to designate genetic products we are compelled to speak of them as the purposes or objects of the mechanisms.

There is, however, a word in biological language which avoids the implication of design. That word is *function*, and the end or purpose of an organ is the function it performs. In the case under consideration, therefore, feeling, which is the means, has for its function the preservation of life. The antithesis, therefore, is constantly between feeling and function.†

* Cf. "The Psychic Factors of Civilization." Boston, 1893, pp. 16, 21, 39.

† I have been making use of this antithesis regularly in all my works and writings and insisting upon its fundamental nature, and it was not till quite recently that I learned that the principle was not generally understood by non-biological readers. It has always seemed so clear and simple to me that I have never before gone into a logical analysis of it, for fear of being unnecessarily ele-

While function, in this sense of anything that tends to preserve, continue, or better existence, is thus clearly the end for which feeling was developed, this is true only from the highly general standpoint of the world at large. It is not true from the standpoint of the creature. The end of the creature is feeling itself. Just here is the origin of the great bio-psychic dualism that is indissolubly connected with the entire sentient world. It is as manifest in the highest types of human beings as it is in the amœba. It is the most fundamental antinomy in the world of living things.

The adaptation between feeling and function is so nearly complete that the absolute dissimilarity of the two terms has been universally overlooked. The assumption on the part of biologists of a natural or necessary relation between them is naïve. It is to be classed along with the dictum of "common sense" as to the knowledge the mind possesses of the external world, the supposed identity of mental conceptions with things conceived, of noumena with phenomena. It was this popular misconception, observed by me from the outset, that led me to liken the adaptation of feeling to function to the "pre-established harmony" of Leibnitz.* At the beginning the adaptation must have been virtually perfect, and throughout the lower forms of life it is very complete. Just as the origin

---

mentary. But I observed that even so clear a thinker as Professor John Dewey stumbled over it (*Psychological Review*, Vol. I., No. 4, July, 1894, p. 403), and the sociologist who has best understood and most appreciated my contributions to that science, Dr. Albion W. Small, in a private letter from which he kindly allows me to quote, said, "I have felt all along that you have had connotations in mind which, when explained, would put a different look on your propositions about 'feeling and function,' but I am quite sure you have not expressed them so that we can do justice to your idea. My impression is that you have taken for granted some familiarity with certain technical concepts in biology, and that terms which carry a commonplace meaning with you somehow lose important parts of their content among people not acquainted with that biological usage." In view of all this I feel that I need not apologize for setting forth all the steps in the logical process by which I somewhat intuitively reached this principle seventeen years ago (see *Science*, original series, Vol. I., New York, October 23, 1880, p. 210).

* "Dynamic Sociology." New York, 1883, Vol. I., pp. 469, 602; Vol. II., p. 121.

itself of sentient life depended upon the closeness of the adaptation, so the continuance and development of this type of life has constantly required the maintenance of this harmony. It is not generally perceived that there is a strong tendency to depart from it. The organism itself has no inherent reason for maintaining it. Its end being feeling, it has no motive to pursue other ends. If, in a changing environment, it is impelled to perform acts that are opposed to its safety or that of its race, it will perform them in harmony with the inexorable law of its nature. The penalty for such acts is extinction, and this has, in fact, been the fate of millions of beings. The organic world has developed under a law which may be called *the elimination of the wayward.*

But nature is full of resources. As structures developed feeling was intensified, and the increase of feeling was attended with increased waywardness and violation of cosmic law. Immediate impulses could no longer be trusted. With higher organization the conditions of existence grew more delicate and precarious. The simple pursuit of food and safety was no longer sufficient. Provision must be made for a longer period of helplessness in the young, and also for future supplies against climatal changes. A curb must be put to the now fully developed *will.* The next great step, necessary to secure these ends, was the origin of *instinct.* Instinct may be looked upon as a device of nature to make the organism desire to perform acts that subserve function, but which would not otherwise be desired. It consists in a readjustment of the nerve plexuses so that acts shall become pleasurable which do not directly satisfy an immediate want. Without these nervous readjustments which lead the creature to act in ways which, from its own standpoint would be illogical, but which in fact make for preservation, it would perpetually pursue pleasures that lead to destruction. But instincts, too, were developed under the law of advantage, or the survival of the fittest, and the obdurate types that refused to adopt them were crowded out of existence.

There is less difference than is generally supposed between simple functions and instincts. Both came into existence in

the same way, only the latter represent a higher and more complicated condition. This truth has been clearly expressed by M. Letourneau. He says:

"Chez les animaux, même chez les animaux supérieurs et chez le premier d'entre eux, l'homme, il existe quantité de coordinations de mouvements, si profondément inscrites dans les centres nerveux, qu'elles sont en même temps inconscientes et indispensables au maintien de la vie; ce ne sont pas des instincts, ce sont des fonctions. Quand la série des actes, enrégistrée dans les centres nerveux, se rapport au genre d'existence de l'animal, lui dicte qu'il en ait ou non conscience, une certaine conduite dans la vie, il en résulte ce que nous appelons des instincts. Mais, au fond, la raison biologique des fonctions et des instincts est la même." *

Life is a frail and delicate thing, and in the course of its history it has passed through several ordeals. The first of these was when plastic organisms were created, endowed with locomotion, and dependent for subsistence on organic matter, the condition to the existence of which was feeling, as above described. This was the origin of mind. The second ordeal was when the will † had so strongly asserted itself that existence was put in jeopardy. This was remedied by the development of instincts. Passing over minor ones, we come at last to an ordeal still more severe than any of the previous ones. In the natural upward march of the psychic faculty feeling became at length so potent and its demands so imperative that the direct efforts hitherto employed in its satisfaction no longer sufficed, and a new device was gradually elaborated that should secure the ends of the creature with far greater success. This was the "indirect method of conation," ‡ and to the affective faculty was now added the perceptive faculty. The intellect was developed as an aid to the will.§

There is a close analogy, or something much more than an analogy, between the action of the intellectual faculty and that of instinct. Although the method is very different, the

---

* "L'Evolution de la Morale," 2e éd., Paris, 1894, p. 34.

† See "Psychic Factors of Civilization," Chapters viii.–xiv.

‡ "Dynamic Sociology," Vol. II., p. 99.

§ "Psychic Factors," Part II.

purpose is the same, and the general result accomplished by the two faculties is identical,—viz., increased efficiency in securing the satisfaction of desire. We saw that instinct had the effect of making the creature desire to act in ways in which it would not otherwise have acted,—*i.e.*, to act illogically, viewed from the strictly individual standpoint. Now, every indirect action is also, from the same point of view, an illogical action.* Intellect, too, like instinct, changes the direction of desire. It leads the agent to desire the means instead of the end, otherwise, under the laws of the mechanics of mind, there could be no action.†

But this immense gain, from the standpoint of the individual, almost immediately commenced to threaten the destruction of the race of beings to which this faculty had been committed. It was now so easy to secure the satisfaction of desire, and desires had grown so manifold and so vehement, a larger and larger proportion of them not being adapted to function, many, indeed, being directly opposed to it, that obviously, if, under this new dispensation, everything were allowed to go on without restraint, the race of rational beings must quickly run its course and come to naught. Fortunately, this very perceptive faculty, which was being so freely employed in the interest of feeling regardless of function, was also capable of dimly and intuitively *perceiving* the dangers to which it was leading. Along with the individual mind working thus egoistically for the individual's end, keenly pointing out the ways in which pain could be thwarted and pleasure assured, there was also working, broadly, deeply, and subconsciously, what may be properly called a collective or social mind, solemnly warning against the danger, and authoritatively inhibiting all race-destroying actions. A new device, analogous in many respects to instinct on the lower plane, was gradually developed and perfected *pari passu* with the reason on the higher plane. This device was *religion.*

---

* See "Dynamic Sociology," Vol. II., p. 380.

† I have fully explained this principle in a previous article. See *The Monist*, Vol. V., Chicago, January, 1895, pp. 255, 256.

Religion is, therefore, as my thesis asserts, the substitute among rational beings for instinct among irrational beings. Just as the intellect was developed for the purpose of enabling feeling beings to satisfy by indirect methods desires which they could not satisfy by direct methods, so religion came forward as a more powerful curb to the excesses into which this new egoistic agent would have otherwise plunged its unguided possessors, and for which instinct would have proved wholly inadequate.

It is customary to regard instinct as a substitute for reason, but in so far as there is truth in this view it is in an entirely different sense from that in which the terms are here employed. It is possible that the modifications of nerve structure which result in preservative instincts may receive their initial impulse from a dim consciousness of the necessity for the acts which the instincts impel, so that instincts may be said to rest primarily upon a form of awareness that cannot be generically distinguished from incipient reason. It is also true that many of the acts that are dictated by instinct are the same that would have been dictated by a fully developed reason, had such existed, so that instincts seem to embody a sort of collective wisdom which the individual creatures do not possess. But neither of these assumptions is required by a full comprehension of the law of natural selection, and acts apparently the most intelligent may be accounted for under that law on the part of creatures wholly devoid of intelligence. It is therefore perfectly scientific to look upon instincts as the exclusive products of genetic forces. It is certain from their eminently conservative character that they constitute the necessary curb to the rapidly growing passions of psychically evolving creatures which without them would have inevitably whelmed them in destruction, and which, in obedience to the universal biologic law of the elimination of the wayward, actually did doom to extinction a far greater number than instinct had the power to save.

After the appearance of reason upon the scene, passion not certainly having diminished, but having continued to increase, the new power of gratifying passion only served to multiply

the dangers that beset the triumphant legatees of this rich heritage. The very method by which intellect works, far too rapid to give time for the development of instincts, precluded for all future time the employment of this safeguard. A new safeguard must be found commensurate with the forces to be held in check, otherwise the fate of the majority of its predecessors must await the dominant race. Religion, in the primitive and fundamental sense in which the term is here employed, was such a safeguard.

What, then, is religion? If we assume, as I shall do, that it is natural and not supernatural,—*i.e.*, that it grew out of the nature of man, and was not given to him from without, it seems altogether probable that it was mainly a product of reason. It arose simultaneously with the rational faculty, but, as that faculty without some check was essentially destructive, this would have been the case even if reason had had no part in the development of religion; if, for example, religion, like instinct, had been wholly due to natural selection. It is not necessary to discuss this point, but personally I am disposed to ascribe it to the joint action of natural selection and reason. These two influences are inversely proportional. The very feeblest forms of reason, while they might cause wide departures from the path of safe activity, could scarcely work out a plan of salvation. At this stage, when the human organism was mainly animal, the survival of the fittest might ultimately result in the development of structural tendencies to the inhibition of destructive actions. Such tendencies would embody the germs of the religious sentiment. They might be called *religious instincts*, but they would differ from normal instincts in merely restraining unsafe activities instead of producing safe ones. In fact, this is the essential characteristic of religion as distinguished from instinct, that it is negative or restrictive, while instinct is positive and constructive.

If the beginnings of religion were genetic, unconscious, and non-rational, this must have constituted a brief and almost hypothetical stage. With the developing faculty which made the satisfaction of desire so easy, there must have also grown

up an increasing sense of the danger of such unbridled satisfaction. The evil effects of excesses could not have escaped observation. As one after another fell a prey to passion and dropped out of the group, a feeling of the necessity of preventing this grew with the strengthening reason and ultimately took form. This sense, although it must have inhered in the individual mind, was essentially a group sense, and the action in which it resulted was group action. The deep-felt necessity of saving the race inspired the invention and adoption of means to that end. The religious sentiment must be distinguished from its products. The sense of race safety is its very kernel. The primary purpose of religion was at the beginning and always has remained *salvation*. It simply says to the wayward self-seeker, "Thou shalt not," and all the Decalogues have this negative form. But it must enforce its decrees. Even a sense of the penalty for race-destroying acts was powerless to prevent their performance. Some kind of organized system, coercive in its nature, was necessary. The group mind of every race has proved capable of devising such a system. Such are the various religious systems of the world. Whence have they derived their sanction?

There is one fact which all races and peoples, however primitive, and all mankind, however enlightened, have universally recognized. This fact is that there is a power outside themselves which is beyond their control. Rude peoples, living as they always do, in direct contact with nature, are constantly brought into relations with this power and made to feel much more strongly than do civilized races their complete subjection to it. It is this sense of helplessness before the majesty of the environment which, if it is not religion itself, is the foundation upon which all religion is built. It is the *point d'appui* of the group sentiment of safety, that upon which the group reason lays hold to restrain the dangerous activities of the individual reason. Teachers of religion have, I believe, a faint perception of this truth, and at long intervals a more or less definite expression of it may be detected in their utterances, usually, however, so muffled in the blanket of doctrinal language as to be scarcely heard. The following passage is the clearest that has yet come to my notice:

"If you analyze religion—not my religion, but religion itself—you will find that the essential idea which is its very soul, inheres in the relation which exists between man and the infinite power manifested in the universe above him, no matter what your theory of the universe may be. . . . If you study the lowest type of religion that we are able to discover anywhere on the face of the earth, you will find that the people of that time were thinking of themselves and of some mysterious power not themselves,—some power that held their lives, their destiny, their happiness in its hands; and the object of their religion consisted in getting into right relations with this power. And this getting into right relations with the god has been the one object and aim of religion in every age of the world, and no change of thought can possibly outgrow it. So long as men love, think, and feel, have fears and hopes, so long as the universe stands and is the manifestation as now of this inscrutable power, so long man must be conscious that his life, his health, his sanity, his prosperity, his all, depends upon knowing something about this power, and getting, so far as possible, into right relations with it. Paul may talk about being reconciled to God, and Herbert Spencer may talk about being adjusted to our environment, both are seeking after one and the same thing, which is the knowledge of this power and right relations to it."*

Philosophers, too, have occasionally, though rarely, caught a glimpse of this truth, and of such adumbrations I will give one of the least shadowy:

"D'une part, toutes nos inclinations se rallient sous la seule affection qui puisse les discipliner: d'une autre part, toutes nos conceptions se coordonnent d'après un spectacle independant de nous. En même temps, cette économie extérieure devient la base directe de notre conduite, toujours destinée à la subir dignement ou à la modifier sagement. L'être se trouve ainsi lié, en dedans et au dehors, par l'entière convergence de ses sentiments et de ses pensées vers la puissance supérieure qui détermine ses actes. Alors il y a vraiment *religion*, c'est à dire unité complète, tous les moteurs internes étant coordonnés entre eux, et leur ensemble librement soumis à la fatalité extérieure. . . . Telle est l'issue finale du grand dualisme positif entre l'organisme et le milieu, ou plutôt entre l'homme et le monde, ou, mieux encore, entre l'humanité et la terre."†

It must be remembered that with primitive man the unknown was vast. He was absolutely ignorant of the stupendous forces of nature playing about him. It is no part of my purpose to trace the growth of religions out of religion. This has been tried many times, but the history has never seemed

* From a sermon preached by the Rev. Minot J. Savage, D.D., on the 3d of December, 1893, at Washington, D. C., which has not been published. It wa reported in full by Mr. Victor Louis Mason, who has kindly shown me his notes, from which I make the above extract.

† Auguste Comte, "Politique Positive," Vol. II., p. 18.

to me to go back to religion itself. Dr. Edward B. Tylor, than whom no one has more ably treated this class of subjects, has reviewed all known primitive religions, and he arrived at what he aptly styled the "minimum definition" of religion,—viz., "belief in spiritual beings" * Doubtless from the standpoint of the ethnographer this definition is the simplest that could be formulated. It satisfies all the requirements of a natural history of man; but from the standpoint of general or cosmical philosophy it falls far short of a principle that can explain the phenomena of religion. Belief in spiritual beings is not religion itself, but a consequence of religion. It grew out of the fact upon which I have insisted, that the race was in danger from unknown and uncontrollable agencies, and the same faculty that perceived this also sought to explain it. Spirits, ghosts, fetishes, gods,—these were only explanations, deductions, conclusions, products of the dread of the unknown. *Primos in orbe deos fecit timor.* Mythology is philosophy. Theology and science start from the same stake.

It remains to point out how religion took the place of instinct on this higher rational plane, and served effectually to check the evils that reason had so greatly multiplied. Although the *sense of dependence* above described is that which made religious systems possible, it could no more manifest its saving virtues without an organ than a sensory system can act without a motor system. Every human thought, in order to accomplish any purpose, must develop a mechanism through which it can work. Every human institution is the product of a thought. The thought went before and produced the institution. The institution is the mechanical embodiment of the thought. It was so with religious institutions. The religious idea, as I have endeavored to sketch it, worked on the group, on society (for association was taking place at the same time), and in the normal way developed the appropriate organ for its expression, the necessary mechanism for its realization. Religion as an institution is a different thing from religion as an idea. The institution arose like all

* "Primitive Culture." London, 1871, Vol. I., p. 383.

other human institutions, as a product of the social forces brought into equilibrium for the storage and economical expenditure of social energy.* As such it was effective in accomplishing its purpose,—*i.e.*, in performing its function.

In the great dualism of life, religion is the champion of function against feeling, of the race against the individual. It is race reason working for function against individual reason working for feeling. It represents the primordial conservatism of mankind. There has never been a time when the desires of men did not impel them to perform acts destructive to the race. The mandate of individual reason is to obtain satisfaction. Interest is its only guide, the interest of the individual. Now, it constantly happens that acts which are in the interest of the individual are against that of the race. A man may pursue egoistic ends successfully during life by acts that do not react upon himself or tend to do so, and yet his whole course may be inimical to society at large. Most self-seeking is of this nature. The fine maxims to the contrary, and the stories in the Sunday-school books, are merely myths invented by religion to deter from self-seeking. So long as any continue to believe them they have this effect by inspiring fear of consequences or hope of reward for good deeds. But the truly wise no longer believe that "the way of transgressors is hard," or that "the righteous are never forsaken." The same book that teaches these things also teaches that "he that seeketh findeth," and the persistent seeker after his personal advantage usually succeeds in finding it. Says John Stuart Mill:

"The very idea of distributive justice, or of any proportionality between success and merit, or between success and exertion, is in the present state of society so manifestly chimerical as to be relegated to the regions of romance. . . . If persons are helped in their worldly career by their virtues, so are they, and perhaps quite as often, by their vices: by servility and sycophancy, by hard-hearted and close-fisted selfishness, by the permitted lies and tricks of trade, by gambling speculations, not seldom by downright knavery." †

* I have developed this principle in an article entitled "The Mechanics of Society." See the *American Journal of Sociology* for September, 1896, Vol. II., No. 2, pp. 234–254.

† *Fortnightly Review*, Vol. XXXI. (New Series, Vol. XXV.), 1879, p. 226.

Not that there are not vices which react upon the individual and ruin him, but these are the results of irrational impulses. The class of actions here under consideration is that of rational calculation aimed at self-satisfaction. Such actions are opposed to the safety of society because the gain to self is chiefly at the expense of others, and the number injured is far greater than the number benefited. The algebraic sum is a loss of social efficiency and a menace to the race. All forms of exploitation of the many by the few come under this head. The evil is twofold. It affects the existing group and it affects the future. It need not at all affect the individual either at the time or at any other time. Such also are all destructive actions that waste the accumulations of time and labor.

Another important class, and the one that religion earliest grappled with and still contends against, results from the powerful reproductive passion. It was possible for primitive peoples to pursue this form of satisfaction egoistically, to lead unregulated, promiscuous lives, with no concern for the functional consequences, and the result would be that while no evils might attend the individuals so acting, while the male sex at least might have considerable to gain and little to lose, the offspring would be neglected and would perish and the race would be, if not destroyed, at least so reduced in strength as to become a prey to other races that had learned to regulate this class of conduct. Religion has been the chief agent in the organization of marriage systems and in establishing the family relation upon which society so largely rests.

But it is needless to multiply examples. Suffice it to say that the mission of religion was to restrain the will. It represented the race and the future; it denied the claims of feeling; it demanded sacrifice. It may be called the *social instinct.* But there are two things commonly claimed for it that form no part of its purpose. These are *altruism* and *progress.* Although the natural enemy of egoism because race-destructive, and although perpetually enjoining group action and social action, religion in its essence has nothing to do with sympathy, or any other kind of 'pathy. It deals with func-

tion, not feeling, and simply serves Dame Nature in her great cosmic scheme of preserving, perpetuating, and increasing life. If to these can be added the perfectionment of living beings, this is only because such perfectionment is a means to the supreme end. It has no reference to the deepening or heightening of the quality of sentiment. Anything in existing religions that seems to contradict this statement is something superadded to religion itself—some late graft upon the original stock—and belongs to a modern period.

As regards progress, the case is still clearer, and here we encounter a singular paradox. Religion may be regarded as the guardian of order, but not for the purpose of securing progress. The progress of the world has consisted entirely in the degree to which the claims of feeling have commanded recognition. What is meant by progress when speaking of man is never the mere increase in the number of human beings. The attempt thus to define it was Mr. Kidd's fatal mistake.* In so far as it ever refers to the perfection of the human type progress has in view man's capacity to enjoy. Social progress consists in the better realization of the power to satisfy want. Æsthetic progress is the increase and refinement of tastes and the increased opportunity to gratify them. All forms of progress are so many victories of the will over nature, of feeling over function. It is in the nature of religion to resist these tendencies. They are centrifugal, and therefore dangerous. Religion is the force of social gravitation that holds the social world in its orbit. The primary analogy is this cosmic one which likens religion to the gravitant and reason to the radiant forces of the universe. Upon this I need not dwell. But there is a biologic analogy which comes much nearer home, and which it is important to note. This likens religion to heredity and reason to variation in the organic world. The former preserves the type while the latter modifies it; the one tends to fix the species, the other to transform it. Biologists are now familiar with this great antithesis which inheres in the entire history of

* "Social Evolution," by Benjamin Kidd. London and New York, 1894.

life. Even Goethe gave expression to it, and in the following form:

"Die Idee der Metamorphose ist gleich der *vis centrifuga* und würde sich ins Unendliche verlieren, wäre ihr nicht ein Gegengewicht zugeben: ich meine den Specificationstrieb, das zähe Beharrlichkeitsvermögen dessen, was einmal zur Wirklichkeit gekommen, eine *vis centripeta*, welcher in ihrem tiefsten Grunde keine Aeusserlichkeit etwas anhaben kann."*

Von Baer arrived at the same truth independently, and the transformist school of biologists have shown that adaptation and modification are the products of the law of variation held in check by the power of heredity. Human progress has followed a precisely similar course, and has been the product of the law of reason held in check by the power of religion. When, therefore, we say that religion is non-progressive, we mean nothing more than when we say that heredity is non-progressive. But for the law of variation there would certainly be no organic development, and if religion worked alone there could be no human progress. But, on the other hand, it could be said that without the hereditary check the organic world would be whirled out of existence by the unrestrained tendency to vary, and, similarly, without the religious check the human race would have been borne to destruction by the extravagant vagaries of the unbridled reason. It is not progress that either heredity or religion opposes, but change, and progress in both the organic and social realms is a compromise between centripetal and centrifugal forces. Cosmic, organic, and superorganic evolution takes place according to one principle,—the principle of organization, which consists in the natural storage and economic expenditure of energy through progressively higher products of these harmoniously interacting antagonistic forces.†

Another point of view from which this fundamental an-

* Goethe, "Metamorphose der Thiere."

† I have worked out these principles in several articles. See, especially, "Cosmic and Organic Evolution," *Popular Science Monthly*, Vol. XI., October, 1877, pp. 672–682; "The Natural Storage of Energy," *The Monist*, Vol. V., January, 1895, pp. 247–263; "The Mechanics of Society," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. II., September, 1896, pp. 234–254.

tithesis may be contemplated is that of economics. That science deals exclusively with *utility*. Religion may be said to be diametrically opposed to it in that it deals exclusively with *necessity*.* This explains its superior sanction. The primary requisite is to live. If existence is lost all is lost. It is useless to discuss degrees of enjoyment until life is first secure. As a matter of fact, man has been thus far chiefly engaged in a struggle for existence. It is only in the later stages of social development, and among the most favored classes of society, that there has been any energy left to expend in efforts to be happy. The mass is everywhere exhausting all its energies in the effort to live. This is largely due to social and moral restraints, to exploitation by the egoistic reason of the specially endowed or favorably circumstanced. Formerly it was chiefly oppression,—*i.e.*, the exploitation of the governing class. The priesthoods that have embodied the germ of religion have contributed their share, and the essential conservatism of religion has usually allied it with the "powers that be." Man's struggles for liberty, of which human history is chiefly the record, have consisted simply in so many assertions of the claims of feeling against function, so many demands of utility upon necessity. Human progress has consisted in the reluctant concession of such of these claims and demands as did not threaten existence.

Throughout western Europe and America this struggle is chiefly over. The ruling class is at the feet of the Demos and the power of the priesthood is broken. But a new kind of oppression has taken the place of the old. A new set of rulers has come forward. The owners of the means of subsistence now dictate to the masses. The struggle for existence goes on as before, and, as before, it is the egoistic reason, coupled with the accident of position and backed by the whole body of proprietary law, that is able to exploit the mass not favored by these conditions. The "labor question" of to-day is a new assertion of the claims of feeling

* I use these terms in the sense in which they were defined by me in the *American Journal of Sociology* for March, 1896, Vol. I., p. 627.

against function, a renewed demand of utility upon necessity. It is essentially utilitarian, and economists are just beginning to understand that their science is dynamic, and that "consumption," *i.e.*, enjoyment, *i.e.*, feeling, constitutes its true basis. To all of which religion, from its very nature, is opposed.

Here, however, an important qualification is to be noted. The mind naturally tends to leave out the steps by which it has arrived at results. This tendency was mentioned in the early part of this paper, where it was shown that it is not nourishment that the animal seeks, but pleasure; not death or destruction that it fears or flies from, but pain. Now, just as we habitually speak of feeling in terms of function and neglect the important step that lies between them, so in speaking of religion as opposed to pleasure we employ a similar ellipsis. It is not pleasure that religion opposes, but danger; and pleasure is so often dangerous, especially in the earlier stages of existence,—in the state that Dr. Patten has so expressively denominated a "pain economy," *—that the two are ultimately confounded. This explains the next point to be considered.

It belongs to the true nature of religion constantly to yield to the demands of reason and of feeling. It is no reproach to it that it has so yielded. Its opposition, as we have seen, is not based on any hostility to pleasure *per se*. It is only as a source of danger that it attacks it. Its mission is not to destroy, but to conserve. It is not pleasure itself that is bad, but the acts it produces. Selfish greed is execrable, but the fruits of honest toil are noble. Promiscuity is hateful, but wedlock is sacred. Just as gravitation must compromise with radiation to produce an orb of space, just as heredity must compromise with variation to develop an organic being, just as function must compromise with feeling to make an animal world possible, just as instinct must compromise with will to secure the highest animal development, so, on the same gen-

* See his "Theory of Social Forces." Supplement to the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* for January, 1896.

eral principle, and in strict continuation of this same grand series of cosmic steps, must religion yield to the demands of reason wherever they are safe before anything worth conserving can be produced by man.

It is true that many of the late derivative products that call themselves religions do combat pleasure *per se*, but, as I have shown, these are artificially distorted forms, and such doctrines are excrescences that have grown out of the normal religious trunk. They are so far removed from the region of healthy circulation that the very ground of the doctrines is lost sight of, and the means that true religion employs are mistaken for its end. All forms of religious austerity, of self-abnegation, asceticism, puritanism, etc., are abnormal growths of this kind, and, like certain anatomical organs that once had a purpose, but are no longer needed, they have become pathologic. This tendency to survival is universal. The persistence of the obsolete is a principle of the organic and superorganic worlds alike. The anchoret hates pleasure for the same reason that the miser loves money.

It follows that the recognition of the claims of reason to the full satisfaction of feeling must be yielded by religion as fast as adequate guaranties are furnished that everything useful thus far created at so great expense shall be conserved; and the most ardent votary of progress ought to admit that without such guaranty it should not be yielded. The question, therefore, naturally arises, Will religion ever cease to furnish a necessary check to the extravagances of reason and of passion? We saw that religion has its sanction in the mystery of the universe, that it is the vastness of the unknown that furnishes it its hold upon mankind. Will that chasm ever be closed? Shall science, brushing aside one after another the cobwebs that obscure the vaults of nature, at last so completely lay bare her secrets that no hidden terrors will remain? Are science and religion, which, as we saw, started together, but which have so widely diverged in their course, destined to converge and ultimately to coalesce? Will science finally swallow up religion, assume its functions, and stand wholly in its stead? We can only answer these questions by noting

the history of science thus far, by considering its long series of conquests and the steady but orderly recoil of religion as the guaranties of safety were one after another placed in its hands. Noting this, and comparing the condition of the vanguard of civilization with that of its dark beginning, it seems impossible to doubt, not that religion is ever to disappear, but that it will ultimately put all confidence in reason and cease to raise its voice against the realization on the part of man of the fullest capabilities of his nature.

Numerous objections may of course be raised by the captious to the general theory above outlined. I shall only attempt to anticipate one of these. Some, I fancy, will say that it is not religion that I am describing, but ethics. I think I can show that this is not the case. No two things have been more hopelessly confused than ethics and religion. By way of clearing up this confusion, it should be stated at the outset that ethics is wholly concerned with feeling,* while, as I have shown in this article, religion is wholly concerned with function. Pleasure and pain furnish the only basis for a moral quality, while religion has nothing to do with pleasure and pain, but is solely devoted to the maintenance of life. It is exclusively a cosmical agent. In so far, then, as moral philosophers have occupied themselves with this latter problem they have been dealing with religion, and whenever religious teachers talk of happiness and misery they are encroaching upon the domain of ethics. Superficial observers may say that religion chiefly deals with happiness and misery —in another world. Two of the great religions of the world do, in fact, deal mainly with this aspect, but they do not thereby refute the above statements. The doctrine of immortality is one of those late grafts upon the primary stock of religion to which reference has been made. Moreover, it is one of the chief concessions that religion has been compelled to make to the demands of reason for the recognition of the claims of feeling, a concession which was found to be altogether safe.

---

* I have furnished a demonstration of this statement in another paper. See INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS for July, 1896, Vol. VI., pp. 443, 444.

These demands had become irresistible in the days of Plato, and the creation of a future state in which feeling should be everything was one of the most sweeping of the whole series of compromises between religion and reason. By it religion saved itself from being completely set aside by the rational will of a determined race, while reason accepted it in the face of its unthinkable assumption of a beginning without an end, an eternity exclusively *a parte post.*

It has been argued that Western peoples are proved by this to be less logical than the Orientals, with their philosophically superior doctrines of transmigration and nirvana, but this is probably not the case, and the explanation is to be sought in the greater power of the egoistic will of the Western world, which rudely thrusts aside all subtle points of logic and makes them wholly subordinate to considerations of interest. The doctrine of immortality, like all the other dogmas of modern faiths, has no connection with the essentials of religion, although it was a necessary phase in the history of the vicissitudes that religion has been compelled to pass through.

I will conclude with a personal remark. Much has been said on the subject of a reconciliation of science and religion. I have not been one of the reconcilers; but if the definition of religion which I have here formulated is correct, it embodies a reconciliation far more complete than any that have been hitherto proposed. If it seems to differ from the view of religion that I have formerly expressed, it is because, in common with most others, I have heretofore taken the actual condition of religion as representing its real nature. I am far from saying that there is anything essentially incorrect in this, and it may well be that what I have here called religion ought to go by some other name. If it is not religion, it is without a name. The name is certainly a matter of little moment. If I have described something that has hitherto escaped attention, I am quite willing another shall give it a name. But that I have in the present essay outlined a chapter still to be written in the history of life, of mind, and of man, I shall remain convinced until clearly shown to be in error.

LESTER F. WARD.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

SOME PRESUPPOSITIONS FOR A HISTORY OF MORAL PROGRESS IN THE FIRST THREE CENTURIES, A.D.

(1) *Moral progress occurs when either the natural tendencies of the individuals composing a community, or their environment, have been modified for the better.* Human nature, as those must believe who accept Weissmann's doctrine of heredity, can really improve only when the state of civilization favors the perpetuation of the superior variations and the extinction of the inferior. A continuous process of weeding is necessary even to prevent decline, for if any nation existed in which natural selection were wholly inoperative, that nation would not remain stationary, but would deteriorate, there being always a tendency to revert to an older and inferior type. Unless, therefore, the population is recruited from the superior types in a larger proportion than from the inferior, each generation will be, as regards natural endowments, inferior to its predecessor. Natural selection is, however, not the only force to be taken into account. Acquired characteristics cannot, it appears, be transmitted; but acquired knowledge and experience, whether scientific or moral, can be and are; so that it is possible for a race which is constitutionally inferior to be more richly endowed with wisdom for the conduct of life than another in which natural selection has acted more beneficently. Those religious, moral, and political ideas which have a profound influence upon conduct, and give each civilization its character, struggle for life among themselves much as living creatures do, the "fittest" surviving.

(2) *There may be a healthy evolution of ideas while there is no racial progress but deterioration.* History supplies several examples of this: but such a state of things cannot last long. The two factors of progress must always act and react upon each other; a decaying race will gradually lose or pervert its moral inheritance; while on the other hand a truly progressive

race is the best field for true progress in morality, science, and art.

(3) A state may be tempted by the prospect of immediate advantage, or compelled, for defence against aggression, to follow a course of development very prejudicial to true moral and intellectual progress. *Immediate needs may demand the sacrifice of long hopes*, or a lower success may be achieved at the cost of a higher. We may go farther, and say that a state has to pay for every achievement with its heart's blood. Just as the human organism is in constant danger of being poisoned by the products of its own activity, so the disease of which a nation or a civilization dies may have been the main factor in its most conspicuous triumphs. "Nicht jeden Wochenschluss macht Gott die Zeche." There are some very old contests which are not yet decided,—the rivalry of Europe and Asia, for example. The most strenuous, complex, expensive type of civilization is at present the victor; but the last word may yet rest with the cheap races of the East.

(4) *Stress of competition is generally a cause of progress, but sometimes of decay.* If trees grows too close, they spoil each other's growth, and the whole wood is stunted. A *régime* of unlimited and unregulated competition should issue in the survival of a proletariat of laborers with the habits of Chinese, exploited by employers with the methods of modern sweaters. Mr. Kidd does not see this; and this is, in my opinion, one of the main defects in his study of social evolution. On the other hand, relaxation of pressure is generally a cause of decline; but it need not be so always, as Mr. Kidd supposes. For (*a*) racial improvement may be effected (as it is to a slight extent among the intelligent classes already) by *rational* selection; and (*b*) the evolution of *ideas* may go on all the better when the industrial stress is relaxed.

(5) *The most brilliant eras follow rather than coincide with those of real racial progress.* During its most brilliant productive periods, a nation is probably living upon its capital. The great principles of anabolism and catabolism, as explained by Messrs. Geddes and Thomson in their work on "The Evolution of Sex," apply to social as well as to in-

dividual organisms. A good historical example is furnished by Greece in the fifth century B.C. This epoch, splendid as it was, was really the beginning of the breaking up of the Hellenic race. Mediæval Italy is another good instance. People often make the serious mistake of regarding the license and corruption of such catabolic periods as a sign or even a cause of their intellectual brilliance; whereas, in truth, these are the characteristics of a society which is squandering its stores.

(6) *Periods of corruption are often symptomatic of political and social disintegration, not of racial decay.* In such cases the license and profligacy will appear chiefly in one class, while in another fresh and healthy ideas may be growing. On the other hand, periods of primitive simplicity and purity, if they ever exist, are for the most part times when the recognized obligations of morality are not very far from the natural instincts: they are times when men are "alive without the law," in St. Paul's phrase.

(7) *Historical crises, convulsions, or cataclysms resemble the cataracts on a great river, which add nothing to the volume of its water.*

(8) *Religious movements always arise from social needs.* Suffering reveals to man the inadequacy of his present institutions and of the ideas which they embody; soon new ideas dawn upon him, leading him to fresh hopes and aspirations. At first the contrast between the *civitas Dei* and the world seems very sharp; but by degrees the new ideas begin to shape institutions, and "the world" no longer appears wholly evil. As this process continues, the new ideas begin, as it were, to stand on their own feet, without supernatural sanction, and what we call an irreligious age results. But soon the social structure again shows signs of breaking at various points; men see once more that they have not reached their goal, nor solved the great problems of human life: once more they reflect, aspire, and pray, until new heights become visible amid the clouds, and new ideals arise, in accordance with which the framework of society must be gradually adjusted.

(9) *In speaking of Christianity, we must always distinguish*

between the religion as it is in its essence and potentiality and the forms which it has actually assumed in the lives and minds of its professors. It is obviously in the first sense only that any religion can claim to be absolute. And here two curious features in the history of religious evolution may be mentioned, which have not yet, I think, been adequately dealt with. First, in the history of Christianity, at any rate, we must recognize the existence of a kind of instinct or guidance which again and again made the leaders of the Church wiser than they knew. In no case can it be seriously urged that the "heretical" party proved to be in the right. (I speak, of course, of the early centuries.) "Opinionis commenta delet dies; naturæ indicia confirmat." Next, religions have a remarkable tendency to what biologists call atavism, or reversion to an earlier and discarded type. Christianity arose, as we all know, very largely as a protest against the traditionalism, formalism, and sacerdotalism of the Jewish hierarchy. But then, after nearly strangling these vipers, like an infant Hercules, in her cradle, the Church proceeded to nurse them in her bosom; and to this day there is not a single Christian community which is not more Jewish than the New Testament. Exactly in the same way, Neoplatonism, in its essence a pure idealistic philosophy, but wholly Greek, as I believe, in its origin, retained Homer and Hesiod as *its* Old Testament!

(10) Can we give a *natural* explanation of the appearance of the highest religion two thousand years ago? I think it must be found in the unparalleled favorableness of the circumstances, constituting together the "fulness of time" of which St. Paul speaks. This natural explanation is not irreligious. Nothing can be revealed till there are eyes to see it, and we must suppose that God, being good, will always reveal Himself at the earliest possible moment. And, moreover, Christianity only claims finality as being itself a principle of growth and development. The parables of the grain of mustard seed, and of the corn of wheat, the declaration of Christ, "I have many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear them now," above all the promise of the indwelling Spirit, "the Guide unto all truth," give a clearer expression to the idea of devel-

opment than it had before received. Christianity thus conceived can never be transcended, though it may from time to time assume transient phases which have to be left behind. From this point of view, it is, of course, true that, in Justin's words, "those before Christ who lived in correspondence with the eternal Reason were Christians, though they were not called so;" but those who follow this line of argument are perhaps in some danger of falling into the unfairness censured by Goethe, who complained that Christian apologists strip the finest feathers from all the fowls of the air to adorn their own bird of paradise.

(11) *The Church in the second and third centuries was a reform party in the Roman Empire, which aimed at the reconstruction of society on ethical principles.* It was a new and original experiment,—this of making the public conscience the basis of a social organization. The Church grasped two facts of the highest importance,—first, that an organization of social life was imperatively necessary; and, second, that nothing was to be hoped for from either the imperial government or any of the popular religions. Neoplatonism tried to rebuild the old religions on the basis of the empire; but both the foundation and the materials were rotten, and the attempt failed. Christianity set up an *imperium in imperio*, governed by organized public opinion, and succeeded, until the unfortunate alliance with Imperialism, which dates from the Edict of Milan, crippled her energies, and perhaps ended for a long period the beneficent activity of her organization as a civilizing and reforming power.

(12) Amid the deep disillusionment and despondency which had overtaken the Roman Empire, all thoughtful men were laboring to find some remedy for what seemed like a mortal sickness. With a true diagnosis men turned to those problems which arise immediately out of the two great primary instincts,—self-preservation and reproduction. The old civilization had been recklessly wasteful in both these matters, attaching very little value to human life, and permitting every kind of abuse in the indulgence of appetite. Some new sanction was imperatively necessary which should regulate both on a sounder basis.

(*a*) *Growing sense of the value of human life.* The maxim "homo sum; humani nihil a me alienum puto" was a great discovery; and so was Juvenal's dictum, "nulla umquam de morte hominis cunctatio longa est." Historians have done scant justice to the humanitarian movement in Greece, which, perhaps, began with Euripides, and which seems to have found expression in the comedies of Menander. The victory of Rome threw this movement back at least two centuries; it is not till the latter half of the first century A.D. that we find a spirit so humane and philanthropic in the Latin world. Christianity, with its doctrine of individual souls, each having an infinite value, exercised an immediate and powerful influence in stopping the waste of human lives: infanticide, abortion, gladiatorial shows, suicide, military massacres, were all alike condemned by the Church, on the ground that no wanton expenditure of human life may be called a *vile damnum;* and there was even a strong feeling among Christians that military service was unlawful. In the long run these doctrines were bound to stop the depopulation of Europe; though, as will be shown presently, the effect could not be manifested at once.

(It has been objected—*e.g.*, by Professor Flint—that the philosophy of history produced by Christianity was "excessively one-sided," because it allowed the significance of industry, commerce, and wealth—all the very important economic side of history—to drop out of sight. The same indictment has been brought against Neoplatonism. But the fault was that of the age, not of the religion or the philosophy. As Professor H. Nettleship said in this JOURNAL (January, 1892, Vol. II., page 225), under the Roman empire "the principles of political economy were not understood at all, taxation was based upon wrong principles, and scientific knowledge was not to any great extent applied to beneficent inventions." Christianity has proved, in the course of time, that it is capable of turning out Quakers and Scotchmen as genuine products of some of its principles; and if it is worth while to defend Neoplatonism against the charge of being "unpractical," it may be pointed out that mystics (*e.g.*, Plotinus, Henry

More, and John Smith, of Cambridge) have generally been excellent men of business. We have no right to expect that a moral and religious revolution should cause Adam Smith to be incarnated fifteen hundred years before his time.)

(*b*) *Growing sense of the necessity of regulating sexual relations.* It is a curious question, to which apparently no answer can be given, when and why the human species lost the periodic instinct. This peculiarity in the human race, which Aristotle mentions with some complacency as a proof of our superiority to the brutes, is one cause of the extreme disorder which this appetite has always caused in civilized and uncivilized societies. Another cause is the saving of life which results whenever men associate together for mutual protection and help. I mean that in any kind of civilized society, if marriage soon after the age of puberty were universal, a large number of children would be born whom it would be impossible to keep alive. We may say, therefore, that the strength of this appetite is at best an inconvenience in any civilized community. In these circumstances man very soon began to use his reason to outwit nature. Superfluous children were got rid of by infanticide and abortion, and the unfortunate discovery of παιδεραστία seemed to offer another solution of the difficulty. With regard to this latter vice, Greek and Roman history shows that it did not always argue or cause moral depravity: among other great names, Sophocles, Euripides, Pindar, Zeno, Horace, and even Virgil, Augustus, and all his successors except Claudius, down to Antoninus Pius, have either confessed it or were suspected of it by their contemporaries: but Plato (in the *Laws*) speaks of it as "only recent" in Greece, and has already discerned its mischievous effects. From the point of view of the sociologist, it is the most disastrous of discoveries; it undoubtedly helped largely to depopulate Greece, and we have evidence of its prevalence in several other states which decayed,—the Etruscans (on the authority of Timæus and Theopompus), the Persians (Herodotus says παῤ Ἑλλήνων μαθόντες), the Canaanites, the Tartars, the Arabians, and in modern times the Turks. In our period the necessity was widely felt of finding some sanction

which should regulate these relations. Musonius and Epictetus are already found to maintain that no indulgence is justifiable outside monogamous marriage, and Marcus Aurelius, a hundred years later, thanks the gods that he "touched neither Benedicta nor Theodotus," with whom, in his young days, he had fallen in love. The Neoplatonist philosophers were for the most part celibates on principle; and the idea that even marriage is a lapse from purity was by no means confined to Christian monks. The teaching of the Christian Church was, of course, definite enough as regards practice, but it was found very difficult to frame cogent and consistent reasons for the legislation. There was a marked tendency, both within and outside of the sphere of Christian influence, to regard the act as in its nature contaminating, and only allowed in marriage in order to continue the species, or "to produce virgins," as Jerome puts it. This advocacy of celibacy was not due entirely to dualistic asceticisms. The principle of abstinence had to assert itself in a harsh and uncompromising form, as against the prevalent licentiousness: the *possibility* of the encratite life had to be established. Epictetus had said *πρὸ γάμου εἰς δύναμιν καθαρευτέον*: the Church must be able to add *ἀλλὰ δύνασθε*. Again, in the lives of the ascetics we trace the spontaneous recoil of a large portion of the body politic from the poison which was destroying it: perhaps in no other way could the disease be worked out of the system. It was a desperate remedy, of course, to sterilize the moral *élite* for some centuries: some may think, with Mr. Galton, that no disease could be worse than such social surgery, and that the brutality of the middle ages was the inevitable result of the monastic system. But, in the long run, the victory was probably worth the sacrifice. In the Teutonic countries, at any rate, the sexes now mix pretty freely without scandal or danger; and few will deny that this step towards real civilization is the fruit of the steady assertion of its practicability by the Church; though morality has here received a most important aid from the democratic principle of equality of consideration. (If any one doubts how much we owe to this latter principle in the matter of sexual

relations, let him study what has lately been written about the state of morality in Russia, or, I regret to say, the exploits of the English settlers in Rhodesia.) But to return to the Roman empire in our period. The recoil from unbridled sensuality was, as I have said, instinctive, and, as usual in such cases, the instinct took the form of a bare prohibition under supernatural sanction: when the Fathers of the Church try to reason about it, they generally go wrong, extolling celibacy as the higher state, and degrading marriage. A modern moralist would, I suppose, take one of the two following lines of argument in dealing with a libertine: (*a*) "Society has a right to demand of its members, and its members have in certain circumstances the right to demand of each other, hard work and self-denial; but neither society at large, nor any of its members, has the right to demand, nor to encourage by offering payment, any service which maims the personality of him or her who offers it. The ultimate aim of society being that every member of it may have the opportunity of attaining the highest moral, intellectual, and physical development of which he or she is capable, any institution (and at present there are many) which thwarts this aim is essentially evil, and should only be tolerated where it is clearly unavoidable. The social evil in question involves, by common consent, degradation to one if not both parties, and sins most flagrantly against the ideal which society should put before itself. And it is in no way necessary: it is therefore detestable." (*b*) "The most distinctive doctrine of Christian ethics is that our nature is our enemy until we have conquered her: we must die before we can live; so only can we arrive at a reconciliation between flesh and spirit. Here, then, is the justification of the Christian legislation about social purity. For when the appetite is under control, we no longer wish to indulge it in loveless unions." It must be admitted that both these arguments apply in a much weakened form, if they apply at all, to those forms of concubinage which most resemble marriage: but we are not now considering the causes which lead to the omission of the legal or of the religious ceremony. The two lines of argument here suggested are both based on

the Christian view of social and personal morality, and both were used by the early Church; but the leaders of the movement were often carried away by a fanaticism very closely analogous to that of our temperance advocates. Indeed, there are few more interesting parallels in the history of moral reform than that between the "total abstinence" propagandists in the fourth and following centuries and now in the nineteenth.

Some of these "presuppositions" are no doubt disputable, and I must apologize for having thrown them together in this short article σποράδην καὶ ἀτάκτως. My object has been to suggest that there is room for a history of morals in this most interesting period, written on somewhat different lines from Mr. Lecky's justly celebrated work. Instead of beginning with a comparison of utilitarian and intuitional morality, it should first consider the conditions which determine the growth and decay of states, with especial reference to moral theory and practice, and should then try to form an estimate of the moral results to the population of the Roman empire of slavery, of miscegenation, of the fusion of nationalities, and of creed, and so forth. In short, the history of ideas during that period should be treated by sociological methods, as part of the natural history of mankind; and, writing as a Christian, I can see no reason why the Christian revelation should not be freely treated in the same manner as the other religious movements of the time. Those who, like Justin, Clement, and Origen, see the hand of the Divine Logos in all history will find nothing inconsistent in attempting a natural history of a revelation which they believe to be divine.

W. R. Inge.

Hertford College, Oxford.

THE BEARING OF THE DOCTRINE OF SELECTION UPON THE SOCIAL PROBLEM.

How completely the attitude of cultivated circles towards the masses has changed in the course of a century is strikingly illustrated if we compare a significant remark in the "Wealth of Nations" with a weighty passage in Mr. Bryce's "American Commonwealth." In treating "Of the Wages of Labor," Adam Smith mentions what in his day was "the common complaint that luxury extends itself even to the lowest ranks of the people, and that the laboring poor will not now be contented with the same food, clothing, and lodgings which satisfied them in former times." He goes on in all seriousness, howbeit with a consciousness of running counter to the generally received opinion, to ask, "Is this improvement in the circumstances of the lower ranks of the people to be regarded as an advantage or as an inconveniency to the society?"—a query he briefly answers, as might be expected, by affirming and substantiating the general benefit to society of a higher standard of wages. This citation from Adam Smith gives us an inkling of the prevalent feeling among the English upper classes in 1776 towards the "laboring poor." To-day but few would think seriously of raising such an issue as to the social benefit of high wages or of solemnly defending a thesis to modern ears so self-evident.

Contrasted with this echo from the past is Mr. Bryce's depiction of one of the distinguishing features of the public sentiment of the present age. After commenting on the way in which the triumphs of science have influenced us by enlarging our ideas of comfort, he adds, "Still greater has been the influence of a quickened moral sensitiveness and philanthropic sympathy. The sight of preventable evil is painful, and is felt as a reproach. He who preaches patience and reliance upon natural progress is thought callous. The sense of sin may, as theologians tell us, be declining, but the dislike to degrading and brutalizing vice is increasing; there is a

warmer recognition of the responsibility of each man for his neighbor, and a more earnest zeal in works of moral reform."

So far am I from drawing any inferences flattering to our own age from the remarks of these two observers, that I freely confess that there is hardly less to condemn in the unctuous social sentimentality of this generation than in the selfish apathy of the last. Sentiment, after all, whether selfish or altruistic, is but the raw material of morality, and unless transfused by rational purpose is morally colorless. But what does appear from these remarks, both so representative of the two respective periods, is the changed attitude of the public mind towards social questions. It illustrates the contention so frequently made, that "the problem of social well-being is one which belongs peculiarly to the present time." The Sphinx has put tantalizing questions to other generations than our own; but to us her most common riddle is summed up in the so-called Social Problem. To state precisely what this problem is would require a long diagnosis, and such a diagnosis would probably issue in an attempt to unravel a plexus of mutually determining causes. Without attempting this nice task of social dissection, it is easy enough to sum up the external aspects of the case. Demos is grumbling over his lot, and Public Sentiment, instead of sharply telling him to accuse no man falsely and to be content with his wages, assures him of sympathy in his endeavors and interest in his condition. How much of this discontent is well founded is not here the question. But it may be worth our while to ask what considerations should determine our attitude towards the social problem. How high hopes of social betterment may we intelligently entertain? Or how complete must be the failure of reform before we may honorably throw away sword and shield and blindly submit to "the force not ourselves which makes for production"?

It is with an uneasy consciousness of bringing out of the economic treasure-house things old rather than new that I essay to revert to the law of selection as throwing a ray of light on this question. This law of selection is not indeed the only nor even the main determinant of one's attitude

towards God or man. But some things that law does say most emphatically, and these things it may be worth our while to rephrase.

It is not very surprising that the law of survival through struggle has encountered some sturdy rebuffs. Its early conquest of many positive sciences was so complete and so speedy that its extensive sway was easily mistaken for universal dominion. The ore extracted to-day from the Darwinian lode does not seem to dwindle very perceptibly in amount, but the most cautious assayers have gauged pretty conclusively its quality. Weighed in the scales of an impartial philosophical analysis we discover in the law of selection only a clue to certain genetic processes and no final theory of the universe. The most complete articulation of phenomena upon the framework of Development could not affect the dictum of the great English idealist, that knowledge can never be a part or product of nature in the sense in which nature is said to be an object of knowledge. But when all this is admitted, the question arises whether for purposes of social study we have exhausted the significance of the fact of "selective slaughter." I do not think we have done so, nor do I know of any question whose solution would more greatly advance our knowledge of human society than the question how far and in what ways the law of selection acts among mankind.

Our conception of "animated nature" has been revolutionized by the recognized fact of selection. We no longer think of Providence as a Great Game-Keeper who "providentially caters for the sparrow;" and there are few, I suppose, who would longer deny that the seeds of potential life, animal and vegetable, are enormously in excess of the number that can possibly be maintained alive, and that the resulting intensity of competition for subsistence makes the world at once a cock-pit and *crêche* where none but the ablest conquer and perpetuate their kind. There are perhaps adumbrations of another order of things even in the province of animal life. Mr. Drummond thinks to find the altruistic microbe in very early forms of life, and Mr. Leslie Stephen points out "a

system of tacit alliances" in the midst of this interminable conflict. Still, conflict is the rule and "tacit alliances" are admittedly the exception. And the question that presses home for answer is this: Does the law of selection operate in human society? does it prevail there in part, or unreservedly, or at all?

The answer is not difficult if we confine ourselves to general statements. This merciless struggle for mere existence is to some extent changed in human society, and the residual competitive process is altered so as generally to become a struggle for domination instead of a struggle for life. Such domination of the weak by the strong may be compatible with mutual service and profit. The area of competition is also narrowed so as no longer to cover the family circle. Within the family the weakest are by the sacrifices of the other members protected from the pitiless struggle to which the weak must succumb were family support withdrawn. So within the state the competitive plane has been raised, so that a predatory life to-day must be one of wits rather than of weapons. The competition of industry, where failure means loss of control over capital, has largely supplanted the competition of war, where failure meant slavery or death. Indeed, so altered and modified has the selective process in human society become that we may be tempted to believe this law of minor importance after all.

Such a conclusion, however, would be highly erroneous. The nature of the competitive struggle has been changed but in part, and the lower the descent we make in the social scale the harsher and more brutal becomes the aspect of the strife and the more apparent the proportion of those "unhappy persons who, in the great lottery of life, have drawn a blank." The higher mortality and the shorter average duration of life which characterize the "submerged tenth" as compared with the well-to-do classes (or which characterize the American negro as compared with the white race in this country), prove conclusively that on the margin of industrial society the unfit "perish," or, what comes to the same thing, they regularly meet an untimely end from the lack of adequate food, shelter,

clothing, and care. If their death differs from that of the beasts that perish, it is because society has decreed that the possession of property rather than mere physical prowess shall be the condition of survival on the new plane of social competition.

This is a very sobering reflection. It may even be pronounced dismal, but we shall not get away from this elemental fact in human society by reviling the phrase which embodies the truth. Seen in this light, the hackneyed saw that God never makes a mouth without providing two hands to feed it becomes a silly attempt to plaster with an epigram a putrefying sore. And the same might be said of Southey's remark that Malthus's doctrine asserts that "God makes men and women faster than he can feed them."

If, then, it be true that the selective struggle on the margin of industrial society is only a prolonged and peaceable version of the cruder struggle for existence in the animal world, what bearing will this fact have upon the social problem,—upon the general interest in and demand for the betterment of the condition of the lower classes?

First, it precludes all optimistic anticipations for the future of society. By this I do not mean that we may entertain no hope of any essential social betterment. But by optimistic anticipations I mean such as apprehend that society in the future will see the disappearance of material want and its attendant suffering. We Americans are much too prone to indulge in unwarrantable expectations of a roseate hue. Our old men dream dreams and our young men see visions with astonishing facility. There is much in our history to explain or even to excuse this tendency on our part. The subjugation of a continent gave such ample scope to enterprise that we had all but forgotten that our territory was not boundless. We are reaching the end of our tether and the unusual constraint galls us bitterly. Still, we do not despair. It is an article of faith with nine out of ten of us that the world is constantly growing better and happier, and that the future is sure to see the dawn of general social prosperity. Whether, indeed, this old world of ours is growing better or happier is a puzzling riddle.

The old reprobate seems, like many of us, to have his relapses into sin as well as his occasional fits of morality. Too often history shows the Puritan Commonwealth succeeded by the immorality of a Restoration to make us feel sure that the cosmic drift even in the long run is in any particular direction.

On one assumption the rigor of our first conclusion might perhaps be somewhat relaxed. If we could assume that the residual element of destructive competition in human society could be transmuted into the lively but non-lethiferous struggle for domination, there might be some ground for our taking an attitude, if not of optimism, at least of cheerful social anticipation. If the civilizing agencies of private property and family responsibility have largely localized social pressure, why may not the same trend of historic progress eliminate that pressure altogether? This suggestion the late Professor Huxley crushed in his lecture on Evolution and Ethics, where he said, "The cosmic nature born with us and, to a large extent, necessary for our maintenance, is the outcome of millions of years of severe training, and it would be folly to imagine that a few centuries will suffice to subdue its masterfulness to purely ethical ends." No race has ever yet appeared in any clime where reckless multiplication has not ultimately created, at least among some classes of the people, an environment whose inevitable outcome was suffering and want. And to suppose that we or our children shall ever see the day when the social swamp will be thoroughly drained is to indulge in a pleasant day-dream which finds no warrant in reason and no counterpart in experience.

But, second, *the persistence of the selective process in society sanctions no fatalistic attitude towards social betterment.* It is perhaps not wonderful that those to whom the naturalistic processes of development are an adequate philosophy of life and who reject volitional freedom as a delusion should fall into a fatalistic temper of mind. But there are other phases of feeling which engender the same kind of indifferentism. Social egoism a century ago found in its distorted version of Malthusianism something it somehow had "loved long since, and lost awhile;" something which "parried the demand for

reform and sheltered selfishness from question and from conscience by the interposition of an inevitable necessity." The feeling that it will be decidedly uncomfortable for us to help our neighbor is often the father of the conviction that it is really impossible to help him at all. The struggle for existence, we are apt to argue, is a hard fight, but, after all, it insures the survival of the best stock and the healthiest "social tissue." Or, our self-exculpatory *apologia* may take still another turn if we but dash it smartly with a cynical humor. Instead of pitying the inevitable misery of those who perish, or pampering the self-complacency of those who prosper, we may argue that the double process of survival and extinction is, after all, reciprocally beneficent to victor and vanquished. "The sheep," says Mr. Leslie Stephen, "that is preserved with a view to mutton gets the advantage, though he is not kept with a view to his own advantage. Of all the arguments for vegetarianism, none is so weak as the argument from humanity. The pig has a stronger interest than any one in the demand for bacon. If all the world were Jewish, there would be no pigs at all. He has to pay for his privileges by an early death, but he makes a good bargain of it. He dies young, and, though we can hardly infer the 'love of the gods,' we must admit that he gets a superior race of beings to attend to his comforts, moved by the strongest possible interest in his health and vigor, and induced by its own needs, perhaps, to make him a little too fat for comfort, but certainly also to see that he has a good sty and plenty to eat every day of his life."

Without attempting to answer *seriatim* these pessimistic views, it will be sufficient to indicate once for all why the fatalistic temper finds no warrant in the doctrine of selection as applied to society. The reason is simply this: that in the domain of social life there is no rigidly fixed boundary between the cosmic process and the ethical process, between the cut-throat struggle for existence and the elevated struggle for domination, between the natural body and the spiritual body, between the flesh and the spirit.

We may therefore with perfect consistency believe in the

existence of the fight for life on the social frontier, and yet hope to push back the barbaric struggle into somewhat narrower confines. "Social progress," as Professor Huxley has said, "means a checking of the cosmic process at every step, and the substitution for it of another which may be called the ethical process, the end of which is not the survival of those who may happen to be the fittest, in respect of the whole of the conditions which exist, but of those who are ethically the best." Rightly viewed, therefore, the doctrine of selection can be used neither to buttress social selfishness nor to justify social indifference. While the inevitableness of the struggle for life may sober our thinking on social problems, and while it may prompt us to disavow—perhaps regretfully—far-reaching schemes of social reform, it cannot wreck the ark of human hopes

"By making all the horizon dark."

Like St. Paul, "we are troubled on every side, yet not distressed; we are perplexed, but not in despair."

What has been said up to this point has borne chiefly on the frame of mind and temper in which we ought to view the possibility of social betterment. Nor is this a matter of small importance. But there is another—and a more practical—aspect of the doctrine of selection as applied to society, for this law is capable of concrete and explicit application to projects of social reform. We may put the case thus: *The doctrine of selection is a vantage-ground from which we may often view in true perspective social issues which, seen close on, are involved in obscurity and doubt.* Let us make sure that the scope of our proposition is understood. The doctrine of selection here means simply this, that the nearer races or individuals approach the level of the brutes, the more liable they are to the brute struggle for existence, and the more subject they become to the condition of "not enough to eat and liability to be eaten." This condition is not universal, but in one disguise or another it persists even in civilized society. It is not ineradicable, but it dies hard and disappears slowly. It is as much a part of the world of men as elasticity and extension are qualities of the world of matter. Again, when we assert

that the recognition of this elementary fact gives us a vantage-ground from which to view social issues, we neither affirm nor imply that survival in the struggle for existence is the final norm of conduct. We do not identify all conduct which tends towards extinction with wrong conduct, nor all actions which promote survival with right conduct, though upon the higher planes of civilized life right action and successful action tend to coalesce. All that we intend to convey by the proposition is this, that selection through struggle is a quantity we cannot expect to eliminate from the social problem, and that therefore we must judge of social duty and social conduct with reference to the actual stage whereon mankind must act its part. Let us put upon duty, social as well as individual, the highest interpretation and the most transcendent worth; let us find her origin not "in the chance play of subjective sensibility or the far-off echo of ancestral lusts," but in the "bosom of God, her voice the harmony of the world;" and still it is true that this lofty sense of duty must manifest itself in a world many of whose denizens "graze and wallow, breed and sleep," until they are cut down in swarms by pestilence or war, or more slowly and decorously removed by the invisible pressure of material want. The etiquette of a picnic is no model for the battle-field or the slaughter-house, and the stern requirements of social ethics must take into consideration other aspects of social regeneration than those which seek to relieve a momentary difficulty or seem to meet a temporary crisis. So far as society to-day is better off than primeval society, the uplift has come largely from two agencies: first, from the steady raising of the plane of competition so as to conform social rivalry to the moral conditions of mutual service; and second, from the persistent focusing of the residual pressure of destructive competition upon those who will not come up to the social and moral standard of an advanced civilization. Any plan of social reform which checks or neutralizes either tendency makes for darkness and not for light. The danger is that we may gauge plans of social betterment or reconstruction from too short-sighted a standpoint. It is against this danger that the doctrine of selection

ought effectually to protect us. Let me illustrate this point by two examples, one domestic and one international. The collectivist is continually agitating against the institution of private property,—of private property in land or in the material instruments of production or distribution. He asserts with truth that private property is "a terrible right;" that its essence is its enforceable exclusiveness in possession and enjoyment; that it traverses ideal justice if by that we mean equality of opportunity; that in practice it means that ample stores of food and clothing are constantly in the magazines of every great city while thousands of its inhabitants "even unto this present hour both hunger and thirst" and "have no certain dwelling-place." Generous humanitarian sentiments revolt at the picture. Christian charity finds it intolerable, and rightly refuses to say it cannot be bettered. But let us beware lest in striking at the evils we deplore we destroy the institutions which render these very evils manageable. Property accentuates the differences between rich and poor, but it renders poverty a localized evil instead of an omnipresent pestilence. The institution of property, if it makes poverty possible, at least prevents it from becoming universal. "The more completely," says Professor Hadley in his "Economics," "you give the prudent and efficient man control of the results of his labor, the more do you localize the pressure of population upon subsistence and confine the effects of this pressure to a few. But give the children of the shiftless, by thoughtless charity or various systems of poor relief, the right to eat the substance of the efficient and prudent, and you will soon lose both the capital and the morality under which that capital has been created." We shall doubtless see in future marked changes in the dividing line between public and private property. But an assault on the principle of private property pure and simple is a plea for a return to barbarism, no matter whether the plea mask itself under the guise of a new coinage law or stalk in the robes of what is called "Christian socialism." Finally, I shall take an example of the way in which we might view an international obligation, provided we read our duty in the light of the doctrine of

selection. If we consider the condition of affairs in the neighboring island of Cuba, we see a large part of the native population in arms against the Spanish government. The insurgents are fighting for independence,—with what prospect of success it is perhaps impossible to say. On what grounds are we to decide where our duty lies? Is a war for independence so holy a cause that where possible we are morally bound, without exception, to aid the insurgents? Suppose the inhabitants of British India revolted against their rulers; where ought our sympathies to be enlisted? Has independence never resulted in anarchy far worse than any tyranny? These considerations may not suffice to decide the case in point. Indeed, the world's outraged human sentiment might require us to interfere in Cuba in favor of neither party, but against both. But the point we are contending for is simply this, that no adequate weighing of our conduct is possible without reference to the struggle for survival between nations. Mere grounds of *primâ facie* justice or immediate sympathy are not enough. Sometimes, as the law of survival teaches us, it is impossible to interfere at all between contestants with any good results. Suppose a European naval commander on a voyage finds two savage tribes bent on immediate conflict. Is he to aid either or to fire on both? If the good Samaritan finds the Priest and Levite both angrily engaged in an internecine quarrel, he may often with a good conscience pass by on the other side. Sometimes the result of intervention in the affairs of other nations or races is involved in great obscurity; and when debating our duty as a nation we may remember that when one is lost in a fog and without a compass it is a good rule to stand perfectly still. Sometimes when intervention could be attempted with clean hands the probable accretion of unworthy motives and the demoralization attendant on war may outweigh the anticipated good, as the melancholy history of the Crusades proves. While there may be exceptions, therefore, the virtuous nation, like the virtuous man, tends to use force mainly in self-defence. These considerations do not, of course, comprise all the factors which should determine our national duty in cases of this

kind, but they are considerations which demand careful attention in any intelligent determination of that duty, and they spring naturally from our viewing the matter from the standpoint of survival through selective struggle. The field truly is the world, but it is a world "that lieth in wickedness;" and to forego strategic advantage or to waste reformatory energy by refusing to view the world or society as they are is to squander our moral patrimony and to waste our moral resources.

WINTHROP MORE DANIELS.

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY.

SUGGESTION AS A FACTOR IN SOCIAL PROGRESS.

ONE of the remarkable potencies in human development to which investigators have just begun to apply the scientific method is the part played in social progress by the form of influence known as suggestion. We have here disclosed for us a deep-reaching influence of which it would be difficult to exaggerate the scope. Even after parental care has been brought to bear upon the child in the home, the grown individual still needs the action of a social environment, since it is the constant, the normal influence of this environment which holds him to the particular stage of civilization which his society represents. For without some such process, the social units could not be kept sufficiently like each other in mental and moral characteristics to enable them to co-operate for social ends. The influence thus exerted differs from that of hypnotic suggestion merely in the fact that, instead of being made to us in a cataleptic condition by an operator, it comes from the people with whom we associate and from the community in the midst of which we live.

Recognition of these social influences and of their moulding power raises the question of the attitude of society towards the social unit, and we are at once reminded of the fact that by a psychological law, the evidences of which abound, the

opinion of a community tends to realize itself in the individual or the class upon whom it bears. The belief which men entertain regarding us, establishing itself in our minds as a perpetually renewed suggestion, modifies our personality, and in the end—unless we are strong enough to resist it—fashions our character and conduct into more or less of likeness with itself. The enormous importance of the social attitude in determining our character as individuals, and our value as such to society, is thus obvious. It is well understood, even by those who have not traced the phenomenon to social suggestion, that individual efficiency in any walk of life is at its maximum when the attitude of the community is most favorable. Equally true must it be that an unfavorable attitude—altogether apart from the question of its justice or injustice—must be harmful, not only to those against whom it is directed, but also to the community itself.

We see this first in the home. Here the injurious influences of pessimism are readily apparent. To constantly treat children as irredeemably bad—to habitually apply to them epithets which indicate a settled conviction of their wickedness—to surround them, in a word, with an atmosphere of moral pessimism—is to accustom them to the idea of their own depravity, to implant in their immature, impressionable minds the belief not only that badness is their normal condition, but that it is one from which they can never hope to emerge. As young people are much more susceptible to hypnotic influences than those more advanced in years, so they are more peculiarly open to suggestions coming from those in authority over them. To familiarize them, therefore, with the idea of their personal depravity, is to create by suggestion a bent of moral nature in the direction of depravity. A child constantly reminded of its inherent wickedness, and knowing that nothing save wickedness is expected of it,—that in the persistent pessimism of the parental attitude its lucid intervals of goodness must all go for nothing,—what tendency can such a child have towards self-improvement? With the very capacity for goodness denied it, the child must grow up fashioned more or less to the likeness of the pessimistic con-

ception formed by its parental guides. And who can say how much recklessness in after life, how much persistent hardness of heart in anti-social attitudes, has not had its birth in the blighting pessimism of the home?

The same lesson is yielded in that second stage of preparation for social suggestion,—the school. Here the child receives a new set of influences having authoritative form, and here the tendencies imparted in the home are neutralized or intensified. Happily, there are teachers who know how to accustom even a backward child to the thought that he has within him possibilities almost infinite. But there are also pessimists in education who seem to delight in crushing in upon the pupil, mentally weak, the sense of its many deficiencies. To seize every opportunity to remind it that it is slow in this branch, incapable in that, positively dull and stupid in a third, is the blunder of the pedagogue who could not do worse were it his desire to brand his victim with mental incapacity for life. The moral paralysis of the individual which is threatened by pessimism only begins in the home; his intellectual paralysis is usually achieved once and for all in the badly ordered school-room.

But the period of tuition offers only a restricted scope for the possibilities of suggestion. For after the school comes the great world over which the evil of distrust in men hangs like a cloud. Here is the field, par excellence, of social influence visibly connected with the psychology of the lower life; for even the animals receive favorable or unfavorable suggestions from one another, and act accordingly. Our first cousin in the organic genealogy is wild because of its well-founded distrust of other animals. Brought into human surroundings and "domesticated," it gradually ceases to snarl and show its teeth,—forgets, as it were, to assume the attitude of defence on the approach of other animate beings,—for the reason that it now lives under peace conditions, is no longer afraid of its animal or human environment. When we call it "tamed," we really mean that it has the benefit of an optimistic attitude. It is the same truth which finds illustration in human societies. The pessimism of primitive peoples per-

petually at war with each other stands naturally correlated with their low social condition. When every man's hand was against every other, and the main business of life was that of defence or attack, there could be no leisure for developing the arts of civilization. The germs of mutual trust between man and man, between one community and another, had to spring up before even the beginnings could be made of that industrial co-operation which now covers the planet with its net-work of railways and telegraph lines. And if anything were needed to show the injury which pessimism causes to the interests of social progress, it would be forthcoming in that universal acceptance of mutual faith of man in man as the principle which must lie at the foundation of all our modern commerce.

Humanity has made enormous progress since the days of the persecutions for witchcraft. Yet the pessimistic attitude of man towards his fellow is by no means a thing of the past. Though manifested in less violent forms, the distrust is no less wide-spread. And though while in some directions, as in the relations of trade, we show faith in men by our acts, in our thoughts we surround them with an atmosphere of suspicion. The high modern development of the quality of "smartness" protects most of us from the danger of being "taken in" by any outward semblance of moral or intellectual superiority, and the ease with which the colloquial epithet of "fraud" rises to the lips, is the suggestive mark of a much diffused mental attitude towards psychic values. In the moral dynamics of the world, qualities not widely possessed are rarely believed in; nor is credulity regarding the prevalence of evil wholly out of relation to the capacity for it. In these high civilizations, which only the Anglo-Saxon race has been able to produce, we tend to judge men by the worst that is in them rather than by the best. For our social gatherings, we have the pessimism of the secret whisper, of the malevolence that masks itself with smiles, of the kisses between women that stab like daggers. Everywhere, as Schiller sings,

> Es liebt die Welt das Glänzende zu schwarzen,
> Und das Erhabene im Staub zu ziehen.

In politics we fear treachery from our associates, and impute base motives to our opponents. At the least disturbance of the normal flow of events, one's nation is in danger. Distrustful among themselves, men are pessimistic as a community. The foreigner, whether as an immigrant or as a government, is always seeking to gain advantage at the country's expense. And when a political issue is added to distrust in international relations, we get that product of the pessimistic attitude known as "jingoism."

Society has its classes whose mental habit, born of their function in civilization, inevitably tends to promote the darker views of life and human nature. There have been pessimists since the beginnings of literature, and we have had declarations that the world is evil in various tones from various voices. Since Job complained that his days were "swifter than a weaver's shuttle, and spent without hope," all forms of religious and philosophical pessimism have had a hearing, from Gnosticism, Manicheism, Augustinianism, down to modern orthodoxy. Calderon has assured us that "man's greatest crime is that he was born;" and A. de Lamartine asks querulously,

Quel crime avons-nous fait pour mériter de naître?

For Leopardi, life is "*amaro e noia*," and the world simply "*fango*,"—a piece of plain speaking which startles until we read in Eduard von Hartmann that description of the universe as "an agonizing blister on the all-pervading Being," which introduces us to realism in speculation as nothing else ever can.

This constant teaching of the evil of existence, even by philosophers who have a system to build up, or, again, by poets who see the world through the glasses of their personal experience, darkly, has not been without its influence in directing the energies of the reformer. But when it becomes injurious to the interests of the race, Nature herself condemns it. The utility of optimism in race perpetuation is incontestable. Upon the view that life is worth living, however inculcated or reached, all social progress finally depends. The great masses

of mankind—despite Buddhism in the ancient world and Schopenhauerism in the modern—have held in this regard a sturdy and unfailing optimism. Men who, like Alexander von Humboldt, view marriage as a sin, and the propagation of children as a crime, may seem worthy of survival, if only on account of their intellectual eminence; yet their attitude towards race interests is simply a sentence of self-extinction. There never was a time in the conflict between the optimism of the physiological process and the pessimism of the intellect when Nature did not know how to take sides. And she has never been truer to herself than when, through the instrumentality of natural selection, she has safeguarded humanity from any form of doubt or unbelief which, realized in conduct, seriously threatened to impair that formidable pressure from below upward, the "will to live."

But while philosophical pessimism is active mainly in the sphere of the intellect, religious pessimism carries its influence deep down into the realm of feeling and conscience. From the beginning, men feared their environment, saw evil potencies in the multifarious forces of nature. The earliest gods were evil, and workers of evil. Even so cultured a nation as the Greeks believed in Furies who had a divinely appointed mission to torment mankind. The Buddhists taught the evil of human existence in so absolute a form that the only escape therefrom lay in self-annihilation. The pessimism of the Christian view is, historically speaking, only less pronounced. There are, it is true, the joys of Paradise, but over against these have been set the terrors of hell, and a conception of God not falling short, in cruelty and vindictiveness, of the most elementary ideas of deity held by barbarous peoples. It would not therefore be difficult to sustain the thesis that low conceptions of "the power outside us that makes for righteousness" have been responsible for much of the intellectual, social, above all, the moral inertia of past ages. Being representations conceived in the likeness of man, as he is at a given time, they not only tend to confirm him in his view of himself, but obtain, so to speak, a celestial sanction for a particular stage of social progress, and thus help to perpetuate that

stage. It being impossible for the morality of men to rise higher than that of the gods they worship, human advance must always have been powerfully limited by systems of theology. We can easily understand how little individual liberty could have been promoted by the wide-spread belief in a deity who was conceived of as a tyrant; and why it is that even to-day the most uncompromising upholder of the necessity of divine retribution looks in vain for popular warmth in the cause of prison reform to an age which accepted Dante's description of hell as a plausible account of the attitude of the Deity towards mankind.

The most serious feature of the Christian system has been its doctrine of the inherent depravity of human nature. Through ages unlighted by a gleam of our modern knowledge, this thought of the natural, inevitable wickedness of man must have weighed on the human conscience like a nightmare. It would be difficult to over-estimate the effect for evil of the sense of sin maintained for centuries as a principle of human conduct. A few heroic souls here and there may have been spurred, through untold agonies, to what has been called "the higher life;" but the great mass of the people open to religious influences must have been held at the level of this low idea of their possibilities. A suggestion thus maintained with the whole power of the church and the force of public opinion could not but tend to realize itself. Belief in the wickedness of an individual or a community is psychologically not distinguishable from the expectation of wickedness, and the gradual moulding of the mind to familiarity with that expectation is an influence which only intellectual and moral giants could resist. Remembering, therefore, the tremendous power of social suggestion in the religious field, where the teaching of the church is reinforced by divine authority; recalling the sluggish moral life of the past, the comparatively recent emergence of mankind into tolerably humane social conditions, there seems far too much reason to fear that the pessimism of the historic religions has proved for many the high road, not to spiritual health, but to moral paralysis.

The power of the minister of religion to promote the more discouraging views of human nature is unquestionable. That he is usually a pessimist *sans le vouloir* does not alter the fact that his interests lie in the direction of a robust belief in the reality of moral evil, of a saintly desire to hold it up to public reprobation. It is his function to pursue wickedness through all its disguises, to drag it from its lurking places, to bring it to the bar of righteousness for the good of mankind, the amelioration of the world. The motives of such a man are the highest. Yet his openness of mind to individual depravity and collective wrong-doing is to be measured, not only by aim, but also by result; not only by the good it may do, but also by its power to perpetuate evil through the potent influences of suggestion. It is in many ways useful to proclaim the ubiquitous presence of temptation, the ineradicable tendency of fallen, unaided man to yield thereto; yet the process is one calculated neither to supply the over-sensitive, self-tortured saint with the healthy calmness which his nature needs, nor to relieve the hardened sinner from the influence of the authoritative recognition of sin as his normal condition. That Satan is to be trodden down under our feet is a proposition which commands the immediate assent of all good people, but its constant reiteration through ages of the life of a church is apt to teach rather the permanence of the Satanic element than to hold out the prospect of its early, or even of its possible, elimination. And as antagonisms, whether physical or moral, are mutually self-involved and self-supporting, it may be wise for the over-pessimistic minister to ask himself how far his own warfare has gone towards stimulating that same "The world, the flesh, and the devil" to which his church undoubtedly owes something of its opportunities for aggressive virtue in the past.

There are certainly signs of a new order. To-day, cheerful influences radiate from pulpits out of which the doctrine of eternal damnation was once uttered in no uncertain tone. It is a far cry from Calvinism to Universalism. But the suggestion of dependence is still conveyed, even by preachers the most optimistic. For, much as a clergyman may insist on the

final appeal to conscience,—much as he may point to the Scriptures as the common source, open to all, of knowledge and authority in religious matters,—there is gradually set up between him and his parishioner a relation that does not tend to qualify the latter as his own spiritual authority. The superior ease for both of such a relation is undoubted; yet the acquired habit of being sermonized at the end of every week into patches of goodness during the next seven days is a process which must be supplemented by much independence of character in the listener, if it is to lead in the direction of moral spontaneity.

Physicians constitute another class of men whose influence is pessimistic. As the clergyman is interested in the discovery and removal of spiritual evil, so the interests of the doctor lie in the diagnosis and elimination of corporeal evil. To say that the sudden and complete elimination of bodily ailments would work havoc with the physician's income is a truth that carries with it no reproach to a body of men who from the beginning have been distinguished for their unselfishness in the service of humanity. Doctors have a moral interest in the banishment of disease higher than that of their social position in the world; as a class, they allow no pecuniary considerations to stand between them and the relief of suffering. Yet disease is a necessity to them, first, by reason of the professional victories which it enables them to win, and next, for the ethical satisfaction afforded by the opportunities it brings of ministering to the deepest needs of their fellowmen. What is more, the very occupation of a doctor helps to promote in a community the belief in the reality of its diseases, as well as to confirm it in the view that disease is a permanent element of its life.

But we may go still deeper. As there is an occult realm of spiritual things which, passing ordinary comprehension, needs to be interpreted by an expert; so the domain of disease is one whose lore can only be reached by the average man through the physician. While, therefore, in the religious field men grow dependent upon the clergyman for knowledge on such abstruse themes as God, heaven, immortality; so the

mass of the people in a community acquire a similar relation of dependence towards the doctors whom they habitually consult. That physicians are not financially interested in removing this dependence upon their ministrations is obvious. Friendly in an especial degree to popular enlightenment, their efforts are not exactly directed towards the qualifying of the average man for the medical care of his own body. As from the clergyman's point of view a man need not necessarily be his own spiritual adviser, so, from the point of view of the physician, the prudent member of society does well to avoid the risk of aspiring to become his own physiological and pathological expert.

The reality of the effect here described becomes more apparent when we recognize the large part played in disease by the mental element. A man knowing little or nothing of his own body—with no expert knowledge of the internal organs and processes by which his life is maintained—is easily made afraid by even slight disturbances of their normal working. For the untutored of all classes the realm of pathology is peopled by forms as terrible as ever haunted the religious imagination in the crudest days of theological speculation. It is unquestionable, as shown not only by the importance of the patent medicine trade, but also by medical advertisements in newspapers, that large numbers in every community pass their lives in a state of almost morbid anxiety regarding their bodily condition. A great number of so-called ailments have no existence save in the imagination of the patient himself; a great many more are of so slight a character as to need for their removal simply the mental cure, which, in perfect good faith, the druggist and the doctor so often co-operate to bring about. Even in cases of some seriousness, the function of the physician is admittedly that of "aiding nature." What aiding nature really means is sufficiently indicated by La Fontaine's fable of the effects respectively produced on their patients by the two physicians, Tant Pis and Tant Mieux. The regular call, the soothing word, the formally administered medicine, plenty of light, fresh air in abundance, judiciously chosen nourishment, these constitute, for a large proportion

of patients, the whole thaumaturgy of the doctor who really knows his business. None the less is the physician bound to believe in the reality of the great bulk of the ailments that are brought to him for his personal attention. Given, therefore, the fact that ailments may be produced in a healthy body by the mere suggestion of them, one hazards nothing in saying that the Tant Pis attitude in disease, like the pessimistic attitude in religion, tends to realize itself alike in the individual and the community.

In the various moral agencies which modern societies maintain, the scope for the pessimistic attitude is enormous. And here, owing to the publicity gained, the influence of suggestion is all-pervasive. The tendency set up in impressionable minds to imitate an action or course of conduct powerfully realized has been shown in the most serious of the forms of evil with which great cities have to deal. All of us remember the story of the soldiers who committed suicide one after another in the same sentry-box owing to the suggestion given by the first act of homicide there by one of their number. We know, too, from the annals of English jurisprudence, that when minor offences were visited with the death penalty, men would go from witnessing a hanging and incur the same penalty by the commission of the same offence. That the powerfully realized knowledge of crime tends in weak minds to the commission of crime is now a psychological commonplace. And though men are less impelled to these imitative acts under the improved conditions of modern communities, the power of suggesting evil by the public punishment or denunciation of it still remains. There are men and women living, for example, who trace their first fall towards intemperance to the curiosity and fascination aroused at home by the absolute prohibition there of intoxicating liquors. The public condemnation of drinking habits, again, with the elaborate machinery which has been called into existence for their suppression, is to some extent, at any rate, the feeder of the very evil which it is sought to eliminate. We have only to recall the notorious effects of the public prohibition of indecent literature to be convinced that open

antagonism, by means such as carry the suggestion of it all over the community, is neither the wisest nor the most efficacious means of suppression.

It is here difficult, moreover, to avoid the thought of a close connection between pessimism in moral matters and the zeal which is so often shown in this branch of social reform. The belief that Providence has committed the moral policing of the world to their care amounts with some almost to a monomania; and when such people, often the best in the community, once fairly take the universe on their shoulders, consequences more or less disastrous are inevitable. We get then the spasms of virtue to which all communities are liable; but we get also that stimulus to wickedness which follows the wide-spread and authoritative expectation of it. And in the result we are once more reminded that a population which is taught to depend for its moral stimulus upon the constant nagging of good people who mean it well, can have little of that spontaneous motion towards right conduct which is the life and soul of all morality worthy of the name.

There is, finally, the pessimism of the classes engaged in the maintenance of social order. We have here two branches,—legislative and executive,—and both of them, as functionaries, if not as individuals, naturally incline to a gloomy view of mankind. The tendency of law-giving is certainly not in the direction of the discovery of how many laws can be dispensed with: it is rather towards keeping pace with civilization by the making of new crimes. A good legislator cannot take chances: he must not, at least, err on the side of a too confiding trust in human nature. He can no more afford to believe in the absolute moral purity of mankind than the physician in its bodily, or the clergyman in its spiritual, health. A similar bent of mind is to be looked for in the police-officer. We need not, of course, see an unreasoning Javert in every gendarme we meet; nor is it necessary to attribute to our *agent de sureté* any of that belief in the ubiquitousness of crime which has been burlesqued in the ridicule cast upon the bogus detective agencies. Just as legislators are often optimistic in their individual capacity, so police-officers may

be found who are themselves the severest critics of the system they administer. It is none the less true that as a class the executive officers of the law are not optimistic on the subject of human nature. Familiar with the frailties of men, and knowing bad men better than good, the myrmidon of the law would be more than human if he did not tend to see in mankind its worst rather than its best possibilities. And as he is often called upon to act in a quasi-judicial capacity, affecting people not yet accused of crime, or just delivered from its punishment, his official attitude may not be without its effect on his decisions. Without being interested in the perpetuation of wrong-doing, he none the less belongs to a class which finds its opportunities of professional activity in the constant recrudescence of the evil possibilities of human nature.

More serious still in its bearing on people convicted of crime is suggestion which comes from society itself. The one hope of reforming the criminal is that of arresting his progress from a temporary to a permanent anti-social attitude, —the hope of preventing him from going over irrevocably into the ranks of the enemy,—the hope of convincing him that he belongs, not to the forces of evil, but to those of good. Now it is this hope which social suggestion is continually working to defeat. Between the man convicted of crime and the rest of humanity society thrusts an enormous gulf. It teaches the convict that he is henceforth separate from his fellow-men by a total difference of kind. The first suggestion of this difference is conveyed by the atmosphere of the prison. Here the evil is not so much that a man comes into contact with other criminals who may be worse than himself, but that he has over and around him those suggestions of evil which ever work to realize themselves in his character. The gaol focuses on its unhappy occupant something at least of the shadow of the social discrimination outside. A still deeper gloom awaits him beyond the walls of the prison. His formal punishment over, he goes forth into society only to feel the crushing force of the new judgment he has earned by expiating his crime. The world sees in him only potentialities for evil: of what avail, against the mark it has authoritatively set

on him, the germs of good that are within? Is it wonder that with nobody to believe in him he should lose faith in himself, or that the work of suggestion begun in the prison should realize itself in the stress of the hostile social attitude outside? A push from one, a kick from another, everywhere pitiless ostracism by the well-to-do and fortunate, and the result which each would shrink from compassing is brought about by all,—despair, suicide, ending in a pauper's grave; or a reckless, hard-hearted criminal, newly manufactured by society, to be a source of evil and a permanent charge on the state while he lives.

Enough has now been said to show that the pessimistic attitude is injurious to social progress, not because it recognizes the evil, but because it ignores the good there is in men. The masses of mankind have lived in the past under the influence of a social hypnosis which, denying to them all but a scant importance in the scheme of things, has made individual conduct a matter of little importance to the individual. We read of philosophical systems under whose teaching the stars have become

> Tyrants in your iron skies,
> Innumerable, pitiless, passionless eyes,
> Cold fires, yet with power to brand and burn
> His nothingness into man.

More deep reaching in its effect on human character has been the influence by which, relegated to classes and positions in the social hierarchy, men have been morally degraded. Were it possible to formulate the psychology of anti-social attitudes, it would be found that the individual has been led into them not by inordinate vanity, by overweening self-conceit, but by the low idea the social unit has been taught to form of himself. As a new attitude of society towards the man whom it notices or honors powerfully affects his view of himself,—leads to the self-recognition of possibilities of good in which he had never before believed,—so such a new attitude towards whole classes as shall raise them in their own estimation must act potently to the promotion of social welfare. Even the success of work like that of the college settlements,

the Salvation Army, and of various philanthropic agencies, may be traced, not only to the material aid rendered, but also to the attitude which conveys the stimulus of a sense of personal worth even to the most neglected.

The same is true in the field of moral reform. The great need of the time is not the sense of sin, already over-emphasized, but a knowledge in men of their higher and better selves. In past ages society has been trying to get the best from individuals by expecting their worst; through centuries of psychological darkness regarding the conditions of human progress it has been endeavoring to promote social advance by means of moral degradation. It is only now that we are getting glimpses of a truer method. We are learning from the study of social suggestion, not only that we cannot improve the world by laying our chief emphasis on its evil, but that we shall equally fail to ameliorate human nature if we withhold from it the subtle encouragement of our belief in its inherent good. A new instrument of progress, unknown to the ages of exaggerated individualism, is now within our reach, and we are to use it, not to make moral automata of men, but to awaken in them the power, so far as may be, of a spontaneously moral life; not to accustom them to the moral slavery of dependence on the community for the impulse towards virtue, but to stimulate them to the self-development of whatever is best in human character and conduct. When society has learned how to utilize the great force at its command for the real ends of social progress, individuals and communities alike will find their strength in a mutual faith that shall remove mountains.

EDMUND NOBLE.

BOSTON, MASS.

DISCUSSIONS.

MR. HERBERT SPENCER ON INDUSTRIAL INSTITUTIONS.*

The Editors of this JOURNAL have already expressed the feeling with which philosophical students, of whatever school, must approach the volume which contains the conclusion and consummation of the immense task Mr. Spencer set before himself six-and-thirty years ago,—the coping-stone of his philosophical labors and the fulfilment of the purpose of his life. It may be that Mr. Spencer is himself the last of the great system-builders: it may even be said that the philosophy of evolution itself discountenances the construction of systems, and that the real value of the Synthetic Philosophy lies not so much in its direct applicability to the detail of experience as in its power of giving a stimulus and inspiration to the several sciences. On the other hand, if a philosopher has found a comprehensive formula which he considers adequate to the explanation of any form of life or existence, he must endeavor to realize and verify its sufficiency by reviewing the variety of experience in the light of such a general principle. That in so doing a philosopher should make mistakes of detail does not invalidate the worth or adequacy of his formula. Hegel's philosophy of history and philosophy of nature are not by themselves sufficient to discredit the Hegelian philosophy. All we can demand is that the example of the method should not constitute a *primâ facie* case against the principle; and, further, that the interpretation attempted of different sets of facts should not be such as to obscure their specific character or distort their peculiar significance. The highly generalized formula of the cosmic process, if it is nothing more than a *μάταιον εἶδος*, must be applied to different subject-matters in the modified and appropriate form that is in each case demanded. The attempt to explain everything in the light of a comprehensive formula is at once a merit and a temptation; it is a method particularly liable to the defects of its qualities. Mr. Spencer is nothing if not synoptic, and the tendency to "think things together" may easily get in ad-

* "The Principles of Sociology." By Herbert Spencer. Vol. III. (Part VI., Ecclesiastical Institutions; Part VII., Professional Institutions; Part VIII., Industrial Institutions.) London: Williams & Norgate.

vance of the equally imperative requirement to think things out. The idea of the unity and continuity of existence is and should be a regulative idea of science; but it may be purchased too cheaply, as it certainly may be applied too hastily. The spirit of analysis asserts itself against premature unification; as Aristotle puts it, there is always the temptation to "unify too much," so that unity comes to represent vagueness of analogy rather than identity in difference. The ideas of "organism" and "natural selection" are at all times suggestive: they have been applied to ethics with the best, but also with the worst, results. Properly applied, that is, with the modification required by the nature of the facts, they have broadened the study of morals and of society, and they have thrown light upon the explanation of ethical, social, and economic institutions. But the transference of such ideas from biology to sociology may mean an arrest rather than an advance of thought, and may result in mere vagueness or confusion, or even falsification. The "organic" view of society is valuable negatively and positively; chiefly, perhaps, negatively, as fatal to certain mechanical ideas of the relation between the state and the individual and corresponding political fallacies. But the conception has been used not only in a way to obscure the difference between a moral and a physiological organism, but to falsify the nature of society itself; and this attempt to conjure with "organism" and "natural selection" has been carried so far that philosophers have been tempted to deny that these conceptions have any value at all, and to cry, "Back to the pre-Spencerian moralists." The truth seems to lie somewhere between.

The real value of the application of such categories to moral ideas lies in the fact that they not only broaden but deepen the conception of morality itself. "Selection" works in the sphere of the moral and social life; but the instructive thing is the way in which the application of such an idea makes us realize the distinction, even more than the similarity, between "moral" and "natural" facts. That a social or moral fact has a physiological basis, and that this basis cannot be neglected, goes without saying; but this does not make such a fact a physiological fact, pure and simple. We want to know what further attribute it is which makes a fact moral or social. Society is an "organism;" but the social organism exists in the feeling, idea, or will of the individuals composing the community. Social progress is by "selection;" but the conscious, deliberate selection pursued by a progressive society is related to "natural selection" at least as much by way of contrast as of likeness. And

so with phrases like "survival of the fittest:" the fittest in a moral order is more like the antithesis than the counterpart of the fittest in the physical order. And the danger of the transference of vague, uncritical, and unanalyzed conceptions to spheres in which their precise application has not been thought out, is that they at once become party catch-words or unmeaning symbols. There is a serious danger in an over-issue of this kind of inconvertible currency, and it easily becomes depreciated. Perhaps the nearest duty of criticism is to show not so much how these ideas apply to ethics and society, but how they do not. For it must be acknowledged that the tendency of Mr. Spencer's method (whether in his own hands or in those of his disciples), however suggestive and stimulating, has been detrimental to the positive method,—the method of analysis by appropriate conceptions. It would seem as if, as was said of Hegel's dialectic, the Synthetic Philosophy had to be done over again and from the beginning. Whatever may be said in disparagement of pre-evolutionary moralists or politico-philosophers, we sometimes feel that we have to return to them, if only to realize what a moral or political fact is, or if only to be reminded of the "phenomena" that have to be explained. Compare the opening of Mr. Spencer's "Data of Ethics" with the "Republic" of Plato or the "Ethics" of Aristotle, or with any great English moral or political treatise selected at random. The "biological" moralists seem to start at such an immense distance off human life, as we know it, that we find it difficult to realize their starting-point or the data they are analyzing.

Mr. Spencer's method has a deceptive facility, just because it lends itself to an inherent tendency of the human mind to find the explanation of something difficult in the terms of something else which is easier and more familiar. To a certain extent this is characteristic not only of all thinking, but of profound thinking. The power to see analogies through and in differences is an accepted evidence of philosophical power, as it is the acknowledged sign of the poet and the man of science. In a sense, moreover, all argument is more or less analogical, so far as it discovers points of identity between partially different things; but the specific value of analogical argument is of the lowest kind, just because it may vary from the most convincing proof to the most insignificant resemblance. Its whole value depends, first, on the amount and kind of identity; secondly, on the degree to which the person who uses it is clear as to its nature. In the form of an illustration of one

thing by another, it arises out of the necessity of human thinking. In one way or other the human mind always helps itself to understand the world and itself by some kind of illustration, by seeing a thing in something else which happens to be more familiar. Just as the Greeks tried to realize moral ideas through art or geometry, the Jews through parables from nature, so the modern mind has recourse to the animal and vegetable world. So far as this tendency represents an attempt to realize the underlying unity and continuity of life, it is a gain in horizon, and is a safeguard against stiffness and narrowness of conception. But what it gains in wholeness of view, it tends to lose in analysis and discrimination. The tendency, therefore, legitimate and even indispensable as it is up to a certain point, is beset with great dangers, more particularly the danger of forgetting that the identity found, and rightly found, is an identity in difference. One of two results follow: either the symbol sinks into a mere symbol and becomes ultimately unmeaning, or the symbol gets substituted for that which it symbolizes. The conception of society as an organism is an illustration of both kinds of result. It follows that the synthetic method must be safeguarded by the analytical instinct, else it becomes an incitement to mental indolence or mental confusion, and may issue in results which are either too vague to be significant, or so abstract as to be positively false and misleading.

To apply these general observations to the volume before us, I will content myself by passing in review the last book ("Industrial Institutions"), partly because it is the only part which is new, partly because of the intrinsic interest of the subject, partly on account of the light it throws upon the claims somewhat confidently advanced in recent times on behalf of general sociology. It seems to me a striking illustration of the strength and the weakness, more particularly the weakness, of Mr. Spencer's method. The peculiar fallacies to which the method is liable are here more conspicuous and recognizable than elsewhere, and to this we must add (after Mr. Spencer) not only the philosophical but the personal bias, not only "intellectual" but "emotional" difficulties. Mr. Spencer is a "philosophical radical" almost before he is an evolutionist, and much of what Mr. Spencer writes about the church, trades-unionists, political and social tendencies, seems much more characteristic of Mr. Spencer than of Mr. Spencer's philosophy. Moreover, Mr. Spencer is writing about a subject-matter which is not only itself being continually modified and developed, but in regard to

which special research and analysis has been peculiarly active and progressive. Mr. Spencer does not seem to have availed himself either of fresh facts or fresh information: it is true that he has read some recent books, but more to confirm than to correct preconceived ideas. For instance, he takes from Mr. and Mrs. Webb's "Trade-Unionism," or Mrs. Webb's "Co-operative Movement," the few "cuttings" that seem to suit his ideas, while he contents himself with regarding Bellamy's "Looking Backwards" as a sufficient guide to socialism.

The method as applied by Mr. Spencer to "Industrial Institutions" has all the defects of its qualities. There is the tendency (familiar to students of Mr. Spencer) to generalize from a single, and not too carefully analyzed, instance; there is the tendency to strain analogies and discover "parallels;" there is the tendency to generalize away the distinctive characters of specific phenomena; there is the tendency to substitute for "the subtlety of nature" fixed and set categories, resulting in unreal antitheses or alternatives; and, quite generally, there is the tendency to press abstractions and ignore distinctions, to think things "together" rather than to think them "out," and to think them together under highly generalized and abstract conceptions, or conceptions which are used without due regard to the conditions and limitations which make them appropriate.

I take at hazard some illustrations of results. Mr. Spencer connects the recent growth and spread of socialistic theories in England with the recrudescence of "militancy," and the reasoning by which he arrives at this familiar but curious "parallelism" is something of this kind. Socialism and militancy are "parallel" types of coerciveness and regimentation: as sufficient proof, if it were wanted, the coincidence of extreme militarism and extreme socialism is conspicuous in Germany. Having thus added a color of historical probability to an abstract generalization, Mr. Spencer boldly proceeds to verify it by an appeal to modern France and England. It is to be noted that Mr. Spencer does not seek an illustration from the Australasian colonies,—certainly not a very favorable illustration of the parallelism asserted. The whole position turns upon the conventional and, I may add, perfectly arbitrary representation of modern socialism as a system of quasi-military "regimentation." This is more false than true of German, as it is demonstrably untrue of English, socialism. There is certainly a connection between the revival of militancy and the spread of

socialism. Socialism is quite generally a more and more conscious revolt against the monetary influence that expresses itself in militant finance, as in other phenomena of "commercial morality;" but that socialism and militarism should be represented as "parallel" forms of "the law of rhythm," or of backward oscillation, can only be counted to the perversities of *a priori* reasoning. This is an extreme instance of the extent to which Mr. Spencer's analogical method may miss the facts: the idea that the movement towards socialism may be a recoil from individualism could find no room in Mr. Spencer's philosophy.

Mr. Spencer devotes a chapter to "competition." His imagination is stimulated by the idea of the natural "organization of labor" in which competition results: "the interdependence of businesses" is a supreme case of the "law of integration,"—of progress from indefinite homogeneity to definite heterogeneity. The idea is familiar, though the language is imposing. But a more specific analysis of the operation of commercial competition might show that "the integration" is much more apparent than real; that it involves not only economic waste but economic precariousness, and that it tends to annihilate rather than to extend freedom of competition and equality of industrial opportunity. If we are to explain *obscurum per obscurius*, the law of integration might be applied to the growth of monopoly and combination even more fitly than to the ramification of business. "Integration" has actually been applied by students of Mr. Spencer to the way in which a railway company tends to become its own manufacturer, and quite generally to any process by which the middleman or contractor is eliminated. Anyhow, the tendency of the modern organization of industry seems to be the reverse of the condition contemplated by Mr. Spencer. Monopoly encroaches more and more upon competition between individual producers, whether under the form of monopolies of efficiency (as Krupp or Armstrong) or of local services, or of combination (as in syndicates and trusts). The organization of industry is, in fact, becoming more and more conscious, and the operation of chance "natural" competition becoming more and more restricted. To illustrate the pure action of "natural" competition, we have to go to industries which are in a condition of arrested development,—industries in which the phenomena of "sweating" and low living are conspicuous. The growth of monopoly, both in productive and distributive agencies, does not mean the elimination of competition, but only of a kind

or form that is more rudimentary. The action of competition is modified, or even altered in form, but not suspended. In many cases it is shifted from competition between individual producers to competition between consumers and producers, or between different groups of producers; or, again, it yields to that form of emulation which is only another side of social co-operation. There is no monopoly, again, however favorably situated, which is altogether above or without any "natural" check from economic forces: the law of monopoly price, if less determinate than that of free competition, is not wholly indeterminate. Mr. Spencer, however, does not follow economic development beyond the point at which it ceases to be an apparent illustration of the general processes required by the law of evolution. He does not, for instance, carry the stage of "compound capitals" beyond the form of the ordinary joint-stock company (of which he gives an excellent characterization). The tendency of monopoly to encroach upon competition would presumably be set down to the "law of rhythm" or reaction; for what seems a forward movement to the student of industrialism is just what the philosopher of evolution tends, or feels bound, to regard as a form of "return movement."

The abstractness of Mr. Spencer's method is, perhaps, even better illustrated by his peculiarly rigid views of what I may call social alternatives. Mutual exclusiveness is a bad instrument of social, or, indeed, any logic. To Mr. Spencer, industrial organization must be either "voluntary" or "compulsory;" whereas it would be truer to say that it must be both. The social state must mean either "self-ownership" or "ownership by others;" whereas it would be truer to say that the social individual is both a means and an end. The idea of mutually exclusive alternatives is quite unreal as applied to the actualities of organic human life. It is not only fatal, it seems to me, to any concreteness of view, but it results in quite futile and unmeaning abstractions. Socialism, again, is regarded as a form of "ownership by others." This may be true of paternal or state socialism (as understood in Germany), but is eminently untrue of what socialism properly and really signifies,—that is, the principle of industrial democracy logically realized in practice. But Mr. Spencer seems to think that even the state is something not ourselves; that democracy is as much a form of "ownership by others" as an oligarchy; and that all "government" stands for "conservatism and officialism." Just so far as this is the case, industrial democracy is incompletely realized. It

seems as difficult to get out of the philosophic, as out of the popular, mind the illusion that socialism has any "elective affinity" to bureaucracy. Socialism is coextensive with the whole idea of democracy and self-government, and yet most of the opposition to Socialist administration arises from the representation of it as only another form of oligarchic bureaucracy, with added weaknesses and disabilities of its own. Even such a generally intelligent student of modern socialism as Mr. Gonner permits himself to remark that socialism is independent of democracy. Socialistic administration proper would be no more "bureaucratic" than any genuine workman's co-operative store or productive society.

It would really seem as if the metaphysics of evolution have effaced the very idea and point of evolution itself. Anything less historical or evolutionary than Mr. Spencer's representation of "state interference"—a phrase which in a general sense is not only obsolete but meaningless—or of modern socialism it would be difficult to conceive. To Mr. Spencer there is only one type of a social "institution;" but it may be fairly said that nothing is less typical of modern socialism than Mr. Spencer's type of socialism. Modern socialism is based upon the idea of as complete a realization of political democracy as possible, as a necessary condition of "so socializing the industries of the community as to make the livelihood of the people entirely independent of private capitalism." ("Report on Fabian Policy.") Or, again,—

> "The Fabian Society does not suggest that the state should monopolize industry as against private enterprise or individual initiative *further than may be necessary to make the livelihood of the people and their access to the sources of production completely independent of both.* The freedom of individuals to test the social value of new inventions; to initiate improved methods of production; to anticipate and lead public enterprise in catering for new social wants; to practise all arts, crafts, and professions independently; in short, to complete the social organization by adding the resources of private activity and judgment to those of public venture, is, subject to the above conditions, as highly valued by the Fabian Society as freedom of speech, freedom of the press, or any other article in the charter of popular liberties." *

From all which it would appear that Mr. Spencer's conception of the socialist *régime* would be the stultification and not the fulfilment of the socialist idea. If socialism is worthy of so much

---

* Fabian Tract, No. 70, "Report on Fabian Policy," etc. The italics are mine.

notice and attention, then it is worth understanding,—*a fortiori*, if it is thought worthy of refutation; and it may be said that the way, and the only way, to the understanding of socialism is the understanding of democracy. Many of the fallacies that beset the understanding of socialism are just those that beset the understanding of democracy.

All "government action"—let alone socialism—is, again, to Mr. Spencer, "restriction:" it may be with just as good reason be described as "liberation." Nothing is gained, and certainly a good deal is lost, by this method of making a partial aspect of a thing stand for the whole thing, which is just what we mean by abstraction (in a bad sense). But, still worse, "the restrictionist is the same in nature, whether he forbids free trade in commodities or whether he forbids free trade in labor." It is somewhat remarkable that the last word of Evolution should be so curiously belated. The distinction which Mr. Spencer regards as no distinction has been emphasized by the logic of facts; it has become even a strictly economic consideration that the exchange of human services is different from the exchange of immaterial commodities. A bale of cotton is not made worse by being bought in the cheapest market, but can the same be said of a human producer? But no: to Mr. Spencer one kind of state action is the same as any other kind, and a partial aspect of state action is the essence or idea of it at all times and under all circumstances, and whatever portion or extent of the community the "state" represents; and one kind of "regulation" or "restriction" is the same as any other kind. Is this the last result of "the philosophy of experience"? Surely, Bacon seems to have written the greater part of the "Novum Organum" in vain; and too true, it seems, that Burke is more quoted than read, and the "historic spirit" more often invoked than obeyed. Even that "blessed word" relativity seems to be *vox et præterea nihil.*

It will, however, be more interesting to review Mr. Spencer's judgment upon trades-unionism, co-operation, and socialism, as also his conclusions as to the present state and future destiny of industrialism.

Mr. Spencer makes no attempt to distinguish and co-ordinate the functions of these movements in the labor movement as a whole,*

* Compare and contrast Mr. Hobhouse's excellent and suggestive treatment in his book on "The Labor Movement."

and (partly in consequence) his idea of them is curiously conventional and stereotyped.

Mr. Spencer on Trade-Unions.—In spite of the indebtedness which he records to Mr. and Mrs. Webb's "History of Trade-Unionism," Mr. Spencer is impelled by his method to find "various parallelisms" which "prove identity of nature between ancient and modern trade combinations." The "parallelisms" in question are quite superficial and insignificant compared with the divergencies: the function of craft-guilds in the mediæval and of trade-unions in the modern industrial system is anything but "parallel." Mr. Spencer is disposed to allow to trade-unions a relative justification as "natural to a passing phase of social evolution." He regards them, in fact, as provisional institutions, partly necessary, partly useful, and partly educational. But it cannot be said that the evolutionist philosophy throws the illumination we might expect on the economic significance of trade-unions. It exhibits a "return movement" to the venerable, but somewhat obsolete, argument against the influence of trade-unions upon wages. The argument depends partly on the treatment of labor as a mere commodity, which carries with it the failure to recognize the influence of wages on the standard of life, and the reciprocal influence of the standard of life upon wages; partly on the assumption that an increase of wages can only come out of an increase of price or decrease of profit, whereas it could be shown that, if it is followed by increased efficiency of production, an increase of wages would diminish cost and price, and may actually increase, or, at any rate, not diminish the profits of employers; and, lastly, it depends on the assumption that the policy of trade-unions essentially consists, not in maintaining and gradually advancing the standard of life, but in generally "forcing up" wages, and therefore the price of products, so that "the trade-union policy, carried out to the full, has the effect that every kind of wage-earner is taxed for the benefit of every other kind of wage-earner." The economics of the question are difficult and complicated, but Mr. Spencer does not seem to have followed the evolution of economic theory, or, indeed, of trade-union action. Nor, again, does he consider the trade-union method and principle of "collective" bargaining, or of boards of conciliation and judicial arbitration, or the legislative influence of trade-unions, all matters of modern importance. Finally, Mr. Spencer carries his refusal to distinguish between "services" and "commodities" to the extent of asserting that the underbidding of

a unionist by a non-unionist, and the underbidding of one tradesman by another, are "transactions completely parallel in their essentials, of which the one is regarded (*sc.* by trade-unionists) as utterly illegitimate and the other as quite legitimate." There seems to be certainly something singularly unprogressive in the philosophy of evolution. There are cases in which either transaction might be equally illegitimate; but the implication of Mr. Spencer's position is only another form of the purely commercial view of human labor. Consistently with such a view, he expresses elsewhere his approval of letting out work by a kind of Dutch auction.

Mr. Spencer on Co-operation.—If Mr. Spencer's account falls short of the true inwardness of trade-unionism, it cannot be said that his appreciation of industrial co-operation is more adequate or significant. Here, again, he has adopted Mrs. Webb's "Co-operative Movement" as a "compendious statement of essentials;" but has not followed her treatment of "co-operative consumption" as the typical form—a kind of rude and initial outline—of the principle of industrial democracy, or of the organization of production by the consumers as opposed to the "profit-making" employer or middleman. Mr. Spencer regards the co-operative store as nothing more than a form of economical purchase, and, following the conventional tradition, confines the strict meaning and proper significance of co-operation to "co-operative production." In a passing reference to "the Christian Socialists," Mr. Spencer justifies their appeal to Christian teaching in the following statement—characteristic, perhaps, but sufficiently remarkable for a philosopher:

> "Though they did not propose to 'take no thought for the morrow,' or enjoin as a duty 'sell all thou hast and give to the poor,' yet their conception of social organization on a co-operative basis was pervaded by kindred disregard of economic principle and essential facts of human nature."

As Mr. Spencer is bound to believe in the economic harmonies of competition, he does not consider whether competition of the co-operative type is less precarious than the competition of the master-and-workman type of industry. On the other hand, he does not dwell upon the democratic aspect of co-operative production, though he seems to recognize it by implication; nor does he show that the principle of "labor association" or "copartnership" is much wider than the form of the self-governing workshop. Treating it under this form, he notes the obvious difficulties,—the "dif-

ficulty of business management, adequately intelligent and honest" (a "chronic" difficulty, Mr. Spencer adds in a more characteristic than evolutionary spirit), and "the difficulty of preserving internal harmony." He has himself a scheme of "self-governing combination," which he thinks would meet the second difficulty: it is a scheme, briefly put, of co-operation carried on by piece-work. Such an arrangement conforms to the law of progressive freedom of choice, for "the workman's activity becomes entirely voluntary;" to the law of "progress from status to contract," for it is throughout based upon contract; and, lastly, it conforms to "the general law of species-life," and the law implied in the conception of justice,—"the law that reward should be proportionate to merit." It is at least doubtful how far, on the supposition of a *régime* of commercial competition, this system could be regarded as a pure instance of any of these "laws." Mr. Spencer himself recognizes that its practicality would depend on character; but, inasmuch as the co-operative is superior to the "master-and-workman" type of industrial organization, he trusts to the operation of natural selection for its ultimate prevalence.

This is a curiously unconscious recognition of the point of social democracy, and there is more than a family likeness between the results of evolution, according to Mr. Spencer, and the conclusions of such an avowedly socialist historian and speculator as Achille Leria. If Mr. Spencer had given as much attention to the substance as he has to the outward form of socialism, he might have discovered that he is a greater socialist than he knows. Socialism, no more than co-operative production, involves the abolition of the wage system, except so far as it implies the dependence of the wage-earner on the private possessor of land and capital. To quote again from the Report on Fabian policy: "Socialism means the organization and conduct of the necessary industries of the country, and the appropriation of all forms of economic rent of land and capital, by the nation as a whole, through the most suitable public authorities,—parochial, municipal, provincial, and central." The area of co-operation might vary from the smallest local association to that of the nation itself, and so far as it is genuinely democratic in method it embodies the idea of socialism: difference of scale would only mean difference of degree. Mr. Spencer, however, seems to contemplate a system of competitive "workshops," in competition not only with one another, but with "private capitalism." It is difficult to see how such a form of industry offers

the prospect of a general economic solution; nor does it seem likely that the realization of industrial democracy will be advanced so much by "voluntary" as by parochial, municipal, and "state" socialism. It would be difficult, however, to overestimate the educational value of co-operative production, or its general suggestiveness; and it is certainly capable of further and of wider application. The limits which are set to its extension are such as are imposed not by human nature, but by an economic system which sets insuperable barriers to the organization of society on the basis of labor. Co-operative production is a part, but not the whole, of socialism.

Mr. Spencer's Scheme of Co-operation.—The point, again, of Mr. Spencer's industrial scheme seems to lie in its idea of remuneration by piece-work. It is doubtful whether such a principle is workable in practice or justifiable in theory. It seems to be an echo of the right of any person, or group of persons, to "the entire product of their labor." As against such an idea, socialism sets the idea of industrial solidarity. "It recognizes that wealth is social in its origin and must be social in its distribution, since the evolution of industry has made it impossible to distinguish the particular contribution that each person makes to the common product, or to ascertain its value." It is only the abstractness of Mr. Spencer's "law of justice" that gives it the appearance of justice; and as an ideal of individualistic justice it seems to fall short of social justice. Its logical realization would be not only fatal to the "co-operative spirit," but would tend to weaken the protection which labor, as a whole, has gained in the establishment of standard wages and trade-union conditions of industry.* Moreover, it suggests a false view of wages or property,—the true view being, as Mr. Bosanquet admirably expresses it, that "wages or property, one's share of the produce of society, is not there to reward one for doing work, but either to give one work to do, or to enable one to do it; and it is by that standard alone that its adequacy must be judged" ("Essays and Addresses," p. 65).

Mr. Spencer on Socialism.—Mr. Spencer's conception of social-

* It may be mentioned that Mr. Spencer's suggestion first saw the light in *Labour Copartnership*, a journal devoted to the cause of co-operative "production," based on the copartnership of the workers; but it was unfavorably received, partly on theoretical, partly on practical, grounds. It was also severely handled by Kropotkin in *Freedom*.

ism is, as already implied, a crucial instance of the fixed ideas under which he regards industrial institutions: the prophet of evolution recognizes no evolution in socialism. He adopts the conventional idea of the socialistic *règime* as "simply another form of the bureaucratic *régime*," but does not explain the antagonism of German social democracy to "state socialism" and officialdom. He does not even too carefully distinguish socialism from certain forms of communism. "At the same time that it is biologically fatal, the doctrine of the socialists is psychologically absurd." Biologically fatal, because, by proposing to extend the *régime* of the family to the whole community, socialism favors "the fostering of the weak by the strong," and would therefore violate one great law of organic evolution by suspending the "natural relation between effort and benefit." Psychologically absurd, because it assumes "the character of all to be so noble that it causes continuous sacrifice of self to others, and so ignoble that it continually lets others sacrifice to self;" and, moreover, because it would "suspend the natural relation between the instinctive actions of parents and the welfare of the progeny,"—that is, by transferring children to the care of the state; and this is the other great law of organic evolution that "more or less fully the doctrine of collectivists, socialists, and communists" proposes to suspend. That there are and have been certain "proposals" to which this criticism applies, it would be useless to deny; but they are certainly not characteristic of the purpose or practice of collectivism. We are then shown that "the real human nature around us makes the irrationality of socialistic hopes still more conspicuous," and the reign of "maleficent selfishness" is depicted with Mr. Spencer's characteristically vigorous and encyclopædic touch. But it is difficult to see what is the use of these promiscuous and undiscriminating characterizations. The few pages in Mill's "Autobiography" upon socialist ideas and prospects, though they make no pretensions to even an appearance of scientific importance, show not only more insight into the meaning of socialism, but also more appreciation of the meaning of social evolution than all these loosely constructed and badly-aimed generalities.

Modern socialism does not put itself forward as a panacea for all human evil, but only as a remedy for the evils produced by a defective organization of industry and an unhealthy distribution of wealth. Its distinctive idea is that of practical industrial democracy. It aims at nothing more or less than the utmost possible achievement

of democracy—political, social, and industrial—at making the life and livelihood of the people "entirely independent of private capitalism." In other words, it aims at the organization of society upon the basis of the free and independent labor of the members composing the community; and this, it is held, implies "the reorganization of society by the emancipation of land and industrial capital from individual and class ownership and the vesting of them in the community for the general benefit." (Fabian Basis.)

Mr. Spencer, in his chapter on "Co-operation," emphasizes the element of "coerciveness" in the "master-and-workmen type" of industry. In his chapter on "Socialism," however, he describes the modern industrial system as "one under which coerciveness approaches a minimum," and socialism, being "simply" a civil regimentation parallel to military regimentation,—it is odd how often "simply" occurs in the philosophy of evolution,—as a form, the worst form, of social coerciveness. But the whole point of socialism lies in its endeavor not only to make the livelihood of the workman independent of individual or class ownership of land and capital, but to gradually substitute a form of industrial organization in which practical equality of industrial opportunity would be combined with direct community of interest and with very much less "interference with personal liberty" than the present system involves.

Mr. Spencer might just as well urge that political democracy is only the substitute of one "master" for another; and his ideal of "self-ownership" could only be logically realized by every man on his own independent island,—a somewhat precarious form of personal freedom. When, however, he describes the ideal as "complete ownership of the unit and exercise over him of nothing more than passive influence by the aggregate," his language, however vague and philosophically unsatisfactory, seems to imply a conception of freedom that can only be actualized in and through a society in which all are equally means and ends.

Mr. Spencer on the Industrial Future.—Mr. Spencer is a pessimist as to the near, an optimist as to the distant future. He foresees the coming "rule of official classes," and this he regards as a "return movement,"—that is, to social restraint and dictation. He does not know how long this phase of social life—this rhythmic change—may last. Its issue will probably be various and uncertain, although generally disastrous. A military despotism may break the "intolerable strain" of the official classes, or, again, the

laws of organic evolution will assert themselves in the gradual decay or "practical extinction" of the society, or its conquest by a less emasculated people, before whom "the socialistic organization will go down like a house of cards, as did that of the ancient Peruvians before a handful of Spaniards."

On the other hand:

> "If the process of evolution, which, increasing throughout past time, has brought life to its present height, as we cannot but anticipate, then, amid all the rhythmical changes in each society, amid all the lives and deaths of nations, amid all the supplantings of race by race, there will go on that adaptation of human nature to the social state which began when savages first gathered together for mutual defence,—an adaptation finally complete."

The two views are combined in the idea of "relative" optimism; "the cosmic progress brings about retrogression as well as progression;" there is no uniform ascent from lower to higher, but only "an occasional production" of higher types, and social evolution "must, while producing step after step higher societies, leave outstanding many lower." Mr. Spencer, however, trusts to the primary process of "integration," which, having so far manifested itself in the formation of larger and larger nations, may culminate in a "peace-maintaining federation" of the highest nations, putting an end to internecine strife and to "the rebarbarization which is certainly undoing civilization." Then "there may be effectual progress towards that equilibrium between constitution and conditions, between inner faculties and outer requirements, implied by the final stage of evolution." All the great societies may at least "become similar in those cardinal traits which result from complete self-ownership of the unit and exercise over him of nothing more than passive influence by the aggregate."

> "On the one hand, by continual repression of aggressive instincts and exercise of feelings which prompt ministration to public welfare, and, on the other hand, by the lapse of restraint, gradually becoming less necessary, there must be produced a kind of man so constituted that, while fulfilling his own desires, he fulfils also the social needs. . . . Long studies . . . have not caused me to recede from the belief expressed nearly fifty years ago: 'The ultimate individual will be one whose private requirements coincide with public ones. He will be that manner of man who, in spontaneously fulfilling his own nature, incidentally performs the functions of a social unit, and yet is only enabled so to fulfil his own nature by all others doing the like.'"

It is with this sentence that Mr. Spencer concludes the "Principles of Sociology," and it must be admitted that it is "a great

word." Sociologists, as we know, disagree even more than other doctors, when they offer us guidance and direction; but the socialist has no ground of disagreement with Mr. Spencer's description of the principle of a completely adapted social state. For the whole object of socialism is to provide the economical mechanism which will satisfy the idea of economic harmony and equilibrium. Where the socialist differs from Mr. Spencer is in thinking that "socialistic" methods are helping to form and not to hinder such a future. It would seem that all social, like all moral, ideals tend to meet, when stated at their best. "The socialist" does not quarrel with the end, as stated by "the individualist," only with his judgment on the means; but "the individualist" not only quarrels with the means, but mistakes the aims of socialists, partly because socialists have mistaken them themselves. This is why we find ourselves disputing with Mr. Spencer at almost every point on the road to his "conclusion," and most heartily endorsing the conclusion itself. But we certainly cannot consider Mr. Spencer's book on "Industrial Institutions" a favorable example of the synthetic philosophy, or a good augury for the claims of "sociological" science. It seems to us a thing of shreds and patches, and, so far from impressing us with the advance of sociology, is continually suggestive of the different kinds of "bias" and "subjective difficulty" which Mr. Spencer has shown to affect the study of social science. It often reads like an expression of personal feeling and experience, under the appearance of a scientific demonstration; and it is to be regretted that Mr. Spencer should have given the weight of his great authority, as also of the authority of the "Synthetic Philosophy," to what we cannot help regarding as political and economical obscurantism. But this in no way diminishes our profound admiration of his devoted and disinterested labors, of the sincerity and earnestness of his purpose, of the breadth and dignity of his speculation, or of his signal services to the cause of commercial morality and national honor, of individual freedom and international peace.

SIDNEY BALL.

ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, OXFORD.

BOOK REVIEWS.

THE ETHICS OF JOHN STUART MILL. Edited with Introductory Essays by Charles Douglas, M.A., D.Sc., Lecturer and Assistant in Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1897. Pp. cxxvi., 233.

The object of this volume is to provide learners who are beginning the study of Ethics with Mill's chief ethical writings in a compact form. Besides a reprint of his "Utilitarianism" and "Logic of the Moral Sciences" (Book VI. of Mill's Logic) with an analysis, the book contains three Introductory Chapters entitled respectively *Ethics and Induction*, *Ethics and Psychology*, and *Ethics and Morality;* a brief Appendix of extracts from various writings of Mill's under the headings of (1) Causality and Induction, (2) and (3) Mill's Theory of the Self, and of the Relation of Morality to Nature, (4) his Estimate of Bentham, and, finally, an Index. The numerous foot-notes contain further quotations from Mill by way of illustration and elucidation of the text.

The Introductory Essays, which are "intended to guide the student in his interpretation and criticism of the ethical writings, and to connect these writings with Mill's philosophy as a whole, and with his place in the development of speculation," are interesting, sympathetic, and in many ways suggestive, and exhibit the possibility and value of bringing Mill's ethical theory into connection with his other philosophical views.

The attempt in Chapter I. to show how Mill's conception of logical method influenced his ethical view, seems to me, however, somewhat strained, both as regards the stress laid on the dependence of Mill's Ethics on his logic, and also as to the value of his logical method. Respect for Mill's intellectual force, and the fullest appreciation of his moral enthusiasm and earnestness and his unfailing candor, need not prevent our recognizing the profound unsatisfactoriness of his account of the relation between "Induction" and "Deduction,"—his ever-renewed and for himself hopeless, though for his readers most instructive, effort to combine inference to the unknown with certainty of proof—and the worse than feebleness of his attempt to base the utilitarian principle on "experience." Dr. Douglas does indeed notice that this

effort of Mill's is "more than questionable." But I do not think his criticism suggests that the attempt to base first principles on facts, particulars, or experience, is necessarily foredoomed to failure.

It is true that in Essay II. he criticises the "psychological way of conceiving conduct" from which Mill's ethics starts,—Psychology being described as deliberately abstracting from the "subject-object relation which is characteristic of human experience,"—the "self-consciousness which is the determining principle" in the unity and objectivity of mental life, and speaks of Mill's perception of this (extra-psychological) "organic unity and continuity which characterize experience." But the only view of Psychology which seems to me acceptable is that which makes recognition of the subject-object relation its distinctive characteristic; and in spite of Mill's talk of a series aware of itself, etc., I do not feel at all assured that he did intend to abstract in Psychology from that relation; certainly he cannot both do this consistently and also recognize self-consciousness as the necessary principle of unity in mental life. Perhaps we might apply to Mill here a modification of his remark on Bentham (quoted p. 219) that "though there is possibly no one of them [*i.e.*, constituents of human nature] of the existence of which an acknowledgment might not be found in some corner of [his] writings, no conclusions are ever founded on the acknowledgment" of certain of these. It appears to be suggested that Mill's difficulties arise from neglect of the "principle of self-consciousness;" that they might be remedied, and Utilitarianism transformed into a satisfactory and non-utilitarian system by the recognition of this principle. But is any such simple solution possible? In his Logic, the relation between the General and the Particular landed Mill in hopeless and more or less obvious confusion; and in his Ethics, in addition to this difficulty from Particulars, there is the struggle between Self and Other, private Happiness and public Welfare, Interest and Duty, which Mill, in common with all previous moralists, had to feel and meet as best as he could. And the way in which he has met it is by an argument (involving both *Petitio Principii* and *Non Sequitur*) from the actual desire of each one for his own happiness, and that alone to the duty of desiring the general happiness. And the kind of "organic unity" that, at this time, is likely to be suggested by Dr. Douglas's remarks can scarcely be attributed to Mill; if we are led by the suggestion, are we not reading into him a meaning that could hardly

even have occurred to him or his contemporaries? And, however much the "principle of self-consciousness" may be admitted, it can have no effect in improving or supplementing the appeal to facts, or experiences, or ideas which form part of a series,—being a necessary presupposition of any such fact, idea, or series.

Neither the strength nor the weakness of Mill's Utilitarianism seems to be sufficiently emphasized (and this is rather noticeably the case with reference to Bentham also), and no reference is made to the more recent elaboration of the doctrine in which Utilitarianism and Intuitionism are shown to be at one. In these points, and in what seems to me an attempt to read into Mill elements of an essentially modern view, I find the chief drawbacks to Dr. Douglas's exposition, as its chief merit is to be found in his sympathetic attitude towards Mill and generous recognition of all Mill's splendid intellectual and moral excellence as a thinker, and in the philosophical charm and value of his careful and instructive effort to exhibit each part of Mill's work in its connection with the rest of his life and thought.

E. E. C. Jones.

Girton College, Cambridge.

Pseudo-Philosophy at the End of the Nineteenth Century. By Hugh Mortimer Cecil. 1. An Irrationalist Trio—Kidd, Drummond, Balfour. London: The University Press, Limited, 16 John Street, Bedford Row, W. C., 1897. Pp. xvi., 308.

This book is written from a point of view violently anti-theistic, anti-theological, and above all anti-Christian, the author appearing to be an accepted champion of what Mr. Balfour would call "Naturalism," what he himself would call "Science" or "Rationalism." It purports to be an attempt to state and controvert the main contentions of "Social Evolution," "The Ascent of Man," and "The Foundations of Belief;" and since these three well-known books are occupied with some of the most difficult and disputed problems of life and thought, the attempt to evaluate them, familiar as they are, calls for a serious intellectual effort on the part of writer and reader.

It may be remarked that Mr. Kidd, Mr. Drummond, and Mr. Arthur Balfour are here treated as a "trio" only in the sense that the three essays in which their books are examined are brought together between the covers of a single volume; that they are all attacked by Mr. Hugh Mortimer Cecil and regarded by him as

"modern champions of theology" who have endeavored to "capture the scientific fortress by the use of pseudo-scientific methods;" and, further, that they all receive similar usage at Mr. Cecil's hands, being quoted from at inordinate length and with frequent repetition, and treated with asperity, vituperation, and an unstinted imputation of stupidity, vulgarity, and dishonesty such as one had imagined to be out of fashion.

One ought perhaps to be always ready for the unexpected and the unexplained,—and the more, that it is not only in books, not only in "scientific" controversy, that we now and then see men in advanced stages of civilization hark back to modes of procedure fit only for their ancestors. Still, the unexplained everywhere calls for explanation; and it is not quite obvious why Mr. Cecil has written his book at this juncture; why he has written it in such a style, or who the public can be to whom he expects it to appeal. It must certainly be highly offensive to "Christians," who after all still exist in considerable numbers, and form a not unimportant section of the respectable and intelligent portion of the community. It is hardly likely to be studied by Mr. Herbert Spencer, who is somewhat ineffectively patronized in the last chapter, and it cannot be very attractive to Mr. Karl Pearson, who is alternately blamed and praised, while Professor Huxley, the other great "Rationalist" who is selected for qualified distinction, is unfortunately no longer among possible readers. It is not likely to appeal largely to students of "Science," who seem for the most part either to "despise and scoff" philosophy, or else to take orthodoxy under their "exiguous wing" (to quote Mr. Cecil); it is too "scientific" for philosophers, too stiff for the idle, too long for the busy, too pungent for a simple taste; and last, though not least, the books which it discusses have quite recently been widely read and most voluminously discussed. There is, however, no doubt that Mr. Cecil writes with considerable ability and genuine conviction, in a style which, while often trenchant not to say truculent, is generally clear and lively; also, that he has succeeded (though not, I think, with any striking originality) in pointing out many weak places in the views which he attacks. His book is from many points of view worth reading; his interest in philosophy is keen, and his logical acuteness great. But this does not lead him always to "define his terms" (a "counsel of perfection" which he frequently insists on), nor preserve him from occasional misstatements and contradictions; it does not prevent his being entangled

by ambiguities of language; it does not help him always to perceive the precise confusion of thought to which the mistakes and incoherences which he notices are attributable; it does not enable him invariably to appreciate the scope of the theories which he criticises.

For instance, Mr. Cecil's meaning would have been clearer, and it would have been easier to estimate his merits and weaknesses, if he had given us careful definitions of the sense in which he uses or accepts such terms as scepticism, rational, reason, sanction, irrationalism, evolution, good, right,* not to mention scientific method, real world, things, matter, inference, experience, etc., terms which he uses constantly, and the meaning of which is very important for a right understanding of his view.

Again and again he speaks of Mr. Kidd's book as having been written with the object of persuading men, by a reasoned appeal, to act in a certain "irrational" manner, and so conduce to future progress; and then he gibes at the writer for using reason to persuade men to unreason, and for being so absurd as to think that his feeble assistance will aid the "great deep-seated evolutionary forces" to fulfil their task. But if Mr. Cecil had observed the meanings attached by Mr. Kidd to *Reason*, part of this taunt (and much of what he says in other passages) would be seen to lose point. And the laugh at attempting to assist evolution has no special appropriateness as against Mr. Kidd, whose book aims rather at being historic, analytic, and predictive than hortative.

Then, again, what does Mr. Cecil mean by "good"? On p. 121 he says, "If God can prevent the suffering [of the world] and will not, he is not *good*," and p. 171 speaks of "crediting God only with the *good*" in Nature (*cf.* also pp. 52, 142, 144). And at p. 115, in speaking of the problem of evil, it is plain that by evil he means pain, and elsewhere that by *bad* he means voluntarily productive of pain (*cf.* p. 122, etc.). In these places we have admission of a "problem of evil" (for what more is that than the recognition that evil exists of which we do not see the justification?) and reference to a standard of goodness and badness; while elsewhere he has said that to talk of a problem of evil is unmeaning, and has refused to allow such reference to a criterion, asserting that the "conception of progress as improvement

* He does indeed say (p. 42) that "evolution is constant change," but this is not the admissible or admitted sense of the word, and in other passages he gives and must give to it, a different and much fuller meaning.

is altogether unscientific," and telling us not to "confuse" things by introducing a Being to whom *infinite goodness* is attributed, since *good* and *evil* are wholly relative.

And Mr. Balfour's appeal to consequences as a ground for accepting or rejecting certain views (which is a recognition of the supremacy of *Right*, a recognition of *practical* reason as something to which ultimate appeal must be made) is severely criticised by Mr. Cecil; but (1) in judging persons and actions to be good or bad he has himself acknowledged a standard of practical reason. (2) He seems sometimes to identify Right and True (accepting both practical and speculative standards), for he says, p. 198, "either biology is right or it is wrong. If it is wrong [= false], we will give up our theory. If it is right [= true], what harm [= wrong] can there be in teaching men the truth?" And unless we can identify the Right and the True, it is not self-evident that to teach the Truth is always Right. (3) Even if he gives up a distinctive practical standard, and says that Truth is all-sufficient, or at least more important than Happiness, he has still not got rid of a Practical Standard; he must still admit Right and Ought as contrasted with Fact (though subordinate to it). For he is constantly allowing—or rather insisting—that many men both judge falsely and speak falsely, and holds strongly that it would be better if they judged and spoke truly; indeed, while most severe with those whom he holds to be mistaken or dishonest, he is very ready to attribute falsity and insincerity.

He says, for instance, speaking of Mr. Balfour, "It is not for the man against whom the insinuation of insincerity has been whispered by reviewer after reviewer to talk of the ethical virtues that flow from the acceptance of Christianity;" as though the whispers and insinuations of a reviewer need be proof of anything whatever in the person reviewed. Indeed, it seems difficult to understand how any one whose eyes were not clouded by prejudice could read the "Foundations of Belief" and fail to perceive the rare sincerity of the writer. But we have not now to learn—though we always have to regret—that no man and no book (especially if in the van of progress) can be secure from injustice, or that blind misunderstanding and misrepresentation are continually putting hindrances in the way of that evolution towards what is better, which, however, in spite of all obstacles, seems on the whole steady and irresistible.

Mr. Cecil is, it is true, unsparing wherever he detects a flaw or

error; but this seems inconsistent, since he is sometimes inclined to give up the objectivity even of truth (which no doubt is a sacrifice demanded by the method that tries to base knowledge on "particulars"). Indeed, his position appears peculiarly unsatisfactory, being precisely that Naturalism against which Mr. Balfour has argued, in all its instability and inevitable incoherence. Mr. Cecil has not, as far as I can see, by any means estimated the force either of the special argument against Naturalism or of the whole contention as to the foundations of science of which it is a part, and, in fact, believes himself to be still impregnable in that hopelessly ruined "fortress."

And he derides the argument from needs, and by a question-begging use of epithets presents the ever-renewed struggle in thought and practice as a contest between "Science" and "Religion," as a crude opposition of two forces, of which the one is always rational, and the other irrational, hypocritical, prejudiced, and violent; whereas, the truth is rather that the fight all along the line has been between different claimants to reason, different stages of Thought and Feeling,—a struggle that goes on also within the borders of Science itself, and within the very sanctuaries of Religion.

Mr. Kidd may have failed in his reading of "Evolution;" Mr. Drummond's attempt to interfuse the selfish struggle for existence with love and self-sacrifice and to transform the apparent evil of the world to good may have broken down; Mr. Balfour may have been less successful in championing orthodox Christianity than in exhibiting the necessary dependence of Science on Metaphysics; but they have at least done much, and in a reverent spirit, to rouse men's minds to intelligent interest in the great questions which concern the relation of Fact to Philosophy, of what *is* to what *ought* to be, of Man to Nature and to God.

E. E. C. Jones.

Girton College, Cambridge.

The Psychology of the Moral Self. By B. Bosanquet. London: Macmillan & Co. Pp. viii., 132.

It may be gathered from internal evidence that this little book was first produced in the form of University Extension Lectures, like the author's previous "Essentials of Logic;" and it is no small distinction of that movement that, partly, perhaps, from the greater mental maturity of the audience than obtains in regular

universities, it should have provoked two such text-books. Less successful than the earlier book, because it is less of one piece, and serves as a kind of introduction to several psychological works, this book has certainly one merit of a text-book, that of stimulating thought and whetting the reader's appetite to learn more of the subject from some of the larger works. But it is exceedingly brief, and lacking in illustration, and it will need ample commentary in some of its harder parts which are brief even to obscurity. The plan of the book is as follows: First comes an account of the nature of psychology as dealing with one aspect of all experience, then a general description of the nature of psychical events. After these preliminaries follow: a sketch of how we are conscious of things (the least lucid part of the book) and how our knowledge becomes organized (one of the best parts); a psychology of self-consciousness as opposed to consciousness of things; and in succession chapters on feeling, on volition and certain problems arising in connection therewith, on reasonable action, and, finally, on the relation of body and soul. It will be seen that a great deal of ground is covered. The frequent references to different writers, while they add to the usefulness of the book for the inquirer, give an impression of disconnectedness; but there is a definite thread of continuity. In describing the general nature of mind and the growth of cognition, Mr. Bosanquet expounds with much effectiveness the singleness or organic character or continuity of mind, which was magisterially formulated by Dr. Ward; and it is doubtless this same principle of organization by "identity of contents" as opposed to atomism and association which makes him insist later on that the moral ideal is not a question of egoism and altruism, but a question of who I am and others are; that the moral self is "the realization of a certain nature which is the outcome" of persons working together in society (p. 94 adapted). It must be confessed that in the crusade against the wickedness of atomism and associationism Mr. Bosanquet (with others) goes far towards putting mental processes out of the way as much as the associationists put "identity of content" out of the way. How do the logical "universals" which association is said to marry, get married? And how do we settle what sort of persons we include in our moral purview except by the action of these several persons enforcing their claims?

In so condensed a book, representing so much thinking and in so individual a form, many points call for remark, of which very

few can be mentioned. In dealing with self-consciousness, it is suggested that successful self-assertion against objects may be its first germ, and later on, in Chapter VIII., when the question is raised whether society is necessary to the genesis of a moral self, the germ of moral feeling is found in the contrast of success and failure in the individual. This is a very interesting point, but Mr. Bosanquet seems not to press it, and to allow that neither self-consciousness nor the moral judgment arise practically without experience of the "we." He illustrates from Hegel, and adds this fine saying of his own: "If we compare self-consciousness in the bad sense (with the good sense of the term), we find that the term is used when the self is indeed aware of itself but cannot count upon a positive place, upon that definite recognition which constitutes its reality." His account of volition follows Professor James on the whole; accordingly, he does not admit the necessary antecedence of desire, comparing decision to the solution of a problem rather than a process which results from feeling. Abandoning psychology for a moment, he raises the question whether the moral self may include non-social elements (such as art or truth), and he concludes that "all the great contents of developed human self—truth, beauty, religion, and social morality—are all of them but modes of expression of the ideal self:" an elusive answer, it may well seem (though illustrated finely from Plato), since we learn neither what the ideal self means, not how its different modes of expression are related to each other. On the question of reasonable action, Mr. Bosanquet, in pursuance of his principle, finds reasonableness in "self-consistency," or "consistency with the whole of experience," a position which he reaches by criticism of Hume, Kant, and Professor Sidgwick. The discussion of altruism is very interesting, and still more the brief section on self-assertion and self-sacrifice. The reader wishes for much more, but perhaps this is the merit of the book that the tabloids of nutriment it supplies leave us with the desire of a further less condensed and more epicurean meal.

S. ALEXANDER.

THE OWENS COLLEGE, MANCHESTER.

THE WILL TO BELIEVE, AND OTHER ESSAYS IN POPULAR PHILOSOPHY. By William James. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1897. Pp. xvii., 332.

Professor James is by common consent in the forefront of his science, and one may with some confidence regard this volume as

in recent years the most striking and powerful product of American thought employed upon serious philosophy. It consists of ten essays. Four of these are, broadly speaking, devoted to the establishment and illustration of what the author calls "the liberty of believing,"—the momentous thesis that in the final problems of life and hope, in default of proof or refutation, a man may lawfully "will to believe" such things as alone to his thinking make the universe habitable for the soul. To these are added a really novel and refreshing treatment of "free-will," the conclusion of which is that we must elect for belief the "indeterminist" view of human action as the only worthy alternative; a briefly traced theory of ethics, according to which that is the best action which leads to the gratification of the most numerous or intense demands of sentient creatures, the demand of God by its greatness being paramount; two papers arguing with much force and apt illustration that genius is not produced by determinable social forces, but is an "accidental variation" whose beneficent results tend to be "preserved in the struggle for existence;" an unsparing attack on some doctrines and methods of Hegel; and a highly judicial but too brief review of the work of the Society for Psychical Research.

A dry and thin summary must be peculiarly false to a production whose foremost qualities are ingenuity of argument, range and richness of imagination, deep color of style, and volume of emotional appeal. The work teems with matter tempting or challenging to the critic. It is a human document calling for study of a singularly interesting tendency and temper, and it is a trenchant polemic against tenets whose defenders must make what answer or compromise they can. It is in both of these aspects—as student and in a measure as opponent—that I have permission from the editor of this JOURNAL to treat of the book in an article to be published in an early issue.

D. S. MILLER.

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE.

IL SOCIALISMO E IL PENSIERO MODERNO, SAGGI. Di Alessandro Chiappelli. Firenze: Successori Le Monnier, 1897. 12mo. Pp. xiv., 342.

This handsome volume, charmingly dedicated to the learned Countess Caëtani-Lovatelli, contains seven essays on various aspects of socialism, in which the author is deeply interested, and which he hopes to direct into worthy channels. Their titles are

these: (1) Patriotism and Socialism; (2) Darwinism and Socialism; (3) Socialism and Art; (4) Philosophy and Socialism; (5) Socialism and Pessimism; (6) the Moral Idea in Socialism; (7) Religion and Socialism.

Professor Chiappelli is one of the ablest and most liberal thinkers in Europe, a man who takes a profound interest in all ethical, political, religious, and economic movements, and has an extensive knowledge of them. The gist of these essays may be summed up in the closing words of the last of them: "To cast the ancient gold of the Christian idea into the new and living forms of modern culture and life—this is the noble and fruitful task of modern times." After reading this no one will be surprised to learn that the author is a "Christian socialist." This means that he utterly rejects the merely economic socialism of Marx and his followers, and would substitute for it a moral socialism, in which every man, loving his neighbor as himself, would religiously interest himself in the welfare of all mankind. This socialism is here presented, and insisted upon, under many aspects, and with great skill and enthusiasm, reminding us at times of Tolstoï, with whom the author seems to be deeply in sympathy. It is, indeed, "a consummation devoutly to be wished;" but whether it can ever be realized upon the basis of Christian supernaturalism and Christian moral heteronomy may very well be doubted. When we remove this supernaturalism and this heteronomy (which must ever be fatal to all true morality), what remains of Christianity but the simple spirit of humanity, which is surely far enough from being peculiar to it or its adherents? Humanity is a far wider term than Christianity, and only blinding and narrowing confusion can arise from any attempt to identify the two. It is no unusual thing for purveyors of new doctrines—especially if they are in precarious official positions—to send forth these doctrines labelled "Christianity Rediscovered;" but this is mere quackery, and should be treated as such. This remark has, of course, no reference to Professor Chiappelli!

What we want is neither Christian, economic, nor "sportive" (Bellamystic) socialism, but that simple, large, human socialism, which the best modern nations, and especially the United States, are doing their best, in all ways, to further,—a socialism which, while cultivating the social spirit, uses its best efforts to safeguard and develop individual freedom and to encourage individual initiative. If Professor Chiappelli were as well acquainted with

modern America as he is with half-mediæval Italy, where moral autonomy is still a rare phenomenon, he would doubtless agree to this—so honest a thinker is he.

THOMAS DAVIDSON.

NEW YORK.

FORECASTS OF THE COMING CENTURY. By a Decade of Writers (A. R. Wallace, Tom Mann, H. Russell Smart, William Morris, H. S. Salt, Enid Stacy, Margaret McMillan, Grant Allen, Bernard Shaw, Edward Carpenter). London: Labor Press, 1897.

This series of essays might serve as an example of the truth on which one of the essayists has insisted with much effectiveness and humor, that the names Socialism and Collectivism cover many very different opinions and social ideals. The ten writers, though all more or less Socialistic in sympathies, appear to represent almost the same number of shades of Socialist opinion, and, perhaps one may add, of degrees of ability to fulfil the somewhat ambitious functions of prophets. The future foretold varies from the Utopia of Anarchism discussed by the editor, Mr. E. Carpenter, to the "miserably prosaic 'bourgeois' development and extension of the middle class respectability of to-day," which Mr. Bernard Shaw describes with delightful impartiality as the more modest goal of Fabian effort. The editor, indeed, maintains that all Socialists are agreed that a stage of Collectivism is to be followed by a stage of Anarchism, and that they only differ as to the importance of the stages. No doubt he is right; but we should imagine that the period to which the authors of the very practical and moderate essays on "Trades-Unionism and Co-operation" and on "The Illusions of Socialism" relegated the stage of Anarchism would probably be about the millennium.

Mr. Tom Mann, indeed, ends the former essay with a prophecy which, if intended to be taken seriously, it would be inadequate to call rash, to the effect that the next ten years will see a legal six hours' day, the nationalization of mines and railways, and other equally sweeping changes; but most of his argument is in a much more moderate vein. He points out that the value of Trades-Unionism and Co-operation consists alike in what they have actually effected,—the one in improving the condition of the working classes, the other in replacing capitalist by democratic ownership, and in the stimulus they give to self-reliance and class loyalty.

In neither of these ways, he thinks, are their services used up, and a long time must elapse before they can be superseded by Collectivism.

Mr. Bernard Shaw, with equal caution, warns the enthusiastic against supposing that Socialism as an accomplished fact will differ less from their visions of it than the realization generally does from a social ideal. Mr. Grant Allen, in a vigorous and effective essay, marred by occasional lapses into bad taste, inveighs against the popular superstition that Socialism involves a "dead level," and argues that its real aim is to substitute a natural for an artificial inequality.

The remaining essays are in a more conventional Socialistic vein. Mr. Alfred Russell Wallace advocates Labor Colonies as the solution of the problem of the unemployed. Mr. Russell Smart's "Programme for a Socialist Parliament" includes all the usual items of an advanced bill of fare. Their space, of course, makes a full discussion of these large questions impossible, but both essays seem to us to bristle with impracticable or dangerous suggestions, and to ignore the most obvious objections and difficulties. Mr. William Morris discusses the future of Art, and Mr. Henry Salt of Literature under a Socialist *régime*. The ideal community of the author of "News from Nowhere" is always an attractive place, but it may be doubted whether Mr. Salt's essay is likely to win many converts to Socialism among lovers of literature. Miss Enid Stacy reviews the Women's Rights movement of the last fifty years, and shows how it may be brought into line with Socialism. The only thing about Miss McMillan's essay on Education which seems to connect it with the rest of the book and with Socialistic theory is the tendency which it shows to exaggerate enormously the power of circumstances as compared with character, and the importance of making everything as comfortable and easy-going and free from disagreeableness for children and everybody else as possible. This tendency, though, of course, in no way logically implied in Socialism, is as manifest in this volume of essays as in most popular Socialistic literature.

The essays are all written in a popular vein, and, though necessarily slight, seem likely to be useful in spreading popular knowledge of Socialist opinions and aims of various types.

ELEANOR RATHBONE.

LIVERPOOL.

LECTURES IN THE LYCEUM; OR, ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS FOR ENGLISH READERS. Edited by St. George Stock. London, New York, and Bombay: Longmans, Green & Co.

One is at a loss how to take Mr. Stock's book. It is not a translation, nor yet a commentary; it professes to be lectures, but drops at frequent intervals into dialogue; it is the *Ethics* for English readers, but contains only half of it. It is, perhaps, best to take it frankly for what it seems to have been,—the *jeu d'esprit* of an Oxford lecturer in his summer holidays (Mr. Stock tells us it was written in the long vacation of 1893). Taking it in this way, we may say at once that, unlike many things that come under this classification, it is *jeu* and has *esprit*. For students or for the general public, to whom the text itself and the better commentaries are inaccessible, it is the pleasantest introduction to Aristotle's moral philosophy that we have come across. Needless to say, the "editor" has made use of Mr. Bywater's new text, and borrows largely and judiciously from Professor Stewart's admirable commentary.

It is when he leaves these excellent guides that the disadvantages of the form of exposition he has adopted begin to make themselves felt. In a translation (if it is a good one) we know what an author has said, in a commentary we know what he has not said, but in a paraphrase like the present we are apt not to know where we are. We need not complain of the many good things we find here which, though not in the original text, are quite in its spirit and throw valuable light upon it. Instances of this are the fine comparison of life to the Olympic games, which is not Aristotle's, but, if we remember rightly, is attributed to Pythagoras; the paraphrase of the idea that external goods are merely the "fittings" of life: "Fortune is our Choregus, Virtue is the true author of our life's drama;" the gloss that reason moves us in the sense in which a candle moves us in the dark; and the metaphor used to explain the paradox that virtue, although a means, is also an extreme; "to lodge an arrow in the bull's eye of a target may be said to be hitting the mean, but it is at the same time an extremely good shot." But there are other expressions of the text which are not so happy. Of some of these the worst that can be said is that they are simply not there. Many of the points started by the "Persons in the Dialogue" are of this kind (*e.g.*, p. 100 *fin.*). Others give a false, *i.e.*, un-Aristotelian turn, to the thought. Examples are the remark that to consider a man apart from society is "like considering a fish

apart from water" (the connection, of course, on Aristotle's view, is much closer than that between organism and environment); "Happiness is the outcome of the combination of all lower goods" (this is just what it is not); "It is the non-existence or undiscoverability of the reason why that makes a thing to be a first principle" (apart from the English this is doubtful [Aristotelian] metaphysics). The whole passage, indeed, from which the last sentence is quoted (pp. 30 and 31) reminds one rather of the metaphysics of Mill than of Aristotle.

These examples illustrate the danger of representing Aristotle as a glorified university extension lecturer, but they do not prove that many university extension and other students will not get a great deal of help from Mr. Stock's kindly attempt to turn out an Ethics without tears.

J. H. MUIRHEAD.

MASON COLLEGE, BIRMINGHAM.

A SURVEY OF GREEK CIVILIZATION. By J. P. Mahaffy, D.D., D.C.L. London: Macmillan & Co., 1897.

A HISTORY OF ANCIENT GREEK LITERATURE. By Gilbert Murray, M.A., Professor of Greek in the University of Glasgow. London: William Heinemann, 1897.

Mr. Mahaffy has written his book confessedly from the personal point of view, and the result is an account, in some respects fragmentary and biassed, but always, as we expect from this scholar, original and stimulating in a high degree. Such a survey of such a civilization, so deep and rich, so far-reaching in its influence, cannot but be of great importance for the history of ethics.

The scope of the book is enormous. Mr. Mahaffy passes in review all the phases of the Greek development as conceived by him,—the pre-Homeric age, a society led by a rich aristocracy, headed by powerful kings, civilized and courteous to their own caste, cruel to those outside the pale; the next age, that shaped the Homeric poems, a time of reminiscence and reverence for bygone splendor; the dawn of historic civilization, with its lyric freedom, exuberance and variety; the golden age of Pericles, unrivalled for intellect and genius, lacking in tenderness and sense of duty; the fourth century B.C., less brilliant, less rigorous, but with signs of wider sympathies and humaner thoughts; the inevitable triumphs of Philip and Alexander; the strange complex period called Hellenistic; and the last days under Roman rule, when conquered Greece took her

conquerors "with beauty," and Greek language and Greek speculation proved channels for the new gospel that had come into the world.

Students of ethics will feel no less interest in Professor Murray's work, an attempt, as Mr. Gosse explains in a preface, to "interpret the most perfect utterance of the ripest thought" of Greece.

The main lines of the book follow the conclusion generally accepted among scholars of the modern school, while the details throughout show the fresh insight of genuine sympathy. Real light is thrown, for instance, on the character of the ancient drama by the recognition that "the power of entering vividly into the feelings of both parties in a conflict is perhaps the most characteristic gift of the Greek genius." Professor Murray himself has a strain of this imaginative many-sidedness; he can analyze with equal penetration the spirit of Herodotus, that writer of enchanting narratives, not teacher nor philosopher, but a man vividly interested in all the events and wonders of the world, a kindly-eyed judge of humanity; and of Thucydides, the tragic-hearted, clear-sighted, unflinching historian; of Euripides, the poet of questioning, the passionate sympathizer with "the two silent classes, women and slaves;" and of Aristophanes, the brilliant, audacious mocker, "using his half-knowledge and partial sympathy to improve his mocking," his one serious sentiment and admiration for the good old times. Considerations of space have restricted the treatment of philosophy. It is, no doubt, owing to this that Professor Murray has not given us his statement of Plato's idealism. Instead, we have a thoughtful study of the man's temperament and a general review of his writings from the early simple dialogues, through the brilliant versatile periods of the Phædo and the Republic down to the last work as shown in the Laws, the Sophist, and the Timæus, more and more confined to the hardest problems of metaphysics and politics. The character and position of Socrates are described with much picturesque force, and the suggestion is striking that "the most fundamental likeness between Plato and Socrates" lay in the capacity of each for intense personal love; but it could be wished that Professor Murray had given a place to the all-important Socratic search for clear conceptions as it stirred the thought of his time and led on to the system of Plato.

F. Melian Stawell.

London.

THE HISTORY OF MANKIND. By Professor Friedrich Ratzel. Translated from the second German edition by A. J. Butler, M.A. With colored plates, maps, and illustrations. Vol. II., pp. 562. London and New York: The Macmillan Company, 1897.

The first volume of this work was published a year ago, and was at that time noticed in this JOURNAL, when the general aim of the author was explained. It is not a history, but a treatise on ethnography, describing the various stocks and races of mankind, principally with reference to their conditions of culture.

This second volume is devoted to the native American or Red race and the Negro or African stocks. There is also a short chapter on "the Arctic races of the old world," by which is meant that group in Siberia and Northern Europe which some call Turanian and others Ural-altaic.

The native American tribes are divided with reference to their progress in civilization into two groups,—the wild and the civilized peoples. In Africa, the division is made between the light stocks of South and Central Africa, such as the Bushmen, Hottentots, and Dwarfs, and the True Blacks, including the Bantus of South and East Africa, the Black Hamites of the East, and the Sudanese. The last mentioned are not embraced in this volume.

In the introductory remarks to each of these divisions the author reviews the geographical environment of the stocks and describes their general physical appearance. A slight sketch of their history when known is added, and a full account of their arts, government, mode of life, and forms of religious worship. In all these branches he has availed himself of the most recent authorities, and his presentations are clear, full of instruction and free from bias. His chapters on the American Indians are the best which have appeared in a work of the kind since the epochal treatise of Waitz on the *Naturvölker* of the world.

While meriting this high praise, yet a careful reader will be aware of some deficiency in the chapters on the religious ideas and organizations of these rude peoples. The author is too exclusively occupied with the externals of worship, and does not catch, or, at least, fails to present, the psychic attitude of the primitive man towards his conceptions of the supernatural. The similarity which both author and editor point out between the myths of far distant nations is not analyzed in its bearings on the spiritual development of the race. The Totemic bond, which underlies

both the religious and civil life of so many tribes, is quite imperfectly explained; and the evolution of ethical ideas through the relation of social necessities to the strictly religious ceremonial law is not brought into the prominence its importance merits. In various passages there is still evidence of that habit of underrating the mental capacity of savages which has come down to us from the literature of the eighteenth century,—when Voltaire could assert that the study of the social conditions of barbarous tribes has no greater interest than that of a pack of wolves! Thus (p. 267) he writes that "some fragmentary ideas about the supernatural, some faded and confused traditions exhaust the evidences of mental life," in the Bushmen,—evidently unaware of the voluminous and rich collection of their myths and folk-lore, filling seventy odd manuscript volumes, obtained by the missionary Bleek.

These, however, are not serious blemishes. The work as a whole is the best on its branch in our language, and should be in all our educational and general libraries. It is printed in clear type on good paper, and the illustrations are numerous, accurate, and drawn from the most trustworthy sources.

DANIEL G. BRINTON.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA.

ESSAYS AND SPEECHES. By William Samuel Lilly, Hon. Fellow of Peterhouse, Cambridge. London: Chapman & Hall, Ld., 1897.

This is a collection of most interesting essays. No one who wishes to understand the development of the modern English mind should omit their perusal. Not, indeed, that the reader will find in them any contribution to the development of the world's thought. With all their erudition and brilliancy, they force the conviction that their writer is off the main track; but they show the working of certain fundamental ideas on a type of mind which has played, and which will play, an important part in the formation of English religious and ethical thought. That man is not merely "ein geniessendes thier," but that he is "a person endowed with true volition," is Mr. Lilly's profoundest conviction, which it may be said to be the object of this volume to establish. But though the proposition is of such unimpeachable philosophical authority, and though it is expressed (especially in the essay on "Literature and National Life") with much eloquence and power, it is unsupported by convincing argument so far as these essays go.

The essay on "Professor Green" * is typical both of Mr. Lilly's fairness to opponents and of the limitations and bias of his thought. He gives "the fundamental position of Professor Green's doctrines" for the most part in Green's own words, or in the words of Green's competent and sympathetic biographer, Dr. Nettleship; but in going on to comment upon Green's philosophical doctrines, he shows a "fundamental misconception" of idealism as such, and remarks, with an amusing air of superiority, that "Professor Green was not extensively read in philosophy. I believe I am right in saying that of the Catholic schools there is no mention in the volume before me. Of the great Oriental metaphysicians, . . . he appears to have been absolutely ignorant. His masters were Kant, Hegel, Fichte, and Lotze among the Germans, and Plato and Aristotle among the Greeks. . . . Now, if Professor Green had turned to Aquinas——." It is not easy to anticipate that the philosophers of any future age will adopt Mr. Lilly's classification of their predecessors. We might imagine them addressing to Mr. Lilly a paraphrase of Ranke's rebuke to a "strenuous divine" (quoted with much approval by Mr. Lilly†), "You are in the first place a Catholic. We are in the first place philosophers. There is a great gulf between us."

In spite, however, of the great gulf fixed between the intellectual position of Mr. Lilly and that of the great philosophers, there is that in these essays which is common to the greatest thinkers of all ages, and which marks the element of permanent value in the book. It is the "fundamental conviction" above alluded to; the conviction expressing itself finely, in the essay on "The New Spirit in History," as the belief that "the elements of civilization are chiefly moral. The main progress of mankind . . . lies in the development of the ethical idea which, existing in our nature in the form of mind, an element of human personality, has ever more and more unfolded itself in history as the vivifying principle of those ordinances and institutions whereby we live as civilized men."

MARY GILLILAND HUSBAND.

LONDON.

---

*The late Professor T. H. Green, Balliol College, Oxford.

† "You," he said, "are in the first place a Christian, I am in the first place a historian. There is a great gulf between us." Page 207.

ESSAYS. By George John Romanes, M.A., LL.D., F.R.S., Hon. Fellow of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge. Edited by C. Lloyd Morgan, Principal of University College, Bristol. London, New York, and Bombay: Longmans, Green & Co. 1897.

Of the ten essays which together form this book, eight are popular expositions of natural science. Two alone ("What is the Object of Life?" and "Recreation") concern this JOURNAL. There is so often occasion of regret when teachers of natural science make excursions into the domain of ethics, that it is pleasant to be able to say what common sense and sound moral instinct characterize these two essays. The moral philosophy of Mr. Romanes (so far as he can be said to have had one) is utilitarian, but nothing could be much better or less distinctive of any school than his conclusion in the essay, "What is the Object of Life?" "But if it is thus true," he says, "that love and thought, conscience and wonder, are the faculties most distinctive of man, it appears to me that we have an objective verification of the conclusion previously reached by subjective analysis—viz., that the object of our human life must be that of exercising these our distinctively human faculties; and that the better each one of us can succeed in doing this, the more fully is he living the life which is most distinctively the life of a man." The essay on "Recreation" is not only full of an enlightened common sense, but presents a noble ideal both of work and of play. "By recreation I mean only that which with the least expenditure of time renders the exhausted energies most fitted to resume their work; . . . recreation is necessary not only for maintaining our powers of work so far as these are dependent on our vitality, but also for maintaining our happiness so far as this is dependent on our health."

MARY GILLILAND HUSBAND.

LONDON.

VOICES OF DOUBT AND TRUST. Selected by Volney Streamer. New York: Brentano's, 1897.

The purpose of this little book is one to be highly commended. It aims to give a candid expression of the soul's search for knowledge of its origin and destiny and its relation to the universe or God. It would bring together the voices of doubt and trust, and let each speak for itself. The inclination of the editor's own opinion is suggested by the arrangement of his material. First

we have denials, doubts, and questionings; next, "Light on the Cloud;" then, "Duty Here and Now;" and finally, "Trust." The selections are in both prose and verse, the latter being more numerous and from a much wider range. Some of these have not the rarest literary merit, the editor being evidently more bent upon the substance of the message than upon its form. Every reader who is well acquainted with this range of thought will miss certain things which he values highly, more highly, possibly, than others that are given. In some cases we imagine that this is because the editor has not wished to trench on other collections of a somewhat similar character. Only in this way can we account for the omission of such a splendid thing as Alfred Lyall's "Theology in Extremis," and Fitz James Stephen's unique expression, in the form of verse, of his most characteristic thought. And why not the crowning part of Browning's "Saul"?

Other omissions might easily be named, but it would be ungracious to name them, the collection is so rich, and one finds so many of the things that have befriended him in hours of brightness or of gloom. If the object of the editor was to woo the mind up from the darkened valleys of denial and doubt to the shining table-lands of hope and trust, his labor may not prove to have been in vain; but, if it should, his book would still have a sufficient justification. For what the doubting often crave is sympathy more than illumination: that their doubts should know that other men have doubted. The majority of these poems and other selections have the accent of reality. One reason why many of us like the expression of doubt more than the expression of faith is because it often has a truer ring. But in these last days there has been quite as much affectation of doubt and denial as of faith and trust, and it is hard to say which is the more deplorable. We have found some of the most encouraging things here among the most distrustful, as, for example, Turgenev's Dialogue of the Jungfrau and the Finsteraarhorn. A world-scheme so irrational as that of this dialogue cannot be real.

JOHN W. CHADWICK.

BROOKLYN.

VOLTAIRE ET LE VOLTAIRIANISME. Par Nourrisson, Membre de l'Institut. Paris, P. Lethielleux, 1896. 8vo. Pp. 670.

Goethe is said to have called Victor Hugo's "Notre Dame de Paris" the most abominable book that ever was written. Had he

lived to read the present work he would have changed his mind. Indeed, there is no way of characterizing it but by saying that it is a cesspool into which the academic author has collected all the filthy and malodorous stories about Voltaire, his family and friends, that he could find anywhere, far or near. How any man, and especially how any man of reputed scholarship and culture, could—and in his old age, too—spend years of time in scenting out such ordure, it is impossible to conceive. Certain it is that he has made a loathsome spectacle of himself to the world, without in the least injuring the object of his spleen. To be sure, Voltaire was, in very many ways, far enough from being a saint or a hero. All the world knows that. But Voltaire did great, yea, inimitable work, in helping to dispel the thick clouds of cruel, degrading superstition that overhung Europe for centuries; and for this no one who is not in love with superstition and spiritual slavery—as our author, who apparently writes in the interest of Catholicism, seems to be—will fail to be duly grateful to him. *Auf einen groben Klotz gehört ein grober Keil.* Luther and Voltaire are the special *bêtes-noires* of fanatical Catholics, and have their memories kept green by periodical attacks from them. But these do no harm, and so need not be refuted. Indeed, no one who respects his own stomach would dream of burrowing in this pool of filth in order to find out how much of it can fairly be referred to Voltaire and his friends. There is only one encouraging thing about this book. It bears testimony to the impotent rage of superstition in the presence of ever-advancing free thought.

THOMAS DAVIDSON.

NEW YORK.

ON HUMAN NATURE: Essays (partly posthumous) in Ethics and Politics. By Arthur Schopenhauer. Selected and translated by T. Bailey Saunders, M.A. London: Swan Sonnenschien & Co. Pp. 132.

This is the seventh of the small volumes of Schopenhauer essays selected and translated by Mr. Saunders, and philosophically the most interesting. It constitutes a brief and popular exposition of the ethical doctrines originally set out in the fourth book of "The World as Will and Idea" and in the two essays on the Fundamental Problems of Ethics. The selections are drawn from the chapters on Ethics and Politics which are to be found in the Parerga and in posthumous writings. Mr. Saunders has divided the chap-

ters there found into sections of his own, and has omitted a few unimportant passages. The topics which thus come to succeed one another in the translation are as follows: Human Nature, Government, Free-will and Fatalism, Character, Instinct, and some Ethical Reflections. Of these, Human Nature and Free-Will and Fatalism have already been presented to the English reader by Mr. Belfort Bax in a volume of Schopenhauer's selections contributed to Bohn's Library. Both translations read well, but Mr. Saunders, by interpolating the chapter on Politics and adding the three later sections, has furnished a completer scheme of doctrine so far as merely ethics is concerned. Readers will now be able to see how our main ethical conceptions look in the light of Schopenhauer's distinctive ontological principle. The first section gives his formula for virtue, that it begins with sympathy, or a man's recognition of his own true being in another individual objectively presented to him; the second section defines legal right as a mere limit adventitiously set to wrong; the third expels free-will from the empirical world and gives it only a transcendental meaning; the fourth assigns, as the sole function of experience towards human character, its unmasking, not its making or unmaking; the fifth distinguishes moral impulse both from non-moral impulse and from reason. But Schopenhauer himself seems to have sometimes felt the incompleteness of his system of ethical conceptions, and students must not expect clear and consecutive deductions of them. The puzzle how to account for the diversity of human characters, secluded as they are from the play of empirical influences, and springing all from the free act of the same timeless will, is here solved by him in a strangely easy fashion. "Perhaps," he says, "some one will come after me who will throw light into this dark abyss."

J. Brough.

University College, Aberystwyth.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

Ethics: an Investigation of the Facts and Laws of the Moral Life. By Professor W. Wundt. Translated from the second German edition (1892) by Professors E. B. Titchener, Julia H. Gulliver, and Margaret F. Washburn. Vol. I. Introduction: *The Facts of the Moral Life.* Vol. II., *Ethical Systems.* London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1897.

THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS, AS BASED ON THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE. By Johann Gottlieb Fichte. Translated by A. E. Kroeger. Edited by the Hon. Dr. W. T. Harris. London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., 1897.

SOCIAL AND ETHICAL INTERPRETATIONS IN MENTAL DEVELOPMENT: A Study in Social Psychology. By J. Mark Baldwin. New York and London: Macmillan & Co., 1897.

THEORY OF THOUGHT AND KNOWLEDGE. By Borden P. Bowne. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1897.

THE PHILEBUS OF PLATO. Edited, with Introduction, Notes, and Appendices, by Robert Gregg Bury, M.A. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1897.

THE WISDOM AND RELIGION OF A GERMAN PHILOSOPHER. Being Selections from the Writings of G. W. F. Hegel. Collected and edited by Elizabeth S. Haldane. London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., 1897.

THE HISTORY OF MANKIND. By Professor Friedrich Ratzel. Translated from the second German edition by A. J. Butler, M.A. With Introduction by E. B. Tylor, D.C.L., F.R.S. With colored plates, maps, and illustrations. Volume II. (Containing Book II., D. The Americans; Book III., The Light Stocks of South and Central Africa; Book IV., The Negro Races, A. The South and East Africans.) London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1897.

EPITOME OF THE SYNTHETIC PHILOSOPHY OF HERBERT SPENCER. By F. Howard Collins. With a Preface by Herbert Spencer. Fourth edition. London: Williams & Norgate, 1897.

A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PHILOSOPHY, being the Sections relating to that subject in *The Best Books* and *The Reader's Guide*. By William Swan Sonnenschein. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1897. [Useful, but already somewhat out of date.]

SOCIALISM AND CHARACTER: a Contribution towards a System of Applied Ethics. By James Leatham. London: The Twentieth Century Press, 1897.

AN OUTLINE INTRODUCTORY TO KANT'S "CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON." By Professor R. M. Wenley. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1897. Pp. 95. [Seems to be more of the nature of an analysis to guide actual students of the "Critique" than of an introduction to it.]

CHILDREN'S WAYS. [An abridged and popularized edition of *Studies of Childhood*.] By Professor James Sully, M.A., LL.D. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1897.

RELIGIONS OF PRIMITIVE PEOPLES. By Daniel G. Brinton, A.M., M.D., LL.D., Sc.D., Professor of American Archæology and Linguistics in the University of Pennsylvania. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1897.

OUTLINES OF A PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION. Based on Psychology and History. By Auguste Sabatier. Authorized translation, by the Rev. T. A. Seed. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1897.

THE DYNAMICS OF RELIGION: an Essay in English Culture History. By M. W. Wiseman. London: The University Press, 1897.

TWO LECTURES ON THEISM. By Professor A. Seth, LL.D. Edinburgh and London: Blackwood, 1897.

A MODERN'S RELIGION. By Ignotus. London: Henry & Co., 1897.

LAZY LESSONS AND ESSAYS ON CONDUCT. [For children.] By W. B. Rands. Edited, with a Preface, by R. Brimley Johnson. London: James Bowden, 1897.

OVER-NUTRITION AND ITS SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES. By Professor Simon N. Patten, Ph.D. Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1897.

THE EASTERN QUESTION: A Reprint of Letters written 1853–1856, dealing with the Events of the Crimean War. By Karl Marx. Edited by Eleanor Marx Aveling and Edward Aveling, D.Sc. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1897.

SOCIAL SWITZERLAND. Studies of Present-Day Social Movements and Legislation in the Swiss Republic. By William Harbutt Dawson. London: Chapman & Hall, 1897.

PSYCHOLOGY: an Introductory Manual for the Use of Students. By F. Ryland, M.A. Seventh edition. Revised and largely rewritten. London: George Bell & Sons, 1897.

THE MATHEMATICAL PSYCHOLOGY OF GRATRY AND BOOLE: translated from the Language of the Higher Calculus into that of Elementary Geometry. By Mary Everest Boole. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1897.

THE HERBARTIAN PSYCHOLOGY APPLIED TO EDUCATION. Being a Series of Essays applying the Psychology of Johann Friedrich Herbart. By John Adams, M.A., B.Sc. London: Isbister & Co., 1897. [Well informed and capable, and written with a good deal of energy and vivacity.]

THE GOSPEL OF HUMANENESS. Selections from the Writings of Count Lyof N. Tolstoi. Vol. VI. of the *Vegetarian Jubilee Library*, edited by Charles W. Forward. London: The Ideal Publishing Union, 1897. [Contains "My Confession," "The Spirit of Christ's Teaching," an extract from "The Kreutzer Sonata," "A Visit to a Slaughter-House," and "Alcohol and Tobacco."]

CHILDREN UNDER THE POOR-LAW: their Education, Training, and After-care. Together with a Criticism of the Report of the Departmental Committee on Metropolitan Poor-Law Schools. By W. Chance, M.A., Trinity College, Cambridge. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1897.

THE WORKS OF GEORGE BERKELEY, D.D., Bishop of Cloyne. Edited by George Sampson. With a Biographical Introduction by the Right Hon. A. J. Balfour, M.P. Vol. I. London: G. Bell & Sons, 1897.

[Contains—"Arithmetic Demonstrated without Euclid or Algebra;" "Mathematical Miscellanies;" "An Essay towards a new Theory of Vision;" "A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge;" "Passive Obedience;" "Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous." The introductory Essay is reprinted from Balfour's *Essays and Addresses.*]

THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO. Edited, with Critical Notes and an Introduction on the Text, by James Adam, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of Emmanuel College, Cambridge. Cambridge: at the University Press, 1897. [Dedicated to Dr. Jackson. The Introduction and Notes deal exclusively with points of textual criticism.]

LA LOGIQUE DE HEGEL. Par Georges Noël, Professeur de Philosophie au lycée Lakanal. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1897.

[An exceedingly clear introduction to the general principles of Hegelianism. Can be very heartily recommended to all who are interested in the subject.]

MODERN RATIONALISM: being a Sketch of the Progress of the Rationalistic Spirit in the Nineteenth Century. By Joseph McCabe. London: Watts & Co., 1897.

CHRISTIAN INSTITUTIONS. By Alexander V. G. Allen. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1897.

THE COMING PEOPLE. By Charles F. Dole. New York and Boston: Thomas Y. Crowell & Co.

CRIME AND CRIMINALS. By J. Sanderson Christison. Chicago: W. T. Keener Company, 1897.

INEQUALITY AND PROGRESS. By George Harris. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1897.

THE GROWTH OF CHRISTIANITY. By Joseph Henry Crooker. Chicago: Western Unitarian Sunday-School Society, 1897.

VOICES OF DOUBT AND TRUST. By Volney Streamer. New York; Brentano's, 1897.

IDEALS OF LIFE; OR, THE SOUL'S WAY TO GOD. As taught in the Sacred Scriptures of Antiquity. Compiled and arranged by Alfred W. Martin. Tacoma, Washington: City Printing Co., 1897.

SONGS OF HAPPY LIFE. Compiled by Sarah J. Eddy. Providence, R. I.: Art and Nature Study Publishing Co., 1897.

EDUCATIONAL VALUE OF THE CHILDREN'S PLAYGROUNDS. A Novel Plan of Character Building. By Stoyan Vasil Tsanoff. Published for the author. Philadelphia: 1897.

METAFISICA SCIENZA E MORALITA. Studi di Filosofia Morale. Di Francesco de Sarlo. Roma: Tipografia di Giovanni Balbi, 1898. (Davidson.)

KRITISCHE GRUNDLEGUNG DER ETHIK ALS POSITIVER WISSENSCHAFT. Von Dr. med. Wilhelm Stern. Berlin: Ferd Dümmlers Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1897.

PSYCHOLOGIE ALS ERFAHRUNGSWISSENSCHAFT. Von Hans Cornelius. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1897.

DER ÄLTERE PYTHAGOREISMUS. Eine kritische Studie von Dr. Wilhelm Bauer. Bern: Steiger & Cie., 1897.

DIE ERKENNTNISTHEORIE MAIMONS IN IHREM VERHÄLTNIS ZU CARTESIUS, LEIBNITZ, HUME UND KANT. Von Dr. S. Rubin. Bern: Steiger & Cie., 1897.

DIE RECHTLICHKEIT ODER EIN POLITISCH-RECHTLICHER TRAKTAT. Von Dr. Abr. Eleutheropulos. Zurich: Verlag von Cæsar Schmidt, 1897.

DE INCARNATIONE VERBI DEI. By Rev. Alan G. Hawkesworth. Albany: Riggs Printing and Publishing Company, 1897.

ESSAI PHILOSOPHIQUE: Quel est le point de vue le plus complet du Monde? et Quels sont les principes de la Raison universelle? Par Henry Lagrésille. Paris et Nancy: Berger-Levrault & Cie., 1897.

THE AGNOSTIC ANNUAL, 1898. Edited by Charles A. Watts. London: Watts & Co., 1897. [Contains—"The Will to Believe," by Leslie Stephen; "The Progress of Liberal Thought," by C. E. Plumptre; "Liberal Orthodoxy," by Professor Goldwin Smith; "The Sources of Modern Doubt," by Joseph McCabe; "The Illusion of Progress," by Mortimer Cecil; "Is Progress an Illusion?—A Reply," by F. J. Gould," etc.]

MIND. October, 1897. London: Williams & Norgate. The October number of *Mind* contains an article by Mr. J. D. Logan on "Fixity of Character: its Ethical Interpretation" (largely with reference to the views of Professor J. Seth on "Freedom"). There is also a Discussion (in reply to Mr. Fairbrother) on "Aristotle's Explanation of ΑΚΡΑΣΙΑ," by Professor Ritchie (who also contributes a review of the new translation of Zeller's *Aristotle*. Mr. E. H. Don[illegible]uggestions on Æsthetics" may be read in connection with Professor Thcnener's review of two æsthetical works. There is also an interesting review of Professor James's *Will to Believe*, by Mr. F. C. S. Schiller. Professor Muirhead's article on "The Goal of Knowledge" is partly in criticism of Mr. Bradley and Mr. McTaggart. The most striking article, however, in this number of *Mind* is that by F. Carstanjen (translated by Mrs. Bosanquet) on "Richard Avenarius and his General Theory of Knowledge, Empirio-Criticism," the first connected account we have had of the fundamental point of view of that remarkable writer, who is just beginning to attract attention in England.

THE ECONOMIC REVIEW. Published quarterly for the Oxford University Branch of the Christian Social Union. Vol. VII., No. 4. October, 1897. London: Rivington's.

[Contains a very interesting article by Mr. Sidney Ball on "Socialism and Individualism: a Challenge and an Eirenikon," being a reply to the recent criticisms of the Master of Balliol and the authors of "Essays on Liberalism." Mr. Ball urges that Socialism ought not to be understood as the antithesis of Individualism, but rather in the sense of Social Democracy. Certainly, if the word is to continue to be used at all, it seems very desirable that we should have a clear definition of it; but it appears doubtful whether this has yet been secured. Apart from this, much of the doctrine advanced by Mr. Ball will probably meet with general assent. There are also articles on "The Workmen's Compensation Act," "Is Co-operation a Failure?" "The Agricultural Laborer: a Rejoinder," and "The Value of an Ideal."]

Books to be reviewed should be sent to one of the following addresses:
Prof. E. Boirac, 27 Rue de Berlin, Paris, France.
Prof. Fr. Jodl, 45 Porzellangasse, Vienna, Austria.
Prof. J. S. Mackenzie, Merchiston, near Cardiff, Wales.
Prof. Josiah Royce, 103 Irving Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts.